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Abstract 
This thesis consists of six chapters focusing on unconventional monetary policy and 
macroprudential policy. Chapter 1 introduces the motivation for the thesis. Chapter 2 
provides the theoretical background and literature review. The subsequent three chapters, 
chapters 3, 4, and 5, are the core chapters in the thesis. The first core chapter, chapter 3, 
examines the optimal strategic interaction between conventional and unconventional 
monetary policy. Precisely, the unconventional monetary policy considered in the study is 
the central bank credit injection or more known as quantitative easing. Using the model from 
Gertler and Karadi (2011) as the reference, the chapter investigates whether conventional 
and unconventional monetary policy should cooperate or be set independently and whether 
the two policies should be operated simultaneously or in leadership manner. The study 
measures the policy performance using an ad-hoc loss function constructed using the squared 
deviation of output, inflation, credit spread, nominal interest rate, and credit injection ratio 
from the steady state. This section demonstrates that the interaction between the two policies 
set simultaneously in cooperation with a fully optimal commitment regime delivers the best 
policy performance. The second core chapter, chapter 4, further examines optimal simple 
rules for the quantitative easing policy. This chapter generates three optimal simple rules for 
quantitative easing, namely the optimal simple rule based on lagged information (past time 
horizon), based on current information (current time horizon), and based on future 
expectation (future time horizon). The study uses the same ad-hoc loss function as in chapter 
one. This section demonstrates that policy performance from the optimal simple rule based 
on lagged information is superior to that of the current and future time horizon. Precisely, 
the optimal simple policy rule is optimally constructed by past leverage, capital price, and 
credit spread. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that higher central bank aggressiveness can 
stabilise the macroeconomy, but results in a lower policy performance. Finally, in chapter 5, 
this thesis investigates the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy 
in a macroeconomic model with credit supply shock. Precisely, the chapter measures policy 
performance when the conventional monetary policy interacts with the capital adequacy 
ratio and the loan-to-value ratio. Using the model from Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti 
(2010), and the ad-hoc loss function from Angelini, Nerri, and Panetta (2011), the study 
demonstrates that macroprudential policy promotes financial stability. Multiple policy 
instruments perform better than a single instrument, but pose a risk of conflict. The study 
also demonstrates that the substitution effect among policy instruments can occur. Finally, 
chapter 6 provides conclusions and recommendations for future research. 
Keywords: Quantitative easing, Macroprudential policy, Monetary Policy 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions 
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 is inarguably one of the most impactful crises 
in the worldwide economy. Also considered as the most severe crisis since the U.S. great 
depression, the crisis created a ripple effect that quickly brought the global economy to its 
weakest growth. The World Bank estimated that the global annual gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth during the crisis was the slowest in history since 1960, which was at -1.68% 
in 2009, as shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1-1: The World’s Annual GDP Growth 
The weakening economy in some advanced industrialised countries such as the U.S., Japan, 
and the Euro area, mainly contributed to the declining economy during the crisis. For 
instance, in 2009, the U.S. economy grew negatively by -2.53%, which was the slowest 
growth after decades. Furthermore, Japanese economy was contracting with growth at               
-5.41%, followed by the Euro area that also grew negatively by -4.50%. During the crisis, 
the U.S. Federal Reserve injected more than $2,000 billion of liquidity to financial markets 
due to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy. This activity created the largest balance sheet 
for the U.S. Federal Reserve throughout U.S. economic history. 
           Despite of the tremendous destruction on the global economy, the crisis signaled one 
crucial lesson: that macroeconomic policy frameworks and the regulations imposed on 
financial institutions at that time were not strong enough to prevent the impact of systemic 
risk from occuring. Hence, the crisis has raised awareness among policymakers regarding 
the importance of strengthening macroeconomic policy frameworks; one of them is the 
implementation of unconventional macroeconomic policies. Quantitative easing and 
 12 
macroprudential policy are two policies that have attracted much attention following the 
crisis.  
 Quantitative easing is a non-traditional monetary policy whereby the central bank 
purchases a large quantity of public or private bonds using cash. This policy usually takes 
place during a crisis and supports conventional monetary policy when the latter is less 
powerful to stimulate the economy. Conversely, macroprudential policy describes policies 
implemented to prevent a systemic crisis and to achieve financial stability. 
 This thesis examines the interaction between conventional monetary policy and 
unconventional macroeconomic policies, namely, quantitative easing policy and 
macroprudential policy. The quantitative easing policy is chosen to represent the 
unconventional monetary policy that is usually active during or after a crisis. On the other 
hand, macroprudential policy is chosen to represent a preventive policy that works before a 
crisis occurs. Hence, by presenting a preventive policy (i.e., macroprudential) and a curative 
policy (i.e., quantitative easing), we expect to deliver a comprehensive assessment of how 
these two macro policies contribute to alleviating economic distress. The research questions 
that this thesis aims to answer are as follows. First, what is the optimal strategic interaction 
between conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing policy? Second, is there an 
optimal simple rule for quantitative easing policy that the central bank can adopt during a 
financial crisis? Third, how substantial is the contribution of macroprudential policy with 
multiple instruments in stabilising the economy? This thesis will address the three research 
questions, devoting a chapter to each, as explained subsequently. 
 In the first core chapter, the thesis will address the optimal strategic interaction 
between conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing policy. Conventional 
monetary policy in this chapter is the monetary policy that relies on the short-term overnight 
interest rate as the monetary policy instrument (or also known as policy rate). On the other 
hand, the policy instrument used in quantitative easing policy is the credit injection ratio, 
which represents the fraction of credit injection from the central bank relative to the total 
credit available in the economy. The first core chapter employs the model from Gertler and 
Karadi (2011) and presents the interaction between the two policies in various strategies, 
such as whether the two policies should cooperate or be independent of each other; or 
whether the two policies should operate simultaneously or in leadership manner. 
Furthermore, the comparison of strategies is conducted based on the policy performance (or 
also called as loss value), which is calculated based on the method from Dennis (2007) and 
Dennis and Ilbas (2016). Based on the policy performance, this chapter is expected to inform 
us regarding the optimal strategic interaction between the two policies. 
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 The second core chapter further examines the interaction between conventional 
monetary policy and quantitative easing. This chapter aims to develop an optimal simple 
rule for quantitative easing that the central bank can adopt during crisis times. Moreover, the 
chapter also studies whether the central bank can sufficiently construct the simple rule using 
information from financial variables or whether the simple rule also requires additional 
information of macroeconomic variables. Finally, this chapter also examines whether the 
construction of the optimal simple quantitative easing rule is sensitive to the change of policy 
rate smoothing parameter or not. The reference model in this chapter is also the one from 
Gertler and Karadi (2011). In this chapter, the optimal simple rule is constructed based on 
the optimisation of quantitative easing policy instrument under commitment, while 
conventional monetary policy is carried out by the central bank through the implementation 
of a non-optimal simple Taylor rule, which is adopted from the model of Gertler and Karadi 
(2011). The evaluation of the optimal simple rule’s efficiency is measured based on a loss 
value, which is calculated using the method from Dennis (2004). 
 In the third core chapter, the interaction of macro policies is applied between 
conventional monetary policy and macroprudential policy. This last core chapter intends to 
measure the impact of macroprudential policy in supporting macroeconomic stabilisation. 
Also, the chapter is interested in examining whether optimising multiple macroprudential 
policy instruments is significantly better than a single instrument optimisation. If it is, then 
whether the interaction of multiple instruments can trigger a conflict or not. This chapter 
adopts the model from Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2010) as a reference. The model 
from Gerali et al. (2010) is chosen to provide an economy where the credit supply shock 
plays a role. Two prominent macroprudential policy instruments are present in the model, 
namely the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and the loan-to-value ratio (LTV).  
 The three topics presented in this thesis have widely not been examined in the current 
literature, either in the literature on quantitative easing policy or macroprudential policy. 
Hence, to our best knowledge, the topics presented in this thesis are the first or, if not, the 
first few examining quantitative easing and macroprudential policy with a unique 
perspective. Most studies of quantitative easing today have focused on the effectiveness and 
impact of this policy on the long-run economy, and have paid less attention to how the policy 
interacts with conventional monetary policy, see for example the studies by Albu, Lupu, 
Calin, and Popovici (2014); Bhattarai and Neely (2016); Chen, Filardo, He, and Zhu (2016); 
Curcuru, Kamin, Li, and Rodriguez (2018); Maggio, Kermani and Palmer (2016); Fisher, 
Ramcharan, and Yu (2015); Kapetanios, Mumtaz, Stevens, and Theodoridis (2019), among 
others.  
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 Similarly, literature exploring optimal simple rules for quantitative easing is not 
abundant. Most studies have focused on developing an optimal rule for monetary policy or 
fiscal policy. As for quantitative easing, only few studies have examined this topic, some of 
them are the studies by Cui and Sterk (2018), Sheedy (2017), Kiley (2008), and Quint and 
Rabanal (2017). However, such studies only focus on fully optimal rules rather than on 
simple rules. Finally, with regard to the literature on macroprudential policy, most literature 
focuses on cases where there is a single macroprudential instrument optimisation rather than 
multiple policy instruments, see for example the studies by Benes and Kumhof (2011), 
Christensen, Meh, and Mohran (2011), Collard, Dellas, Diba, and Loisel (2012), Beau, 
Clerc, and Mojon. (2012), Brzoza-Brzezina, Kolasa, and Makarski (2013), Ozkan and Unsal 
(2013), and Suh (2014), among others. 
 The method of measuring various scenarios based on policy performance of 
quantitative easing and various macroprudential instruments in this study offers a simple yet 
a reliable result, which gives a unique contribution to the literature on quantitative easing 
and macroprudential policy. As suggested by Martin and Milas (2012), the literature on 
quantitative easing is limited and too narrow, and hence exploration of alternative 
approaches to quantitative easing are required. Therefore, these three core chapters are 
expected to expand the literature scope of quantitative easing and macroprudential policy. 
 The thesis is outlined as follows. The first chapter motivates the thesis. The second 
chapter reviews theoretical literature. The three subsequent chapters are the core chapters, 
namely chapter three, four and five. Finally, the last chapter concludes and provides policy 
implications and recommendations for future study. The subsequent section will describe 
the structure of the three core chapters in more details. 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
1.2.1 Chapter Three: Scope and Contribution 
The primary objective of this chapter is to investigate the optimal strategic interaction 
between conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing. To our best knowledge, this 
chapter is the first study assessing the optimal strategic interaction between these two 
policies under one institution. This chapter employs the model from Gertler and Karadi 
(2011) and presents two scenarios, namely, the cooperation scenario and the independent 
scenario (non-cooperation scenario).  
 The cooperation scenario is the scenario where both conventional monetary and 
quantitative easing policies are optimised to pursue the single central bank’s objective (i.e., 
the central bank only has one objective function or loss function). Under the cooperation 
scenario, we introduce four policy regimes, namely, the fully optimal commitment regime, 
 15 
the discretionary policy regime, the simple policy rule regime, and the cooperating-
leadership regime. The fully optimal commitment regime is the case when the authority is 
committed to its chosen initial policy and never reoptimises. On the contrary, in the 
discretionary policy regime, the authority always reoptimises every period. In the simple 
policy rule regime, the authority sets policy instruments based on simple rules that are 
directly adopted from the reference model of Gertler and Karadi (2011). The simple 
monetary rule chosen is the Taylor rule, while the simple quantitative easing rule is the credit 
policy rule. Finally, the cooperating-leadership regime is the case where one policy is 
optimised before the other, but they both pursue the single objective function. 
 On the contrary, the independent scenario (or non-cooperation scenario) is the 
scenario where each policy pursues different objective functions. Precisely, each policy is 
allowed to have its own distinct objective function. That is, monetary policy aims to achieve 
inflation stability, while quantitative easing policy aims to achieve credit stability. In the 
independent scenario, we present two policy regimes: the independent-simultaneous regime 
and the independent-leadership regime. The independent-simultaneous regime is the 
situation where the central bank simultaneously optimises the conventional monetary and 
quantitative easing policies to pursue different objective functions. On the other hand, in the 
independent-leadership regime, the policies are optimised sequentially rather than 
simultaneously. 
 The independent-leadership regime consists of two cases. The first case is when 
conventional monetary policy leads the interaction and the second case is when quantitative 
easing policy leads the interaction. When monetary policy is the leader, the central bank 
optimises the nominal interest rate first, which is then followed by optimising the 
quantitative easing policy instrument. As a follower, the quantitative easing policy 
instrument is optimised based on the information of the nominal interest rate from the first 
mover. In other words, the central bank incorporates information of the nominal interest rate 
into the optimisation of quantitative easing policy instrument. On the contrary, the second 
case is the situation when quantitative easing policy is the leader and the conventional 
monetary policy is the follower. In this case, the first policy that the central bank optimises 
is quantitative easing, which later then followed by the optimisation of conventional 
monetary policy. As a follower, the nominal interest rate is optimised based on information 
of the previously optimised quantitative easing policy instrument. 
 The simulations are run in such a way that we measure the policy performance of 
each policy regime according to a specific ad-hoc loss function. The ad-hoc loss function is 
constructed based on the fluctuation of output, inflation, credit spread, nominal interest rate, 
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and credit injection ratio. Our simulations emphasise that commitment are necessary to 
achieve the optimal strategic interaction between conventional monetary and quantitative 
easing policies. That is, the best performance is achieved when the central bank is fully 
committed to all policy rules, never reoptimises, and pursues a single objective function. We 
also show that when the two policies pursue different objective functions, the leading policy 
can benefit more than the follower. However, our simulation points out that the leadership 
interaction, either cooperating or independent, performs nearly identical to that of 
discretionary policy regime, and perform much worse than the fully optimal commitment 
regime. 
 Moreover, we demonstrate that the interaction between conventional monetary 
policy and quantitative easing policy is the second-best when the central bank implements a 
non-optimal simple rule for both policies. However, the effectiveness of the simple policy 
rule regime depends on the degree of the central bank’s aggressiveness in combatting the 
crisis. We show that excessive aggressiveness can stabilise some macroeconomic variables 
detracting from overall policy performance. In most policy regimes, we find that 
conventional monetary policy is superior to quantitative easing policy. Hence, we suggest 
that quantitative easing should not replace conventional monetary policy, but it is sufficient 
to be a secondary tool of stabilisation. 
           The findings from this chapter, such as the importance of commitment in quantitative 
easing, the negative impact of the central bank’s over aggressiveness, and the superiority of 
the leading policy, contribute positively to the literature on quantitative easing policy. 
Furthermore, one of the results from this chapter, regarding the simple policy rule regime, 
also contributes to one of the raising issues in quantitative easing policy, namely, whether 
quantitative easing should be implemented in a rule like manner or using a balance sheet 
target. We follow up this finding in the second core chapter focusing on constructing an 
optimal simple rule for quantitative easing policy. Overall, the results from this chapter 
expand the scope of quantitative easing literature in general. 
1.2.2 Chapter Four: Scope and Contribution 
This chapter investigates optimal simple rules for quantitative easing policy when the central 
bank conducts conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing policy simultaneously. 
Specifically, in this chapter, we allow the central bank to only optimise credit injection ratio 
(which is the quantitative easing instrument) under commitment, while leaving the setting 
of nominal interest rate to a non-optimal simple Taylor rule. The reference model in this 
chapter is the unconventional monetary policy model from Gertler and Karadi (2011).  
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 This chapter introduces two scenarios in developing the optimal simple quantitative 
easing rule. The first scenario is when the central bank constructs its optimal simple rule 
only based on information on banking variables and the second scenario is when the central 
bank also incorporates additional information on macroeconomic variables, namely output 
and inflation. The reason for introducing these two scenarios is to understand whether 
financial variables are sufficient to produce an effective optimal simple quantitative easing 
rule or whether adding output and inflation yields a more significantly efficient optimal 
simple rule.  
 Under each scenario, three cases are provided. The first case is when the central bank 
constructs the optimal simple rule based on lagged information or past variables (i.e., past 
time horizon). The second case is when the central bank constructs its optimal simple rule 
based on current information (i.e., current time horizon), and the the third case is when the 
central bank develops its optimal simple rule based on future expectation (i.e., future time 
horizon). Finally, the simulations are conducted under two conditions, namely when the 
central bank applies the policy rate smoothing parameter and when it is not. In total, the 
simulation involves twelve different cases. 
           The simulations are run in such a way that we measure the policy performance of 
each case according to a specific ad-hoc loss function. The ad-hoc loss function in this 
chapter is constructed based on the fluctuation of output, inflation, credit spread, nominal 
interest rate, and credit injection ratio. The benchmark model in this chapter is the fully 
optimal commitment rule where the central bank constructs the optimal simple rule for 
quantitative easing based on all endogenous economic variables in the economy. In contrast, 
under the optimal simple rule, the construction of the optimal simple rule is constrained by 
some specific economic variables. 
 Our simulations demonstrate that the optimal simple rule for quantitative easing can 
approach the performance of the fully optimal commitment rule very well. The simulations 
also illustrate that incorporating information of financial variables is sufficient to construct 
an efficient optimal simple rule of quantitative easing, either when the central bank applies 
a zero or non-zero smoothing parameter on the policy rate (i.e., zero smoothing parameter). 
Across all time horizons, our simulations demonstrate that the optimal simple quantitative 
easing rule constructed based on past time endogenous variables is superior to the rules based 
on current or future variables. Our simulations also show that, in the case of our reference 
model, the optimal simple rule for quantitative easing is optimally constructed by the lagged 
deviation of credit spread, leverage, and capital price from their steady states.  
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 The banking variables chosen constructing the optimal simple rule are unchanged to 
whether the central bank smooths the policy rate or not. That is, the optimal simple rule 
remains to be optimally constructed by past period of credit spread, leverage, and capital 
price under zero or non-zero interest rate smoothing parameter. Relative to the fully optimal 
commitment rule, the optimal simple rule corresponds to less credit injection. However, this 
less credit injection consequently leads to higher fluctuations in output and credit spread 
than those under commitment. Output is the most volatile variable in the loss function. 
 Based on these findings, some recommendations stand out. First, information from 
the banking sector is crucial for the central bank when constructing the optimal simple rule 
for quantitative easing. Second, given that past information on endogenous variables is 
superior to current and future information, this means that ample access to historical data 
would give great benefit when the central bank intends to manage quantitative easing policy 
using an optimal simple rule. Third, the credit spread has the largest feedback coefficient in 
the optimal simple rule, regardless the time horizon used and the value of the interest rate 
smoothing parameter. Given that credit spread is the main variable amplifying the impact of 
financial imbalances in the banking sector, we argue that this large feedback coefficient is a 
feature to maintain credit spread’s stability and hence dampening the moral hazard behaviour 
in the banking sector. Lastly, the optimal simple quantitative easing rule using past 
information delivers policy performance that is almost as good as that for the fully optimal 
commitment rule, and while being more compact and more easily communicated to the 
public. 
 We argue that this chapter positively contributes to the literature on quantitative 
easing policy, especially to those focusing on conventionalising the unconventional 
monetary policy. The finding on this chapter, such as the well-performing of optimal simple 
rules for quantitative easing, the negative impact of the central bank’s over aggressiveness, 
and the role of exogenous shocks on the optimal simple rule, have contributed to the existing 
literature on quantitative easing. Beyond its contribution on the literature, from a practical 
perspective, this chapter also provides useful information for policymakers regarding the 
alternative structure of the optimal simple rule for quantitative easing. 
1.2.3 Chapter Five: Scope and Contribution 
This chapter examines the effectiveness of macroprudential policy with multiple instruments 
for economic stabilisation when it interacts with conventional monetary policy. 
Additionally, this chapter also examines the effectiveness of multiple macroprudential 
instruments over a single instrument optimisation, and whether optimising multiple 
macroprudential instruments triggers a conflict among the instruments or not. The idea of 
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this chapter is to compare the policy performance across all possible interactions among the 
policy instruments. The reference model in this chapter is the one from Gerali et al. (2010). 
Besides offering multiple macroprudential policy instruments that meet the need of this 
study, the model from Gerali et al. (2010) also accommodates monetary and macroprudential 
policy to interact in a model where credit supply shock plays a prominent role in the 
economy.    
 We allow the central bank to implement monetary policy according to a non-optimal 
simple monetary policy rule while at the same time optimising its macroprudential policy 
instruments under commitment. There are two types of macroprudential policy instruments 
presented, namely, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and the loan-to-value ratio (LTV). 
These ratios are two prominent macroprudential instruments suggested by the Basel 
committee from the Bank of International Settlement. Furthermore, the LTV is decomposed 
into three types of ratios: the LTV for impatient households, the LTV for entrepreneurs, and 
the joint LTV. The joint LTV ratio means that the central bank equalises the log linearised 
of one LTV to that of the other LTV ratio. 
           The simulations in this chapter consist of three scenarios. The first scenario is the 
benchmark scenario, which is the case when the central bank only operates the conventional 
monetary policy and treats all macroprudential policy instruments as constants. In other 
words, this benchmark model reflects a situation where macroprudential policy is not active 
in the economy. The second scenario is when the central bank optimises only one 
macroprudential policy instrument. In this scenario, we measure policy performance when 
the central bank only implements a single macroprudential policy instrument, covering 
CAR, LTV for households, LTV for entrepreneurs, and the joint LTV ratio. Thus, there will 
be four cases in the second scenario where each case represents one macroprudential policy 
instrument. The third scenario is when the central bank optimises more than one 
macroprudential policy instrument. In this scenario, we test a situation where the central 
bank optimises all possible interactions among the macroprudential policy instruments. 
Finally, we measure the unconditional variances of the variables constructing the loss 
function. 
 The simulation are run in such a way that we measure the policy performance of each 
case under a specific ad-hoc loss function. The ad-hoc loss function is constructed using the 
fluctuations of output, inflation, loan-to-output ratio, nominal interest rate, and 
macroprudential policy instrument being optimised. Our simulations argue some important 
findings. First, we show that macroprudential policy can benefit the economy significantly 
more than when the central bank only relies on conventional monetary policy (i.e., when all 
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macroprudential instruments are not active). The ability of macroprudential policy to achieve 
financial stability is the main reason behind the benefit. That is, we found that the presence 
of macroprudential policy can significantly stabilise the variation of loan-to-output ratio. 
Second, although a mutual benefit from interacting multiple macroprudential policy 
instruments is seen, the interaction can also trigger conflict among the instruments 
themselves. The conflict manifests in the way that the interaction can benefit some policy 
instruments but also attenuate the efficacy of another policy instrument. 
           Third, our simulations also demonstrate that there is a substitution effect between the 
macroprudential policy instruments. This substitution effect is seen in a way that the 
presence of one instrument can help stabilise the variation of another instrument, but at the 
cost of higher fluctuation of the instrument itself. For this model, we show that optimising 
CAR and the joint LTV ratio can deliver the best policy performance, but it gives a negative 
impact on inflation stability. Therefore, we argue that the central bank should not operate 
this policy. In contrast, the case when the central bank optimises CAR and the separate LTV 
ratios gives a second-best policy performance but it promotes inflation stability, which 
suggests that the implementation of this policy does not trigger a conflict with monetary 
policy. Hence, we establish that optimising CAR and the two LTV ratios simultaneously is 
the best scenario that the central bank can implement in our reference model.  
 Fourth, across all simulations, this chapter shows that that LTV is superior to CAR. 
The superiority of the LTV ratio to CAR is understood, as the mortgage market and housing 
prices dominate banking activity in our reference model. Finally, among all variables in the 
loss function, the loan-to-output ratio is the variable that contributes most significantly to 
the improvement in policy performance. This result indicates that macroprudential policy is 
useful to achieve financial stability by significantly minimising the fluctuation of the loan-
to-output ratio. This finding is consistent with the recommendation from the Basel 
committee which suggests the central bank to employ macroprudential policy to stabilise the 
debt-to-GDP ratio.  
 The findings on this chapter, such as the positive impact of macroprudential policy 
through financial stability and effectiveness of various macroprudential policy instruments, 
contributes to the literature on macroprudential policy. This contribution is useful because 
relatively few studies have looked at optimising multiple macroprudential policy 
instruments. Furthermore, the study also gives a  contribution by presenting a trade-off 
situation under multiple policy instruments’ optimisation that most studies in 
macroprudential policy area have overlooked.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2 LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGICAL REVIEW 
 
 
Abstract 
The central purpose of this thesis is to explore the role of unconventional monetary and 
macroprudential policies that could be implemented to combat an economic crisis, 
particularly regarding their interaction with the conventional monetary policy. The three 
topics presented concern with the interaction between conventional monetary policy and 
quantitative easing policy, the optimal simple rule for quantitative easing policy, and the 
interaction between conventional monetary policy and macroprudential policy. In 
investigating these topics, this chapter provides conceptual theories to support the thesis. 
This chapter consists of three parts The three parts focus on the assessment of conventional 
monetary policy, quantitative easing policy, and macroprudential policy.  
 
Keywords: Unconventional monetary policy, Quantitative easing, Macroprudential policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The terms quantitative easing and macroprudential policy have become increasingly popular 
after the subprime mortgage crisis that occurred in 2008. Quantitative easing was first 
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implemented in Japan during the asset price crisis of 2001, which dragged the country into 
a state of long-term deflationary pressure. At the time, the government of Japan injected 
billions of dollars into the country’s financial and real sectors with the hope of accelerating 
the national economy. Although the policy yielded temporary successful results, it did not 
ultimately help the country resolve the long-term deflation in subsequent decades. However, 
the strategy of liquidity injection remains in use. Even today, the Japanese government 
adopts the Abenomics approach to inject a massive level of quantitative easing into the 
economy to stimulate inflation.  
 A similar turn of events also occured in the U.S. when the country was combating 
the subprime mortgage financial crisis in 2008. Differently from the Japanese case, the 
quantitative easing from the U.S. Federal Reserve specifically aimed to purchase mortgage-
backed securities (MBS). In November 2008, the Federal Reserve initialised its asset 
purchase program with a plan to buy $100 billion in government-sponsored enterprise debt 
(GSE) and $500 billion in MBS. Not very long after this, the U.S. Federal Reserve continued 
purchasing assets totalling $750 billion in MBS, $100 billion in GSE debt, and $300 billion 
in long-term Treasury securities. In total, this $1,725 billion is known as the first program 
of quantitative easing (QE1), which increased the U.S. monetary base by three times and 
expanded the Federal Reserve balance sheet significantly. 
 The second and third quantitative easing programs were implemented after the 
Federal Reserve and Congress found that no significant improvement had been achieved 
from the first instance of quantitative easing. The labour market remained sluggish, and 
inflation had gone down. In November 2010, the authority injected an additional $600 billion 
through the second program of quantitative easing (QE2), intending to further accelerate the 
economy and stabilise inflation. Furthermore, before going into the third program of 
quantitative easing (QE3), the Federal Reserve also implemented the operation called the 
maturity extension program (MEP) and the reinvestment policy. The MEP aimed to reduce 
the long-term interest rate relative to the short-term interest rate. Through this program, the 
Federal Reserve spent another $400 billion to purchase long-term assets, which then 
expanded its balance sheet by $267 billion of asset purchases in June 2012. Finally, the third 
program of quantitative easing (QE3) was implemented in September 2012. Through QE3, 
the Federal Reserve purchased $40 billion in MBS per month, as long as the labour market 
remained sluggish. 
 The crises experienced in Japan and the U.S. indicate that quantitative easing is 
different from conventional monetary policy. The former is usually implemented when the 
economy is under distress, not in normal situations. Hence, this policy is not a preventive 
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tool but rather works as a curative policy that is activated after a state of distress is confirmed. 
Furthermore, quantitative easing is not a one-time policy. That is, the authorities need to 
observe the market’s reaction every time a liquidity injection is performed and top up 
additional injection when the target is not achieved. The size of the injection in quantitative 
easing is crucial since it involves an enormous amount of liquidity that can change the 
monetary base substantially and impose a long-term impact on the economy. Most studies 
in the area of quantitative easing use various econometric models to focus on this impact, 
particularly regarding the effectiveness of the policy and its potential impact on the 
economy. Unfortunately, studies focusing on the strategic interaction between the traditional 
monetary policy and quantitative easing policy are not abundant, as will be discussed later.  
 Another policy that is a central point of this chapter is macroprudential policy. The 
term macroprudential policy was recognised in 1986 in the Euro-currency standing 
committee report released by the Bank of International Settlement (BIS), and the policy has 
gained massive popularity since the global financial crisis of 2008. The report defines 
macroprudential policy as a policy that promotes the safety and soundness of the broad 
financial system and payment mechanisms (World Bank, 2014). Different from the 
quantitative easing policy, which is implemented during a crisis, macroprudential policy is 
embedded in the financial system with intention to reduce the impact of systemic crises. 
Macroprudential policy is a new and growing type of policy relative to other existing 
stabilisation policies, such as monetary or fiscal policy. Also, unlike monetary policy, which 
already has a well-established policy instrument and intermediate objective, macroprudential 
policy has no consensus regarding the best policy instrument to use. This unclarity has led 
studies in this field to introduce various types of policy instruments, as will be shown later.  
 This chapter provides the theoretical background of the quantitative easing policy 
and macroprudential policy. Overall, this chapter consists of five parts. The first part presents 
the conceptual theory of conventional monetary policy. The two subsequent parts explains 
the conceptual theories of quantitative easing policy and macroprudential policy. 
2.2 Conventional Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy is a macroeconomic policy that aims to manage the amount of money 
circulated in the economy. The monetary authority, which is usually mandated to the central 
bank, has a role in operating monetary policy by managing the monetary policy instrument 
to change the monetary base in the economy. In general, monetary policy is primarily used 
to maintain price stability. However, besides for price stability, central banks in some 
countries also use monetary policy for other purposes. For instance, the U.S. Federal Reserve 
also use monetary policy to simultaneously achieve low unemployment and price stability. 
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Other examples of alternative objectives are interest rate stability, foreign exchange market 
stability, economic growth, and financial market stability. The general mechanism of 
conventional monetary policy is described in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2-1: Monetary Policy Mechanism (Source: Hubbard and O'Brien, 2012) 
 In executing the policy, the central bank uses various policy tools, such as open-
market operations, discount policy, and reserve requirement. Policy tool is the only part of 
the policy that the central bank can fully control. For instance, through open market 
operation, which is one kind of policy tools, the central bank purchases and sells government 
bonds to operate the expansionary or contractionary monetary policy. The central bank then 
uses the policy tools to achieve its intermediate targets. The intermediate targets are typically 
monetary aggregates or interest rates. However, the central bank is restricted to influencing 
the intermediate target indirectly because it is also affected by private sector-economic 
decisions. Hence, the central bank usually sets up another measure, known as a policy 
instrument, to bridge the policy tools and the intermediate goal. In operating conventional 
monetary policy, most major central banks use the short-term overnight interest rate as a 
policy instrument.  
 There are two types of monetary policy – namely, expansionary monetary policy and 
contractionary monetary policy. An expansionary monetary policy aims to expand the 
monetary base of an economy. The central bank commonly reduces the short-term interest 
rate or purchases government bonds to introduce more liquidity into the banking sector. This 
increase in available liquidity in the banking sector provides more room for banks to increase 
their assets, particularly through credit intermediation. Subsequently, a greater availability 
of credit in the economy is expected to make loans more affordable, thus stimulating growth 
in the real sector. However, an expansionary monetary policy can create an inflationary gap 
in the economy. On the contrary, a contractionary monetary policy aims to reduce or shrink 
the monetary base in the economy. The central bank implements a contractionary monetary 
policy when the economy is accelerating too quickly (or overheating). The authorities then 
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increase the short-term interest rate and sell government bonds to reduce the monetary base, 
which, subsequently, is expected to pull money into the banking sector, increase the cost of 
borrowing, and eventually cool down the overheated economy. 
 Based on the instruments used, monetary policy can be divided into two types: 
conventional monetary policy and unconventional monetary policy. Conventional monetary 
policy is the operation of monetary policy under normal condition (i.e., a situation in which 
the short-term interest rate is still influential in driving the overnight lending and borrowing 
transactions between banks). On the other hand, unconventional monetary policy is the 
operation of monetary policy when the short-term interest rate functions worse than normal 
to stimulate banking activity. The short-term interest rate in this situation is usually very low 
or approaching zero. This section focuses on the conventional monetary policy, while the 
unconventional monetary policy will be explained in the following part.  
2.2.1 Conventional Monetary Policy Tools 
There are at least three conventional monetary policy tools that the central bank utilises - 
namely, open market operations, discount rate, and reserve requirement. 
• Open Market Operation 
Open market operation is the monetary policy tool by which the central bank manages its 
monetary base by purchasing and selling government bonds. This type of operation only 
works only in the country where its market of bonds/securities has developed. Through this 
operation, the central bank purchases government bonds from primary dealers when it 
wishes to lower the policy rate. The primary dealers consist of commercial banks, investment 
banks, and securities dealers. Hence, by purchasing government bonds from the market, the 
central bank supplies money in circulation, increases the monetary base, and lowers the 
policy rate. For instance, suppose the central bank intends to purchase $10 million worth of 
government bonds from a commercial (Bank A). In this case, Bank A will transfer the 
ownership of the bonds to the central bank, and, in return, the central bank will deposit $10 
million into the account of Bank A in the central bank. A similar procedure is applied when 
the central bank intends to achieve a higher policy rate, in which case it needs to sell 
government bonds to the primary dealers. 
 
 
• Discount Rate 
Discount rate is another monetary policy instrument that the central bank implements to 
affect the monetary base in the economy. The discount rate is simply a charge for the loans 
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that commercial banks have in the central bank through a scheme known as the discount 
window. Discount rate is also known as the base rate or repo rate. Through the discount 
window, the central bank allows eligible institutions to borrow money on a short-term basis 
to satisfy their reserve requirement in the central bank. This borrowing is usually done to 
offset temporary liquidity shortages. Subsequently, commercial banks can also use the loan 
for other purposes, such as for asset purchases or credit expansion. Hence, by changing the 
discount rate, the central bank can incentivise or disincentivise commercial banks from 
borrowing. This change of banks’ preference towards central bank loans affects the 
monetary base in the economy. However, the discount rate’s impact is smaller than that of 
open market operation because the central bank cannot fully control the banks’s preferences 
to borrow loans. This case is different from the open market operation, through which the 
central bank has full control of the purchase or sale of government bonds at any given price 
to achieve its targeted interest rate. 
• Reserve Requirement 
Another instrument that the central bank uses to manage monetary policy is the reserve 
requirement. The reserve requirement is defined as the minimum amount of cash or cash 
equivalents that banks must deposit either in the central bank or in the commercial bank 
itself that cannot be used for lending or investing. This reserve requirement is computed as 
a percentage of deposits. Besides functioning as an instrument at the central bank’s disposal 
for monetary policy management, the reserve requirement also works as a safeguard against 
unexpected withdrawals, such as bank runs. When the central bank decides to increase the 
reserve requirement ratio, commercial banks need to save more deposits in the central bank, 
which makes them less able to channel loans into the economy.  
Hence, a higher reserve requirement corresponds with a contractionary monetary policy. 
Similarly, when the central bank decides to lower the reserve requirement ratio, commercial 
banks will have excess money, which they can use to expand their assets. However, similar 
to discount rate, the impact of the reserve requirement is less potent than open market 
operation. Also, the central bank prefers open market operation to this ratio, as the latter 
tends to affect the banks’ business planning. 
2.2.2 Policy Instruments 
Policy instruments are a measure that the central bank employs to link policy tools to its 
intermediate targets. Policy instruments are necessary to translate policy tools into an 
achievable standard because the central bank is unable to control its intermediate targets. In 
general, most central banks use the short-term interest rate as a policy instrument. The short-
term interest rate used by the central bank is the short-term nominal interest rate, which is 
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the interest rate used between banks to lend and borrow money overnight for cash flow 
purposes. This nominal short-term interest rate is also generally known as the policy rate. 
Some countries also recognise this policy rate as the cash rate or cash rate official.  
 The central bank determines the policy rate based on its assessment of the current 
macroeconomic situation. Based on its evaluation, the central bank then conducts a high-
level committee meeting to decide whether to cut or raise the current policy rate. In the U.S., 
this high-level meeting is known as the Federal Open Market Committee (FMOC) meeting. 
Once the decision is made, the central bank implements the instrument to achieve the desired 
level of policy rate. This is usually done through open market operation. However, policy 
rate is not the only policy instrument available. Reserve aggregates are another type of policy 
instrument. The central bank can formulate or choose a new policy instrument to link its 
policy tools to its intermediate targets based on several criteria. For example, the U.S. 
Federal Reserve has three criteria that it considers when determining what policy instruments 
should be used – specifically, the policy instrument must be measurable, controllable, and 
predictable.  
2.2.3 Intermediate Targets 
This subsection explains about intermediate targets in monetary policy. Although 
intermediate target is not directly related with the content of this research, this subsection is 
presented for the sake of completeness in conventional monetary theory under this chapter. 
Intermediate targets (or also known as nominal anchors) for monetary policy are considered 
a single variable that the central bank uses to lead expectations of private agents regarding 
the nominal price level or its path or about what the Bank might do with respect to achieving 
that path (Krugman, 2003). There are at least three types of nominal anchors that most central 
banks implement in their monetary policy: monetary aggregate targeting, price-based 
targeting, and exchange rate targeting. 
• Monetary Aggregate Targeting 
When the central bank employs a quantity-based nominal anchor, it usually targets the level 
of monetary aggregates in the economy. The target market variable for this type of nominal 
anchor is the growth of the money supply. This type of nominal anchor gained attention 
during the 1960s and 1970s when researchers and policymakers viewed nominal aggregates 
and inflation rate are as being connected. The U.S. Federal Reserve then accommodated this 
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view by defining money M1 through M5.1 This type of nominal anchor was popular during 
the 1970s.   
 However, targeting the money supply growth rate was later considered a weak 
strategy, as economists came to believe that there was no link between monetary aggregates 
and inflation. For instance, in the mid-1970s, econometrics estimates of M1 money demand 
relationships began to break down. This was true not only for inflation, but the stable 
relationship between monetary aggregates with other nominal variables was also questioned 
– which is called as “the case of missing money.” In the U.S., the missing link between 
monetary aggregates and inflation occurred because of financial innovation, deregulation, 
and other factors that led to recurrent instability in the relationship between various monetary 
aggregates and other nominal variables (Bernanke, 2006). Similarly, Hubbard and Obrien 
(2012) explain that most economists believe that the breakdown occurs because the nature 
of M1 and M2 changed after 1980 due to financial innovations. For instance, the automated 
transfer of saving accounts has moved checkable deposit balances into higher-interest 
certificates of deposit each night and then back into checkable deposits in the morning.  
• The Price Based Targeting 
The second type of nominal anchor is known as the price-based nominal anchor. There are 
two variables within this type of nominal anchor: inflation and price-level targeting. With 
inflation targeting, the central bank considers the particular rate of change in the consumer 
price index (CPI). Contrarily, with price-level targeting, the central bank focuses on a 
specific level of CPI. Through this type of targeting, the central bank explicitly announces 
its inflation target to the public. Subsequently, the public and government observe the 
performance of the central bank at the end of the period when the actual amount of inflation 
is released. If the government and public believe that the central bank will commit to 
achieving inflation at the announced inflation target, they will adjust their expectation for 
future prices and will eventually bring inflation to the central bank’s target level. In that 
circumstance, the central bank is seen as credible. However, when the central bank is not 
seen as credible, the government and public will not adjust their expectations.  
 Proponents of inflation targeting believe that inflation targeting can promote the 
accountability and credibility of the central bank, hence, helps improve the effectiveness of 
the monetary policy. In contrast, opponents of inflation targeting argue that rigid numerical 
inflation targets can cause the central bank to be relatively inflexible in its pursuit of other 
 
1 M1 is currency and demand deposits at commercial banks. M2 was M1 plus commercial bank savings and 
small time deposits, and M3 was M2 plus deposits at mutual savings banks, savings and loans, and credit 
unions. M4 was M2 plus large time deposits. M5 was M3 plus large time deposits (Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, 1976).  
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goals besides those related to inflation. However, currently, inflation targeting is the most 
widely adopted nominal anchor. New Zealand was the first country to implement this 
nominal anchor, followed by other countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, India, 
and South Africa.  
• Exchange Rate Targeting 
The last common type of intermediate targeting is exchange rate targeting. Under this 
nominal anchor, the central bank attempts to fix the nominal exchange rate at a certain level 
based on an anchor nation. The choice of anchor nation depends on based on trade 
relationship, openness, capital mobility, and other economic factors. There are various types 
of exchange rate targeting,  such as a system of fiat fixed rates, a system of fixed 
convertibility, a system of fixed exchange rates, and dollarisation.  
 Under a system of fiat fixed rates, once the authority declares a fixed exchange rate, 
the determination of the exchange rate is based on the interactions between various economic 
activities, such as international trade or capital control. Hence, under this system, the 
authority does not actively intervene with the exchange rate. On the contrary, in a system of 
fixed convertibility, the authority is actively involved in the intervention of the exchange 
rate. The authority, which is usually the central bank, sets a fixed band within which the 
central bank will intervene to ensure that the exchange rate fluctuates within the band.  
 In a system in which the exchange rate is fixed, the authority will peg the local 
currency to the currency of the anchor country (thus, this currency is known as the anchor 
currency). The anchor country is usually chosen based on its trade and economic relationship 
with the country implementing the exchange rate targeting strategy. In this system, every 
unit of local currency is backed by a unit of foreign currency. The country that implements 
this targeting used usually has the sufficient foreign reserves. Finally, the dollarisation 
implies that the local economy can freely use a foreign currency (usually the U.S. dollar), 
together with the local currency. This targeting is usually implemented when people have 
lost faith in the local currency.  
2.2.4 Transmission Channel of Monetary Policy 
The transmission channel of monetary policy is the process that links the intermediate targets 
to the monetary policy goals. This transmission channel explains how the economy is 
affected after the central bank implements the monetary policy. In general, the transmission 
channel of monetary policy consists of two stages. The first stage has to do with the impact 
of policy rate on other interest rates in the economy. The second stage of the transmission 
relates to how the interest rates subsequently affect other economic variables, such as output, 
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inflation, and unemployment. Among others, the following points explain five types of 
transmission channels that connect monetary policy to real economic variables. 
• Saving and Investment Channel 
Through the saving and investment channel, the change in interest rates can influence the 
behaviour of households and investors through intertemporal effects. For instance, suppose 
the central bank raises the policy rate, which is then followed by a rise in the lending rate. 
The higher lending rate increases the cost of borrowing, hence, disincentivises households 
from demanding loans and encourages them to save. This saving decision will reduce their 
consumption spending and, thus, decelerate economic growth. In contrast, when the central 
bank lowers the policy rate and forces the lending rate downward, the cost of borrowing 
today becomes cheaper and encourages investors to borrow from banks. This pattern then 
drives investment and increases economic growth.  
• Cash Flow Channel 
The cash flow channel explains how changes in interest rates affect the spending decisions 
of households and businesses. For instance, under an accommodative monetary policy, 
lowering interest rates can reduce the interest on debt and also the interest received from 
deposits. This lower interest rate then affects the amount of cash flow that households intend 
to spend on consumption. 
• Asset Prices Channel 
Lower interest rates can drive up asset prices, which then stimulate demands for assets. This 
process happens because lower interest rates increase the present discounted value of the 
assets’ future income flows. Hence, by purchasing more assets, households receive more 
wealth. Furthermore, through the wealth effect, households tend to increase their 
consumption spending. Also, the reduction in interest rates can increase collateral value, 
which subsequently expands borrowing capacity. Thus, in the end, banks can provide more 
loans and eventually stimulate economic growth. 
• Exchange Rate Channel 
Lower interest rates decrease the return on assets and disincentivise investors from 
purchasing them. Investors can sell their assets and reallocate the money in the local currency 
to buy other assets in foreign currency. Thus, a lower interest rate can decrease the demand 
for local currency and, thus, depreciates the local currency. Local currency depreciation 
makes local products more competitive in foreign countries but causes international products 
in the local market to be more expensive. This situation can lead to an increase in exports 
and a decrease in imports, thus increasing the net exports, and bolstering GDP growth. 
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• Inflation Expectation 
A low interest rate is an indicator of an expansionary monetary policy. At this rate, through 
the expectation channel, the public can assume that the central bank tends to expand the 
economy and will create an inflationary gap in the future. With rising inflation expectations, 
firms will adjust prices so that they increase. Higher prices then generate profitability for 
firms and stimulate economic growth. Similarly, lower interest rates cause households to 
expect higher inflation in the future, which leads them to increase their consumption 
spending before the prices rise. This activity eventually stimulates economic growth. 
2.3 Quantitative Easing 
Conventional monetary policy works through a policy instrument that affects the interest 
rate and eventually affects the economy via various channels. These channels include the 
saving and investment channel, the cash flow channel, the asset prices channel, the exchange 
rate channel, and the inflation expectation channel. However, there is no guarantee that all 
these channels will always work. For instance, during the global financial crisis, the efficacy 
of monetary policy in influencing banking activity diminished significantly. When monetary 
policy is either weak, ineffective, or poorly functioning, the unconventional monetary policy 
has been used to purchase a significant scale of assets in the financial market. This activity 
is widely known as quantitative easing. This process is considered unconventional because 
it is used when monetary policy is less effective than usual.  
 Quantitative easing policy is the purchase of a large amount of private or public 
securities beyond the level required in return for liquidity injection. This policy intends to 
keep the short-term interest rate extremely low. This policy was started at a large scale in 
Japan in 2001-2006 and was later adopted by other central banks such as the U.S. Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of England, during economic crises. Woodford (2012) explains that 
there is a linkage between the monetary base and aggregate expenditure.  In his paper, 
Woodford (2012) illustrates the pure quantitative theory explaining that the increase in the 
monetary base – that  entirely under control of the central bank – should be able to stimulate 
aggregate expenditure regardless of the change in overnight interest rates. The quantitative 
easing policy changes the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet; hence, it is also 
called the central bank balance sheet policy. By receiving a liquidity injection, private banks 
can resume their business activities – especially those conducted to expand credit to 
customers – and eventually stimulates economic growth.  
 A quantitative easing policy can also be related to fiscal policy (i.e., when 
quantitative easing purchases government securities instead of private securities). This 
policy can also have an expansionary fiscal policy effect, as the government can use the 
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resultant liquidity to stimulate real growth. A quantitative easing policy is different from 
open market operations, as the latter is constrained by the policy instrument used (usually 
policy rate), while the former is intended to trigger economic growth. The quantitative easing 
policy also influences the economy by changing the monetary base, and this occurs at a level 
that is much more significant than is the case with  open market operations. Hence, the basic 
mechanism of quantitative easing policy is basically similar to that of the conventional 
monetary policy, as described in Figure 2.1. The difference is that the quantitative easing 
policy does not recognise policy rate as the policy instrument. 
2.3.1 Transmission Mechanism of Quantitative Easing 
Bowdler and Radia (2012) describe three main channels that explain the mechanism of the 
quantitative easing policy in relation to the real economy. These channels are the portfolio 
rebalancing channel, the liquidity channel, and the policy signalling channel. These three 
channels will affect the real economy – specifically, economic  output, and inflation – 
through  asset prices. Figure 2.2 describes this mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Portfolio Rebalancing Channel 
This channel works based on two theories: the preferred habitat theory and the portfolio 
balance theory. The preferred habitat theory explains that the financial market participants 
basically have preferences regarding the maturity of assets. The portfolio balance theory 
asserts that assets of different maturities are imperfect substitutes because of frictions that 
inhibit arbitrage across maturities (Williamson, 2017). Based on these two theories, through 
this channel, private banks rebalance their investment portfolios due to the number of large 
asset purchases from the central bank. Specifically, when the central bank purchases long-
term securities from private banks, private banks are encouraged to replace the purchased 
securities with other assets that offer higher returns while retaining or reducing their portfolio 
risk.  
Asset 
purchases 
Policy 
signaling 
Portfolio 
rebalancing 
Liquidity 
Asset prices 
Total wealth 
Cost of 
borrowing 
Output and 
inflation 
Figure 2-2: Transmission Mechanism of Unconventional Monetary Policy (Source: Bowdler and Radia, 2012) 
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 However, Peersman (2014) argues that the effectiveness of the portfolio rebalancing 
depends on the substitutability of assets and the extent to which changes in the relative 
supply of specific assets impact absolute and relative returns. For instance, if the assets 
purchased by the central bank and the assets available in the market are perfect substitute, 
investors will sell their holdings and rebalance their portfolios via assets from the central 
bank. This transaction will not have any impact on the overall economy, but the central 
bank’s balance sheet will have expanded dramatically. Even worse, this situation can lead 
the economy into a liquidity trap. 
 However, a more significant impact on the broader economy can be seen when the 
assets available in the market (including those sold by the central banks) and the assets 
purchased by the central bank are imperfect substitutes. That is, when the central bank 
purchases a large number of securities from private banks, the private banks will rebalance 
their portfolios by purchasing other assets that are better substitute for the sold ones. This 
happens because there is an unmet risk appetite, which is then balanced by the increasing 
demand for riskier assets (Lim and Mohapatra, 2016). When private banks receive liquidity 
in return for the purchased assets, the exchange process rebalances the financial institutions’ 
portfolio such that they can shift the liquidity to higher-risk assets that give more returns 
(e.g., loans). Hence, the conversion from liquidity to loans can increase investment and 
consumption and can stimulate the economy (Fernandez, Bortz, and Zeolla, 2018; Vayanos 
and Vila, 2009). Besides using loans, private banks can also use the liquidity to purchase 
other assets with the same portfolio duration. For instance, a pension fund or insurance 
company might prefer long-term securities - such as corporate bonds - to money or short-
term securities. This raises the prices and reduces the yields of these other assets, which then 
stimulates aggregate demand (Peersman, 2014).  
• Signalling Channel 
Another transmission mechanism of the quantitative easing policy is the signalling channel. 
The idea behind the signalling channel is based on the signalling theory, which states that 
committing to future monetary policy can affect economic outcomes in the present and that 
quantitative easing is one way to express this commitment (Williamson, 2017). The 
signalling channel works through the public expectation for future economic policy when 
the central bank commits to purchasing significant assets. That is, large-scale asset purchases 
represent a credible commitment to keep the short-term interest rate low during the recovery 
process from an  economic crisis (Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013; Clouse et al., 2003). Such a 
signaling channel can reduce yields by lowering the average expected short-rate component 
of long-term rates (Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013; Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Joyce et 
 34 
al., 2011). A quantitative easing is usually invoked when a conventional monetary policy is 
not functioning well (i.e., when the short-term interest rate is near zero). As such, Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2003) argue that one key action to dealing with such a situation is for the 
central bank to credibly manage public expectations. An essential precondition for this 
action is for the central bank to clearly understand the kind of history-dependent behaviour 
to which it should be seen to be committed so that it can communicate and act consistently 
with the principles that it wishes the private sector to understand (Eggertsson and Woodford, 
2003).  
 Several studies demonstrate the important role that signalling plays in the 
quantitative easing program. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) argue that 
signalling is an essential channel of quantitative easing during a subprime mortgage crisis. 
Hendrickson and Beckworth (2013) are also in favour of the signaling effect, arguing that it 
can improve household and business sentiments by diminishing concerns regarding 
deflationary pressure in the future. Similarly, Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) also state 
that signalling is an important communication strategy for the central bank during the 
massive asset purchase program. However, Christine and Rudebusch suggest that the 
contribution impact between the portfolio rebalancing channel and the signalling channel 
hinges on the forward guidance strategy pursued by the central bank.  
 However, a study by Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) shows that during the subprime 
mortgage crisis, the signalling effect is substantial only in the first program of quantitative 
easing (QE1), but then its impact diminishes for subsequent injections. The impact 
diminishes because the public expects the low policy rate in the upcoming future time 
horizon. Nevertheless, the role of signalling in channeling the quantitative easing policy to 
the real economy remains essential. The signaling channel provides a confidence effect to 
bolster investment activity (Lim and Mohapatra, 2016). However, asset purchases seem to 
change purchasers’ expectations about future policies if the purchasers are rationally related 
to the future policy that they are intended to signal (Woodford, 2012).  
• Liquidity Channel 
The final transmission channel for quantitative easing is the liquidity channel (Gagnon et al., 
2011; Joyce et al., 2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011). The liquidity channel 
works based on the liquidity risk premium. The idea behind the liquidity channel is that 
quantitative easing can compress the liquidity premium on multiple assets (Garabedian, 
2018). When financial markets are incomplete or segmented, central banks can influence 
term, risk, and liquidity premiums by altering the relative supply of securities (Peersman, 
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2014). The liquidity risk premium is an additional return that investors demand in addition 
to illiquid assets. An asset is known to be illiquid when its liquidity premium is high.  
 Gagnon et al. (2011) describe that the liquidity channel is crucial during the early 
stages of quantitative easing during a subprime mortgage crisis. At that time, the agency-
related assets were mostly illiquid and extensively widened the yields gap between the assets 
relative to treasury securities. A high liquidity premium also reflects the degree of trust 
between investors over their traded assets. Hence, by purchasing a significant amount of 
assets in the market through quantitative easing, the central bank can increase the amount of 
liquidity in the market, rebuild trust among investors, and gradually lower the liquidity 
premium. Garabedian (2018) argues that a decline in the liquidity premium results in a 
decline in borrowing costs and drives up the overall credit intermediation of investors.  
2.4 Macroprudential Policy 
The term macroprudential policy was recognised in 1986 in a BIS Euro-currency Standing 
Committee Report, though the policy did not gain massive popularity until the global 
financial crisis of 2008. The report defines macroprudential policy as a policy that promotes 
the safety and soundness of the overall financial system and payment mechanism (World 
Bank, 2014). Macroprudential policy aims to improve stability, which is defined as the 
robustness of the financial system from exogenous or endogenous shocks resulting from 
personal financial distress (Allen and Wood, 2006; Schinasi, 2004; Borio and Drehman, 
2009a). The BIS and the International Monetary Funds (as cited in Zhang, 2015) 
characterised macroprudential policy as a policy that restricts systemic financial risk and 
prevents critical economic disruption by increasing the funding costs of firms. 
Furthermore, Crockett (2000) argues that the focus of macroprudential policy is the 
whole financial system and its aim to minimise macroeconomic costs and financial distress. 
The primary functions of macroprudential policy are to manage financial risk, suppress 
measured risks related to economic booms, and increase measured risks during economic 
busts (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). Moreover, macroprudential policy also plays a role in 
reducing negative externality in the financial system by dissuading banking activities and 
strategies that trigger the impact of systemic risk (Perotti and Suarez, 2009). 
As shown in Table 2.1, macroprudential policy is different from microprudential 
policy in the sense that the former concentrates on policy implementation at the larger scale 
of the whole financial system, while the latter focuses on individual financial institutions. 
The ultimate objective of macroprudential policy is to reduce or avoid any macroeconomic 
costs due to financial instability, while microprudential policy aims to protect consumers.  
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Table 2-1: Macroprudential versus Microprudential Perspectives (Borio, 2003) 
Aspects Macroprudential Microprudential 
Proximate objective Limit financial system-wide 
distress 
Limit distress of individual 
institutions 
Ultimate objective Avoid macroeconomics costs 
linked to financial instability 
Consumer (investor/depositor) 
protection 
Characterization of risk “Endogenous” (dependent on 
collective behaviour) 
“Exogenous” (independent of 
individual agents’ behaviour) 
Correlations and 
common exposures 
across institutions 
Important Irrelevant 
Calibration of 
prudential controls 
In terms of system-wide risk; 
top-down 
In terms of risks of individual 
institutions; bottom-up 
The scope of macroprudential policy is broad, as it captures all institutions in the financial 
sector. Due to this extensive coverage, it is difficult for a consensus to be reached regarding 
this kind of policy because it has to aggregate various financial institutions that might behave 
and interact in an intricate patterns. For instance, agreements pertaining to monetary policy 
have been reached regarding its policy instruments, such as the short-term overnight interest 
rate. Fiscal policy is also well known to manage aggregate demand via government spending 
and taxes. In contrast, macroprudential policy does not have a primary instrument to 
represent its policy goal. However, as noted by Galati and Moessner (2014), more analyses 
are still needed to elaborate on the appropriate macroprudential instruments, 
macroprudential policy’s transmission mechanism, and its policy impacts. The following 
section explains some alternative policy instruments that can be used in macroprudential 
policy. 
2.4.1 Macroprudential Policy Instruments 
As explained previously, macroprudential policy is focused on achieving financial stability. 
However, Galati and Moessner (2013) argue that there is no commonly shared definition of 
financial stability. Gallati and Moessner (2013) also survey that the origin of financial 
instability can be related to exposure to the evolution of systematic risk over time, which is 
closely linked to the business cycle, as explained in Borio (2003). Hence, one reason for the 
absence of a consensus regarding macroprudential policy instruments is the vast sources of 
financial instability. 
 Nevertheless, although no consensus has been reached, efforts to present the choices 
of macroprudential policy instruments have been conducted by various authors. One survey 
from Carreras, Davis, and Piggot (2016) provide some taxonomies of macroprudential 
policy instruments based on different perspectives. For instance, Benanni, Despres, 
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Dujardin, Duprey, and Kelber (2014) classify macroprudential policy instruments based on 
the time dimension and cross-sectional dimension. They divided the instruments into three 
types: capital, asset, and liquidity. The capital-type macroprudential instruments include 
countercyclical capital buffers and dynamic provisioning. Asset-type macroprudential 
instruments include loan-to-value ratio and debt-to-income ratio. Finally, liquidity-types 
policy instruments include loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) and liquidity ratio. Table 2.2 presents 
a comprehensive list of the sample instruments. 
Table 2-2: Macroprudential Instruments Classification (Bennani et al., 2014) 
 Time Dimension Cross-sectional dimension 
Capital Countercyclical capital buffer 
Dynamic provisioning 
Sectoral capital requirements 
Sectoral risk weights 
Countercyclical leverage ratio 
G-SII and O-SII buffer 
Systemic risk buffer 
Leverage ratio 
Assets Loan to value caps 
Loan to income caps 
Debt to income caps 
Large exposure measures 
Concentration limits 
Liquidity Limits on loan to deposit ratio 
Time-varying liquidity ratio 
Time-varying margin requirement 
Systemic liquidity surcharge 
Liquidity coverage ratio 
Net stable funding ratio 
The capital-based instrument is usually used to address externalities related to strategic 
complementarities associated with the accumulation of credit risks. This instrument is meant 
to equip credit institutions with buffers that can be used in the contractionary phase of the 
financial cycle (Bank of Slovenia, 2017). Similarly, asset-based instruments are usually 
implemented to handle instability related to interconnectedness. This type of policy 
instrument is also implemented for a specific market, such as the housing market. For 
instance, when mortgage activity over accelerates, the authority can put a cap on the loan-
to-value ratio to dampen the housing demand. Finally, liquidity-based instruments are 
employed to reduce banking vulnerabilities related to funding shocks and unstable sources 
of financing (Bank of Slovenia, 2017). For instance, the loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) 
indicates the ability of banks to channel credit. A low LDR indicates that a bank cannot 
easily convert deposits into credit. This can be caused by a trouble in funding activity. On 
the other hand, an excessive LDR indicates that a bank is over-lending. In cases when the 
LDR is too high, the authority can limit the ratio and dampen credit activity. Consequently, 
banks are directed to hold the money as funds. 
 Furthermore, differently from Benanni et al. (2014), Claessens, Ghosh, and Mihet 
(2013) classify macroprudential policy instruments based on the phases of the cycle rather 
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than based on a time or cross-sectional dimension. That is, macroprudential policy 
instruments can be classified into expansionary phase, contractionary phase, and propagation 
of shocks. Table 2.3 illustrates the complete list of these instruments. As presented in Tables 
2.2. and 2.3, the choice of macroprudential policy instruments is broad, and the best choice 
depends on the objective that the macroprudential policy is hoped to achieve. For instance, 
the BIS suggests that capital requirement ratio should be the macroprudential instrument 
when credit growth is the primary source of instability. On the other hand, when housing 
prices are the major source of instability, the general macroprudential policy instrument 
suggested is the loan-to-value ratio rather than a capital requirement. Other countries also 
implement varied capital weights to alleviate concerns regarding the housing market 
(Carreras, 2016).  
Table 2-3: Macroprudential Instruments (Claessens, Ghosh and Mihet, 2014) 
 Restriction 
related to 
borrower, 
instrument or 
activity. 
Restrictions on 
financial sector 
balance sheet 
(assets, liabilities) 
Buffer based 
policies 
Other 
Taxation, 
levies 
Other 
(including 
institutional 
infrastructure) 
Expansionary 
phase 
-Time-varying 
caps on: 
-Debt to income 
-Loan to income 
-Loan to value 
-Credit growth 
-Margin haircut 
Time-varying caps 
on: 
-Mismatches (FX 
or interest rate) 
-Reserve 
requirement 
Countercyclical 
capital 
requirements, 
leverage 
restrictions, 
general 
provisioning. 
Levy/tax on 
specific 
assets 
and/or 
liabilities 
-Accounting 
such as 
varying rules 
on mark to 
market 
-changes to 
compensation, 
governance, 
market 
discipline 
Contractionary 
phase: fire-
sales, credit 
crunch 
-Adjustments to 
specific loans  
-loss 
provisioning,  
-margins or 
haircuts 
Liquidity limits 
such as net stable 
funding ratio, 
liquidity coverage 
ratio 
Countercyclical 
capital 
requirements, 
general 
provisioning 
Levy/tax on 
non-core 
liabilities 
Standardized 
products, 
safety net, 
OTC vs n 
exchange  
Contagion, or 
shock 
propagation 
from SIFIs or 
networks 
Varying 
restrictions on 
asset 
composition, 
activities 
Institution-specific 
limit on financial 
exposures, 
balance-sheet 
measure 
Capital 
surcharges 
linked to 
systemic risk 
Tax/levy 
varying by 
externality 
Institutional 
infrastructure 
Resolution 
Varying 
information 
 Finally, the other complete list of macroprudential policy instruments that are widely 
referenced is the list released by the BIS (Table 2.4). The BIS has accommodated the 
formation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to regulate and develop 
the international standard for commercial banking operations, particularly those regarding 
the regulation of capital adequacy in commercial banks across countries. In strengthening 
the resilience of the financial and banking sector, the Basel standard requires the capital-to-
asset ratio to be above the minimum international standard. In addition to regulating capital 
requirement, the BCBS also regulates the global standard for financial reporting.  
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Table 2-4: Macroprudential Instrument (Gallati and Moessner, 2013; adapted from BIS, 2008) 
Macroprudential instruments Examples 
1. Risk measurement methodology 
By banks Risk measures calibrated through the cycle or the cyclical through 
By supervisors Cyclical conditionality in supervisory ratings of firms; develop measures 
of systemic vulnerability (e.g. commonality of exposures and risk profiles, 
intensity of inter-firm linkages) as basis for calibration of prudential tools; 
Communication of official assessments of systemic vulnerability and 
outcomes of macro stress tests. 
2. Financial reporting  
Accounting standards Use of less procyclical accounting standards; dynamic provisions. 
Prudential filters Adjust accounting figures as a basis for calibration of prudential tools; 
Prudential provisions as add-on to capital; smoothing via moving averages 
of such measures; time-varying target for provisions or for maximum 
provision rate. 
Disclosures Disclosures of various types of risk (e.g. credit, liquidity), and of 
uncertainty about risk estimates and valuations in financial reports or 
disclosures. 
3. Regulatory capital  
Pillar 1 Systemic capital surcharge; Reduce sensitivity of regulatory capital 
requirements to current point in the cycle and with respect to movements 
in measured risk; Introduce cycle-dependent multiplier to the point-in-
time capital figure; Increased regulatory capital requirements for 
particular exposure types (higher risk weights than on the basis of Basel 
II, for macroprudential reasons). 
Pillar 2 Link of supervisory review to state of the cycle. 
4. Funding liquidity 
standards 
Cyclicality-dependent funding liquidity requirements; Concentration 
limits; FX lending restrictions; FX reserve requirements; currency 
mismatch limits; open FX position limits. 
5. Collateral arrangements Time-varying loan to value ratios; conservative maximum loan to value 
ratios and valuation methodologies for collateral; limit extension of credit 
based on increases in asset values; through the cycle margining. 
6. Risk concentration limits Quantitative limits to growth of individual types of exposures; (Time-
varying) interest rate surcharges to particular types of loans. 
7. Compensation schemes Guidelines linking performance-related pay to ex ante longer-horizon 
measures of risk; back-loading of pay-offs; Use of supervisory review 
process for enforcement. 
8. Profit distribution 
restrictions 
Limit dividend payments in good times to help build up capital buffers in 
bad times. 
9. Insurance mechanisms Contingent capital infusion; pre-funded systemic risk insurance schemes 
financed by levy related to bank asset growth beyond certain allowance; 
pre-funded deposit insurance with premia sensitive to macro (systemic 
risk) in addition to micro (institution specific) parameters. 
10. Managing failure and 
resolution 
Exit management policy conditional on systemic strength; Trigger points 
for supervisory intervention stricter in booms than in periods of systemic 
distress. 
 In conclusion, as a new developing macroeconomic policy, macroprudential policy 
is equipped with broad policy instruments to work with. Consequently, different policy 
instruments have different impacts on the economy. This situation then calls for the 
importance of the macroprudential authority to carefully select the best policy instrument as 
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a response to a specific type of instability. More importantly, macroprudential policy must 
also be implemented based on interactions with existing macroeconomic policies, such as 
monetary or fiscal policy. Understanding their interactions can help us to observe the extent 
of macroprudential policy in affecting the economy. The subsequent section explains the 
transmission mechanism of macroprudential policy. 
2.4.2 Transmission Mechanism of Macroprudential Policy 
Unlike monetary policy, the formal transmission mechanism for macroprudential policy is 
not commonly shared. This is because different macroprudential policy instruments can 
provide a unique transmission mechanisms that link between the instrument to the policy 
goal. However, their goals are practically the same – namely, to improve financial sector 
resiliency and to minimise the impact of systemic risks. Some works of literature provide 
the transmission channel of macroprudential policy such as Rogers (2013), Carerras (2016), 
and Karamysheva and Saragina (2018), among others. Due to the wide array of available 
macroprudential policy instruments, not all mechanisms of macroprudential policy 
instruments can be described thoroughly here. This section will present three samples of the 
transmission channel, which cover capital-, asset-and liquidity-based macroprudential 
policy instruments. 
• Capital Based Macroprudential Policy Instruments 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the transmission mechanism of macroprudential policy when the 
authority increases the countercyclical capital buffer during an excessive credit period, 
which is adopted from Roger (2013). The idea underlying capital-based macroprudential 
instruments is to cushion the banking sector with increased capital during an excessive credit 
period and reduce the capital during a slow credit period. Once the authority observes that 
the impact of systemic risks in the financial sector has elevated, the capital requirement ratio 
is raised. As shown Figure 2.3, banks can raise their capital by issuing equities to private 
market, increasing retained earnings, and reducing their assets holdings. All these actions 
can increase the loss absorbency of banking sector, strengthen the banking solvency, and 
eventually improves the resiliency of the financial system. The opposite mechanisms are 
applied when the authority reduces the countercyclical capital buffer.  
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Figure 2-3: Transmission Mechanism of Raising Capital Requirements (Roger, 2013) 
The decision to raise capital will negatively affect the credit supply. That is, banks are 
restrained from lending credit and accumulating it as capital instead. This falling credit 
supply will increase funding costs and, hence, reduce the credit demand. The credit demand 
suppresses asset prices and then reduces risks in the financial sector. However, through this 
policy, policy ineffectiveness can also happen through the leakages. That is, once borrowers 
observe that banks are no longer able to lend credit, they can turn to demand loans from non-
banking financial institutions instead. 
 The transmission channel of a higher capital requirement ratio can also impact the 
policy goal through the expectation channel. That is, banks and market participants can 
increase their banking capital before the announcement to raise capital requirement reaches 
the end of notice period. This way, the rise of capital requirements can affect the financial 
sector (in terms of stronger banking resilience and lower systemic risks) more quickly than 
expected. Empirical studies show that a high capital requirement ratio can reduce the impact 
of systemic risks in the financial sector.  
• Assets Based Macroprudential Policy Instruments 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the transmission mechanism channel when the authority decides to 
lower the loan-to-value ratio. The loan-to-value ratio is the ratio of total credit relative to the 
market collateral values. Hence, a high loan to value ratio corresponds to a wide access for 
borrowers to take out loans from banks.  
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Figure 2-4: Transmission Mechanism of Raising Loan to Value ratio (Roger, 2013) 
The purpose of implementing this policy instrument is to raise the ratio during slow credit 
conditions and dampen the ratio during excessive credit conditions. Figure 2.4 illustrates the 
mechanism when the authority sets a limit on lending with a high loan to value ratio.  
 The restriction policy constrains potential borrowers from demanding such credits 
from banks. This policy negatively affects both credit demand and credit supply and finally 
results in  lower equilibrium of loans in the credit market. Also, the collateral value rises 
when the authority imposes a higher limit. The rising value of collateral can strengthen the 
ability of banks to manage credit defaults and, hence, reduces the loss-given-default (LGD). 
At the same time, the probability-of-default (PD) of customers can also be dampened. This 
situation can help to increase the resilience of the financial system resilience. With regards 
to the policy’s impact on the systemic risks, a weakening demand for credit and a smaller 
credit supply negatively affect housing prices.  
 In addition to the asset prices channel, policy restriction can also impact the financial 
sector through the expectation channel. That is, banks can limit credit via a high loan-to-
value ratio before the policy restriction reaches its notice period. This way, the impact of the 
policy can be realised more quickly than expected. However, the expectation channel can 
also bring an adverse effect when borrowers practice forward borrowing (or when banks 
practice forward lending), which can temporarily increase credit demand and housing prices 
temporarily. In anticipating this issue, the authority needs to implement tighter risk 
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management strategies by setting a short notice period (e.g., two weeks). As shown in the 
figure, the potential for leakages exists during the implementation of this strategy. That is, 
when the mortgage from banks is no longer acceptable, borrowers can turn their assets to 
non-bank financial institutions and offset the impact of policy restrictions. However, 
empirical studies show that policy restrictions are still effective in reducing the impact of 
systemic risks.  
• Liquidity Based Macroprudential Policy Instruments 
The final sample of the transmission channel in the macroprudential policy is given using 
liquidity-based macroprudential policy instruments. Figure 2.5 illustrates the transmission 
channel when the authority decides to elevate the core funding ratio. The core funding ratio 
works as a funding buffer to protect banks from liquidity shocks. Hence, banks increase the 
core funding ratio during excessive credit periods and lower the ratio during the slowing 
credit periods. 
 Figure 2.5 describes the transmission channel when the authority increases the 
minimum core funding ratio, which means that the economy is in an excessive credit period. 
The bank can increase the funding ratio through two channels – namely, by increasing the 
wholesale funding (deposits) and by reducing lending, or both. These activities boost 
deposits, increase the funding buffer, and strengthen the financial system’s resilience. The 
increased funding buffer consequently reduces the credit supply, which subsequently 
suppresses credit demand.  
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Figure 2-5: Transmission Mechanism of Raising Core Funding Ratio (Roger, 2013) 
 A high core funding ratio can also affect the financial sector through the expectation 
channel. That is, the announcement to increase the ratio stimulates banks to increase funding 
faster than expected due to the expectation effect. However, this expectation channel could 
also have a negative consequence. Specifically, banks could have increased lending before 
the regulation officially takes place. This action can accelerate loans temporarily and boost 
asset prices. Hence, in anticipating this issue, the authority requires tighter risk management 
practices, such as carefully monitoring banks to ensure that all banks are acting in full 
compliance with the short notice period. As with the other two macroprudential policy 
instruments, leakage can happen when borrowers obtain loans from non-banking financial 
institutions. A similar instrument (i.e., the net stable funding ratio) has been shown to have 
an impact on the credit cycle.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3 THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL 
MONETARY POLICY 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the optimal strategic interaction between conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy using the model from Gertler and Karadi (2011). The 
unconventional monetary policy considered in the model is quantitative easing, where the 
authority injects a direct loan into the banking sector. Two scenarios are introduced, namely 
the cooperation scenario and the independent scenario. Under the cooperation scenario, we 
present four policy regimes: the fully optimal commitment regime, the discretionary policy 
regime, the simple policy rule regime, and the cooperating-leadership policy regime. Under 
the independent scenario, we present the independent-simultaneous regime and the 
independent-leadership regime. Policy performance is evaluated based on the ad-hoc loss 
function constructed by the fluctuation of inflation, output, credit spread, nominal interest 
rate, and credit injection ratio. The study found that the cooperation between conventional 
monetary policy and quantitative easing policy in the fully optimal commitment regime 
delivers the best policy performance. Adopting non-optimal simple policy rules for 
conventional monetary and quantitative easing policies resulted in a second-best 
performance. However, the simple policy rules’ second-best result depends upon the level 
of a central bank aggressiveness in combatting a crisis. If two independent policies work 
sequentially, the leading policy performs better than the following. However, when the two 
independent policies work simultaneously, monetary policy is superior. 
 
Keywords: Monetary policy, Quantitative easing policy, Policy interaction, Policy 
performance. 
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3.1 Introduction 
An economic crisis is a situation where the economic performance of a region or country 
deteriorates sharply. Many types of risks can trigger economic crises to erupt; one of those 
is financial instability. An example of event causing financial instability is the collapse of a 
major bank that deteriorates the movement of credit flow between banks and borrowers, 
which then negatively affects investment, production, and consumption. An economic crisis  
results in a majority of populace being worse off. During the 19th and 20th centuries, most 
financial crises were triggered by banking panic, stock market crash, asset price bubble, or 
sovereign default. Prominent crises are well-known: the Japanese ‘lost decade’, the Asian 
financial crisis, the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, and the European debt crisis. These crises 
highlight the fragility of the financial sector and how severe the impacts can be.  
 During a crisis, the general practice is for the governmental authority to implement 
various efforts to stabilise the economy back to normal. The implementation of macro 
stabilisation policies such as monetary policy or fiscal policy is one of the efforts. The central 
bank, through monetary policy, usually responds to a crisis by cutting their policy rate to 
help banks accelerate lending activity. This action is known as expansionary monetary 
policy. On the other hand, the government will activate accommodative fiscal policy by 
relaxing tax regulations to stimulate investment and drive real sector economic activity. 
Theoretically, these actions should bring the economy back to equilibrium. However, that is 
not always the case. For example, during the U.S. global financial crisis in 2008, traditional 
monetary policy was less effective in encouraging lending and borrowing between banks, 
which then aggravated credit intermediation to the public even when the short-term 
overnight interest rate was extremely low. Consequently, when the traditional interest rate 
monetary policy is weak or poorly functioning, government and central bankers step in by 
activating unconventional monetary policy. In most crises, the central bank activates 
unconventional monetary policy in the form of quantitative easing. 
  Quantitative easing is the central bank action to purchase a substantial volume of 
private or government bonds or securities using cash. This policy essentially intends to flood 
the dried financial sector with fresh liquidity that banks can use to accelerate lending. In 
normalising the economy from the global financial crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve injected 
more than $2 trillion to purchase private and public securities, particularly mortgage-backed 
securities. Although the policy is believed to be useful in reviving credit activity, some 
criticise that quantitative easing is not meant to replace conventional monetary policy as it 
can invite negative long-term consequences on the economy. Such policy effects might 
include long run inflationary pressures, higher impact of systemic risks, widening income 
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inequality, and increasing moral hazard rate (Curdia and Woodford, 2010; Cui and Sterk, 
2018; Fernandez, Bortz, and Zeolla, 2018). Therefore, a careful implementation and 
exploration of quantitative easing is crucial, particularly in conjunction with an existing 
macroeconomic policy such as monetary policy.  
 Unfortunately, studies related to quantitative easing policy are limited. Martin and 
Milas (2012) argue that the literature in quantitative easing policy is limited and too narrow; 
hence exploration of alternative approaches to quantitative easing is required. Recent 
literature on quantitative easing policy focuses mostly on the effectiveness and impact of the 
policy on the economy. For instance, Albu, Lupu, Calin, and Popovici (2014); Bhattarai and 
Neely (2016); Chen, Filardo, He, and Zhu (2016); Curcuru, Kamin, Li, and Rodriguez 
(2018); Maggio, Kermani and Palmer (2016); Fisher, Ramcharan, and Yu (2015); and 
Kapetanios, Mumtaz, Stevens, and Theodoridis (2019), among others.  
 In contrast, only few studies that focus on the optimal strategic interaction between 
conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing policy, but they do not specifically 
simulate the interaction between these two policies. For example, studies from Reifschneider 
(2016); Chung, Laforte, Reifschneider, and Williams (2012); and Engen, Laubach, and 
Reifschneider (2015) that examine the impact of quantitative easing but do not consider how 
the quantitative easing interacts with the setting of the short-term interest rate. Another 
example is a study from Carlstorm, Fuerst, and Paustian (2016) that examines the role of 
quantitative easing in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model but does 
not present the interaction between the quantitative easing and conventional monetary 
policy.  
 Although papers on the topic of quantitative easing and monetary policy are limited, 
fortunately some studies comparing the effectiveness between traditional interest rate 
monetary policy and quantitative easing policy provide useful information regarding the 
benefit and loss from the interaction of these two macro policies. Among others, some 
studies describing such interaction are those by Cui and Sterk (2018); Kiley (2008); Sheedy 
(2016), and Quint and Rabanal (2017). Ellison and Tischbirek (2014) also suggest that the 
central bank should coordinate conventional and unconventional monetary policy. Similarly, 
Cui and Sterk (2018) emphasise that the optimal and simultaneous interaction between 
quantitative easing policy and interest-rate policy is one of the essential questions to further 
explore.  
  This chapter examines the optimal strategic interaction between conventional 
monetary policy and quantitative easing policy. That is, we are interested to investigate in 
what circumstance the interaction between conventional monetary policy and quantitative 
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easing policy produces the best performance. In this study, we allow the central bank to 
manage both policies and has full authority to optimise the two policies. The model used as 
a reference for this chapter is the unconventional monetary policy model from Gertler and 
Karadi (2011). We consider this model sufficient to describe how the central bank 
implements quantitative easing policy during a financial crisis, which is in line with the need 
of this research. The monetary policy instrument utilised in the model is the nominal interest 
rate, while the policy instrument representing quantitative easing policy is the credit 
injection ratio. A credit injection ratio is defined as the percentage (or fraction) of credit 
injected by a central bank relative to the total credit available in the economy. For instance, 
a credit injection ratio by 0.2 means that the portion of banking credit from the central bank 
is 20% of the total credit available in the economy. In addition to these two policy 
instruments, the model also features monopolistic competition and nominal rigidity in the 
manner of Calvo’s pricing.  
 Among many similar papers in quantitative easing, this study is closely related to a 
study by Cui and Sterk (2018). However, our study is different from most papers in 
quantitatve easing policy in terms of the way we articulate the interaction. That is, we 
generate various patterns of interactions, including the possibility where the central bank 
assigns a leadership role on each policy, where other studies of quantitative easing policy do 
not incorporate. Our study is also different from Cui and Sterk (2018) and most similar 
studies in terms of the way we measure optimality level of the interaction. This study 
measures optimality of the interaction based on the policy performance or unconditional loss 
value. The unconditional loss value is a single number reflecting the total variation of 
variables in the loss function that calculated based on all exogenous shocks coming into the 
economy, not only conditional on a specific shock. The highest policy performance (or the 
lowest loss value) indicates the most optimal strategic interaction, and vice versa. Finally, 
the method to measure the policy performance (or loss value) is adopted from the algorithm 
developed by Dennis (2007), and Dennis and Ilbas (2016). 
 This chapter examines the interaction between conventional monetary policy and 
quantitative easing policy through two different scenarios, namely, the cooperation scenario 
and the independent scenario. The cooperation scenario is a situation where both monetary 
and quantitative easing policies pursue a single objective. The central bank has a single 
objective function which the two policies simultaneously aim to minimise. In contrast, the 
independent scenario is the situation where monetary policy and quantitative easing policy 
pursue different objective functions.  
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 Under the cooperation scenario, we present four policy regimes: the fully optimal 
commitment regime, the discretionary policy regime, the simple policy rule regime, and the 
cooperating-leadership regime. The fully optimal commitment regime is where the central 
bank is committed to implement the chosen initial policy to all subsequent periods without 
reoptimising. On the contrary, under a discretionary policy regime, the central bank always 
reoptimises the policy instruments in every period. Furthermore, in the simple policy rule 
regime, the central bank does not optimise policy instruments but sets them based on the 
non-optimal simple monetary and quantitative easing rules. Finally, in the cooperating-
leadership regime, one policy is optimised before the other policy. The cooperating-
leadership regime consists of two parts, namely the cooperating monetary policy leadership 
regime, and the cooperating quantitative easing leadership regime. 
 In the independent scenario, we present two policy regimes: the independent-
simultaneous regime, and the independent-leadership regime. The independent-
simultaneous regime is the situation when conventional monetary policy and quantitative 
easing policy optimise their own policy instruments at the same time, but they pursue 
different objective functions. Thus, the independent setting is characterised as when a central 
bank designs a specific objective function for each policy. Under the independent scenario, 
monetary policy aims to stabilise inflation, while quantitative easing policy aims to stabilise 
credit activity.  
 Furthermore, the independent-leadership regime consists of two regimes, namely the 
independent monetary policy leadership regime and the independent quantitative easing 
leadership regime. In the former case, monetary policy is optimised first, followed by the 
optimisation of quantitative easing in the subsequent period. When optimising the 
quantitative easing in the second period, the central bank incorporates the nominal interest 
rate from the first mover into the optimisation process of the credit injection ratio. The 
quantitative easing leadership regime first optimises quantitative easing, followed by the 
optimisation of monetary policy in a subsequent period. 
 This study demonstrates that the fully optimal commitment regime under the 
cooperation scenario gives the best policy performance. However, the role of commitment 
is more important than coordination, as our result shows that the discretionary policy regime 
has the worst policy performance although cooperation takes place. Thus, if the authority 
implements a discretionary policy, the cooperation becomes less valuable. However, we 
show that although commitment regime offers the smallest loss value, its ability to stabilise 
inflation is less potent than simple policy rule regime. This implies that simple rule regime 
outperforms the commitment and discretionary regime in stabilising inflation. However, the 
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commitment regime is superior in stabilising output, credit spread, and the nominal interest 
rate. Finally, the fluctuation of the credit injection ratio is found to be the smallest in the 
discretionary regime and results in the slowest recovery after an economic crisis. The 
performance of the discretionary policy regime is also identical to that of the cooperating-
leadership regime, either when monetary policy is implemented first or when quantitative 
easing is the leading policy. If the two policies are independent of each other, the simulation 
demonstrates that the leading policy performs better than the follower. 
 Interestingly, our simulation shows that the simple policy rule regime is superior to 
the discretionary and leadership regime. However, its performance is conditional on the level 
of the central bank's aggressiveness in combatting the crisis. Our simulation illustrates that 
the simple policy rule regime outperforms the discretionary regime and all regimes under 
the independent scenario if the credit parameter is below 15. Simulations of impulse 
response functions under various shocks demonstrate that credit injection under the 
commitment and discretionary regime is smaller than that under the simple policy rule 
regime. In general, our simulation on the impulse response function under various shocks 
shows that credit injection is the largest under the simple rule regime. Overall, we discover 
that monetary policy performs better than quantitative easing in most policy regimes. This 
finding suggests that conventional monetary policy has a greater impact than quantitative 
easing policy, which confirms earlier findings in the literature that quantitative easing policy 
is not meant to replace conventional monetary policy (Cui and Sterk, 2018; Kiley, 2008, 
Curdia and Woodford, 2010). Thus, quantitative easing has a role as a secondary tool that 
works when conventional monetary policy is functioning poorly. 
 This chapter contributes through several ways. First, this study contributes to the 
literature regarding the importance of commitment in quantitative easing policy, which 
support studies by Woodford (2012), Ugai (2007), Beriel and Mendes (2015), 
Khrisnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), and Oda and Ueda (2007), among others, who 
argue that commitment is an essential factor in the operation of quantitative easing policy. 
Second, this study also contributes to the set of literature supporting superiority of monetary 
policy over quantitative easing policy, such as studies from Curdia and Woodford (2018), 
Cui and Sterk (2018), Sheedy (2016), and Kiley (2018), among others. Finally, the finding 
on this study, regarding the superiority of the leading policy and the negative impact of 
massive quantitative easing, also support the finding from Cui and Sterk (2018). 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section two describes the literature 
review. Section three describes the reference model in detail. Section four contains the 
 51 
results and analysis, including the loss value report and the simulation of the impulse 
response function under various shocks. Finally, section five provides the conclusion. 
3.2 Literature Review 
Literature regarding the interaction between conventional monetary policy and quantitative 
easing policy cannot be separated from studies examining the effectiveness of quantitative 
easing policy in stabilising the global financial crisis. Currently, assessing the effectiveness 
and impact of quantitative easing policy on the economy is the central theme in the literature 
on unconventional monetary policy. See, for example, studies from Albu et al (2014); 
Bhattarai and Neely (2016); Chen et al. (2016); Curcuru et al. (2018); Maggio, Kermani and 
Palmer (2016); Fisher, Ramcharan, and Yu (2015); and Kapetanios et al (2019), among 
others.  
 The literature reveals various conditionality factors for quantitative easing policy. 
For instance, Woodford (2012) argues that quantitative easing is not only about the large-
scale asset purchased by the central bank; it also reflects the central bank’s effort in 
signalling its commitment to lower the short-term overnight interest rate within a measured 
period. Therefore, this balance-sheet policy is closely linked with the central bank’s forward 
guidance policy. However, Kuttner (2018) argues that forward guidance and quantitative 
easing are not substitutes, as they operate through the same expectation transmission 
channel. Martin and Milas (2012) argue although quantitative easing can reduce government 
bond rates, this effect is only temporary and negligible if bond rates are already low. The 
literature highlights that the investigation of quantitative easing policy’s effectiveness should 
consider the impacts of other policy variables. This study, however, does not consider the 
forward guidance policy but only focuses on the interaction between quantitative easing and 
interest rate policy.  
 Studies focusing on the strategic interaction between conventional monetary policy 
and quantitative easing policy are not abundant. For example, Reifschneider (2016); Chung 
et al. (2012); and Engen, Laubach, and Reifschneider (2015) examine the impact of 
quantitative easing, but the studies do not consider how quantitative easing interacts with the 
short-term interest rate. Another example is the study from Carlstorm, Fuerst, and Paustian 
(2016), that examines the role of quantitative easing but does not present the interaction 
between quantitative easing and the interest-rate rule. Some researchers argue that the 
interaction between these two macro policies is essential. For instance, Cui and Sterk (2018) 
maintain that the optimal and simultaneous interaction between quantitative easing policy 
and interest-rate policy is an interesting further research question to explore. Similarly, 
Ellison and Tischbirek (2014) suggest that the central bank should coordinate conventional 
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and unconventional monetary policy, where the former responds to inflation, and the latter 
responds to output gap fluctuation. Although few studies examine the topic of this paper, 
some works examining the comparison between conventional monetary policy and 
quantitative easing policy provide useful information to support our effort to investigate the 
optimal strategic interaction between these two policies. See the studies from Cui and Sterk 
(2018), Kiley (2008), Sheedy (2016), and Quint and Rabanal (2017). 
           Our study has a close relationships to Cui and Sterk (2018) and Kiley (2018). Cui and 
Sterk (2018) focus their study on comparing the role of conventional and unconventional 
monetary policy during an economic crisis. They present a quantitative New Keynesian 
model that allows for household heterogeneity and assets, an incomplete market, and 
different degrees of liquidity. Based on their study, the authors demonstrate that a 
quantitative easing policy can impose a powerful impact on macroeconomic stabilisation. 
However, the optimal quantitative easing policy tends to deliver lower welfare performance 
than that of the optimal interest-rate rule. The lower performance happens because 
quantitative easing can create a strong side effects that exacerbate inequality, which make 
the policy is inadvisable from a welfare perspective. Also, the study argues that quantitative 
easing is not desirable to replace conventional monetary policy. Cui and Sterk (2018) also 
demonstrate that aggressive quantitative easing is not recommended. That is, the more 
aggressive the central bank is in executing the quantitative easing, the more severe the 
adverse impacts are that the policy brings to the future. Finally, the study demonstrates that 
quantitative easing benefits the economy only when conventional monetary policy does not 
exist. 
           Similar to Cui and Sterk (2018), a study from Kiley (2008) also found that 
quantitative easing is not welfare-improving if the steady state of interest rates is high. 
However, if the steady state interest rate is low, quantitative easing policy can offset some 
of the negative impacts of the lower bound interest-rate policy. The finding also advised that 
quantitative easing policy can be useful when output falls below potential and when the 
short-term interest rate is at the effective lower bound. However, the efficacy of quantitative 
easing policy is enhanced when it is sizeable enough and deployed quickly by the time the 
crisis erupts. Hence, Kiley (2008) suggests quantitative easing to be a secondary tool and 
not to replace the interest rate policy.  
 Curdia and Woodford (2010) argue that there are at least two main reasons why 
thinking of quantitative easing as a substitute for interest rate policy is dangerous. First, this 
thinking directs attention away from the most relevant costs and benefits when thinking of 
the appropriate scale, timing, and allocation for a quantitative easing policy. Second, this 
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thinking can allow the central bank not to adjust the target criterion for interest rate policy 
due to the zero lower bound. The ineffectiveness of quantitative easing policy under some 
circumstances is also argued by Sheedy (2016). Based on an economic model that adopts 
various types of unconventional monetary policy instruments, the author argues that 
quantitative easing policy is a poor substitute for the conventional nominal interest rate 
policy. The author further suggests that the ineffectiveness of quantitative easing policy is 
due to an intertemporal trade-off. That is, the use of unconventional monetary policy today 
can be detrimental for economic stability in the future. 
 Quint and Rabanal (2017) maintain that quantitative easing policy is ineffective 
under ordinary business cycle shocks. That is, benefits from using unconventional monetary 
policy under traditional supply and demand shocks are minimal. Results from Cui and Sterk 
(2018), Kiley (2008), and Sheedy (2016) contradict the finding. The studies reveal that 
quantitative easing policy is found to be welfare-improving when it reacts to a financial 
shock that affects banking capital. This finding is similar to those from Wallace (1981) and 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), that demonstrate that expansion in the monetary base 
before a crisis does not affect real variables. Quint and Rabanal (2017) investigate this issue 
using a general equilibrium model based on the model from Justiniano, Primiceri, and 
Tambalotti (2013) and augment the model with a banking sector in the same fashion as 
Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Andreasen, Ferman, and Zabczyk (2013). The unconventional 
monetary policy in the model is designed to target credit spread, which is similar to one of 
the variables used in an ad-hoc loss function in this study. Moreover, Quint and Rabanal 
(2017) posit that either providing credit for the private sector or purchasing government 
bonds has a very similar effect on the economy. Woodford (2012) show that the most 
effective type of balance-sheet policies is to directly channel credit to particular segments of 
the market, which is similar to the credit injection ratio instrument used in the study. 
 In conclusion, studies in the area of quantitative easing are currently polarised in the 
efforts to assess the long-run impacts of the policy on the economy. Among the literature 
found, our study has a close relationship with Cui and Sterk (2018) and Kiley (2018). 
Common understanding signals that quantitative easing is only present unconventionally 
when traditional monetary policy is less effective. This understanding seems to have 
demotivated the possibility of investigating the two policies’ interaction in greater detail. 
Hence, this chapter contributes to the literature by presenting a unique perspective when the 
traditional monetary policy is not entirely dull and actively interacts with the quantitative 
easing policy in combatting the economic crisis. 
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3.3 Model 
The reference model in this study is the unconventional monetary policy model developed 
by Gertler and Karadi (2011). The economy under this model contains seven agents: 
households, financial intermediaries (or banks), intermediate goods firms, final goods firms 
(retailers), capital goods producer, government, and the central bank. The model contains 
five types of shocks, namely technology shock, capital quality shock, net worth shock, 
monetary policy shock, and credit injection policy shock. 
3.3.1 Households 
There is the continuum of identical households in the economy with the sum of unity. Each 
household consists of two members with different occupation as workers and bankers. The 
workers supply labour in the intermediate good firms, while the bankers manage financial 
intermediaries. In each period, the members may switch their occupation, i.e. households 
can be a banker and vice versa, regardless of how often they changed their job previously. 
Households are the owner of both intermediate good firms and financial intermediaries. 
Correctly, the profit that workers receive is returned to households. Likewise, the bankers 
also transfer any earnings from financial intermediaries back to households. Each family 
additionally consumes and save besides supplying labour. There is perfect consumption 
insurance within each household that both workers and bankers are guaranteed to consume. 
Furthermore, each household saves fund in the financial intermediaries. The fund is then 
channeled to firms. 
In each period, members in the household can switch their occupation. In the 
aggregate level, at each period !, the fraction of (1 − %)are workers, and the fraction of % 
are bankers. There is a probability ' for each banker at period ! to remain as a banker at 
period (! + 1), regardless their previous occupation. Nevertheless, in ensuring that no 
bankers can fund all investments from their capital, (1 − %)% bankers exit and become 
workers at each period. In the same way, their job is also replaced by the quantities of 
workers switching to be bankers by the rule that the relative proportion of workers and 
bankers in the economy is fixed all the time. Consequently, there are two types of bankers 
in the economy: the existing bankers and the new bankers. The new bankers start working 
by receiving the endowed start-up funds from households. 
In each period of !, household ) chooses the level of consumption (*!)  and labour 
(+!) to maximise the utility, which is given by ,! -∑ /" 0123(*!#" − ℎ*!#"$%) − &%#' +!#"%#'5		(")* 7,                                 (3.1) 
 55 
where 0 < / < 1 is the discount factor, 0 < ℎ < 1 is the consumption habit formation, ; >0 is the relative utility weight of labour and = > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. 
In aggregate level, households maximise their preference subject to the budget constraint, 
which is given by *! + >! + ?! = A!+! + B! + C!>! ,       (3.2) 
where A! is the real wage in period !, >! is the amount of saving in period	!, ?! is the lump 
sum tax paid and C! is the real return of bonds from period (! − 1) to period !. Note that the 
bonds are one period riskless bonds that pays the gross real return C! in one period. This 
budget constraint implies that the source of income that households receive come from the 
workers labour income (A!+!), the dividend from the ownership of financial intermediaries 
(B!), and the interest income from the previous saving in bonds (C!>!). Furthermore, the 
income is then used for consumption (*!), saving in one period bonds (>!) and pay lumpsum 
taxes (?!). 
The first order condition on labour and consumption from the above optimisation 
problem results in the labour market equilibrium and marginal utility of consumption, 
respectively, as given below D!A! = ;+!' ,             (3.3) D! = (*! − ℎ*!$%)$% − /ℎ,!(*!#% − ℎ*!)$%,          (3.4) 
where D! denotes the marginal utility of consumption at period !. Furthermore, the first order 
condition with respect to saving delivers the optimal real interest rate as follow /,!EF!,!#%GC! = 1,       (3.5) F!,!#% ≡ ,(.!"#).! 	,               (3.6) 
where F!,!#% denotes the growth of marginal utility of consumption. As shown above, the 
marginal utility of consumption in period	!. depends on the current, past and the expectation 
of future consumption. 
3.3.2 Financial Intermediaries 
Financial intermediaries in the model are the whole banking sector that covers both 
commercial banks and investment banks. The intermediaries operate to channel funds from 
depositors to non-financial firms. Specifically, they convert short-term liabilities into long-
term assets through a lending activity. Under this model, perfect information is assumed to 
hold between financial intermediaries and non-financial firms. The amount of credit 
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obtained by firms are equal to the number of financial claims held by financial 
intermediaries. The constraint of financial intermediaries during their operation is given by,  I!J0! = K0! + >0!,                  (3.7) 
where J0! denotes the number of financial claims held by intermediary L at period !, I! is 
the relative price of each claim and K0! is the amount of net worth of intermediary L  at the 
end of period !.  
It is also important to note that financial claims held by the intermediaries can be 
coming from households EJ1!G and macroprudential authority EJ2!G. Macroprudential 
authority is assumed to inject funds to the intermediaries at period ! by the fraction of M! of 
the total intermediated assets. Hence, I!J0! = I!J10! + M!I!J0! ,         (3.8) 
which implies (1 − M!)I!J0! = I!J10!.        (3.9) 
Equation (9) implies that the authority injects funds to financial intermediaries by the 
percentage M! from the total credit in the economy. The authority intermediates credit by 
issuing bonds to households that gives households riskless rate at C! and requires non-
financial firms as a lender to pay back the authority at market lending rate C3!#%. 
 The model assumes that the objective of the financial intermediaries is to maximise 
the banking net worth N!, which is given by N! = ,!O∑ (1 − ')'"/"#%F!,!#%#"EK0!#%#"G(")* P,                 (3.10) 
where the banks net worth is defined as the difference between earnings on asset and interest 
payments on liabilities, that is K0!#% = C3!#%I!J10! − C!>0!.             (3.11) 
Furthermore, recall from (3.7) that the deposit funds received by bank L is equal to the 
amount of credit given and the banks net worth, then the above equation can be decomposed 
into K0!#% = ,!(C3!#% − C!)I!J10! + C!K0! .                     (3.12) 
As shown in equation (3.12), banking net worth depends on the premium (C3!#% − C!) and the amount of financial claim I!J0!. Thus, the preference of the financial 
intermediaries in the economy can be expressed in greater detail as 
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N! = ,! -∑ (1 − ')'"/"F!,!#" 0(C3!#%#" − C!#")I!#"J0!#" + C!#"K0!#"5(")* 7.    (3.13) 
Furthermore, in aggregate terms, the value of banks net worth above can be expressed as the 
linear combination as follow N! = R!I!J! + S!K! ,                (3.14) 
where R! is defined as the marginal gain from expanding assets and S! is the marginal gain 
from adding one unit of net worth. The R! and S! are defined as R! = ,!T(1 − ')/F!,!#%(C3!#% − C!) + '/F!,!#%U!,!#%R!#%V,          (3.15) S! = (1 − ') + ,!E/F!,!#%'W!#%S!#%G,      (3.16) 
where R! denotes the marginal gain received by the intermediary for increasing the asset J!, 
holding net worth K! constant. While S! denotes the marginal gain received by the 
intermediary for increasing net worth K!, holding asset constant. Moreover, W!,!#% denotes 
the growth of banking net worth and U!,!#% denotes the growth of intermediation fund which 
are respectively defined as follows W!,!#% = 4!"#4! 			,              (3.17) U!,!#% = 5!"#6!"#5!6! 		.      (3.18) 
As shown in equation (3.15), the optimisation problem for financial intermediaries depends 
on the discounted risk adjusted premium /"#%F!,!#%#"(C3!#%#" − C!#")I!#". To the extent 
that the discounted risk adjusted premium is positive, the model assumes that the 
intermediary will always intend to broaden its assets indefinitely by borrowing additional 
funds from households. Specifically, everything else equal, the intermediaries will keep 
expanding asset by borrowing funds from depositors and channel it as credit to non-financial 
firms until the marginal gain from doing so, R!, is zero. 
3.3.3 Agency Problems 
The model introduces a moral hazard problem in the banking sector which creates friction 
between households and financial intermediaries. This moral hazard is introduced in such a 
way that bankers always have an option to divert the fraction X of the total asset back to 
themselves than channeling the fund to non-financial firms. This moral hazard can force the 
banks into bankruptcy due to the decreasing banking profitability. Therefore, in minimising 
the possibility of moral hazard, the intermediaries are obligated to satisfy an incentive 
constraint to enable them obtain funds from households. Specifically, the incentive 
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constraint is formulated such that depositors can only lend funds to banks as long as the 
value of banks capital is higher or equal to the gain from doing the moral hazard. That is, N! ≥ XI!J1!,         (3.19) 
which implies that N! = R!I!J1! + S!K! ≥ XI!J1!.         (3.20) 
Recall that (1 − M!)I!J! = I!J1! , then the equation above can be expressed as I!J! ≤	 7!4!(8$9!)(%$:!)	.              (3.21) 
Therefore, if the constraint binds, then the assets that bankers can acquire from households 
must at least satisfy I!J! = [!K!,                                        (3.22) 
where [! = 7!(8$9!)(%$:!) denotes the leverage, which is simply known as the ratio of privately 
intermediated assets to equity. 
This constraint limits the intermediaries leverage ratio to the extent that bankers’ 
incentive to cheat is exactly balanced by the cost. Thus, given the net worth K! > 0, the 
constraint is binding as long as 0 < R! < X, which is the range where expanding assets is 
profitable. The leverage shows that higher value of  R! corresponds to lower probability for 
bankers to conduct the moral hazard. In case the value of R! is larger than X, the constraint 
does not bind (i.e., that the gain from expanding asset is always higher than the gain from 
doing moral hazard). Given the definition of leverage above, the relationship of banking net 
worth can then be expressed as follow K!#% = E(C3!#% − C!)(1 − M!)[! + C!GK!.      (3.23) 
Using the new evolution of banking net worth, the growth of banking net worth W!,!#% and 
the growth of intermediation funds U!,!#% can be expressed in the more specific form as 
follow W!,!#% = 4!"#4! = (C3!#% − C!)(1 − M!)[! + C! ,           (3.24) 
which now the banks net worth depends on the leverage ratio [;! and the realization of 
premium (C3!#% − C!). Furthermore, the expression of credit growth can be derived as 
follow U!,!#% = 5!"#6!"#5!6! = 0<!"#<! 5 W!,!#%,       (3.25) 
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which now is expressed as the function of leverage and the growth of banking net worth.  
3.3.4 Intermediate Goods Producers 
Intermediate goods firms produce intermediate goods in the economy which then are sold to 
final goods firms.  That is, at the end of period !, intermediate good firms receive credit from 
financial intermediaries and use the fund to acquire capital \! to produce intermediate output 
in subsequent period. Once the intermediate outputs are produced in period (! + 1), 
intermediate good firms have an option to sell the remaining capital to capital good 
producers. Intermediate good firms are assumed to operate in a competitive market. Perfect 
information is assumed to hold between financial intermediaries and intermediate goods 
firms. Hence, no agency problem or friction exists between the two agents. For the firms, 
the amount capital acquired is exactly equal to the amount of credit given, that is I!\! = I!J!.                    (3.26) 
 In each period !, intermediate good firms produce intermediate output by following 
the Cobb-Douglas production function as follow ]=! = ^!(_!`!\!$%)>+!%$> ,                (3.27) 
where ]=! denotes intermediate output produced at period !, _! denotes the capacity 
utilisation rate chosen at period !, `!\!$% denotes the effective capital acquired in period (! − 1) and a is the effective capital share. Furthermore, there are two stochastic 
disturbances within the production function namely technology shock ^! and the capital 
quality shock `!. The capital quality shock in this model is defined as economic depreciation 
of capital. Taking the first derivative of the production function towards labour results in the 
labour demand as follow  b=!(1 − a) ?$!@! = A! ,       (3.28) 
where b=! is the price of intermediate output. Furthermore, the optimal capacity utilisation 
rate can also be derived by taking the first derivative of the production function towards _!, 
which is given by b=!a ?$!A! = cB(_!)`!\!$%.       (3.29) 
Since c(_!) the reference model defines depreciation rate as c(_!) = c; + C%%#D_!(%#D),       (3.30) 
where d is the elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to the utilisation rate and eE 
is defined as  
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eE = >FG$?G$HI .         (3.31) 
Then, cB(_!) is given as cB(_!) = eE_!D .                                           (3.32) 
Accordingly, the capacity utilization rate is given by 
_!(%#7) = b=!a]=!eE`!\!$% .																																																			(f. ff) 
Next, given that the intermediate good firms operate in the perfect competitive market, hence 
the optimal profit for the firms in each period ! is zero. Recall that the profit for firms B!J 
can be formulated as follow B!J = ab=!]! + (I! − c(_!))`!\! − C3!I!$%\! ,         (3.34) 
where ab=!]! is the capital share of revenue, (I! − c(_!))`!\! is the effective capital that 
left over and C3!I!$%\! is the credit cost that firms must pay to financial intermediaries. 
Since in the competitive market the profit for firms is equal to zero state by state, the market 
lending rate that firms need to pay to financial intermediaries in period ! can be defined as 
follow 0 = ab=!]! + (I! − c(_!))`!\!$% − C3!I!$%\! ,                      (3.35) 
hence, C3! = F$!>?!H!5!&# + K!5!&# EI! − c(_!)G.     (3.36) 
Given this return on capital information, we can define the credit spread g! as follows g! = ,!C3!#%C! ,																																																				(f. fh) 
which represents the difference between lending rate and deposit rate when the formula is 
loglinearized as gi! = ,!ECj3!#% − Cj!G.                                         (3.38) 
3.3.5 Capital Goods Producers 
Recall that at the end of period !, intermediate good firms have an option to sell used capital 
to capital producing firms. Capital producing firms will purchase the capital and harness it 
to refurbish the depreciated capital as new capital, which then are sold back to intermediate 
good firms. The model assumes that there is flow adjustment cost associated with producing 
new capital. The capital producing firms will maximise their preference, which is given by  
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,! -∑ /!F!," k(I! − 1)lL! − % 0 M'(#M))M'(&##M))5 (lL" + lNN)m(")! 7,   (3.39) 
subject to lL! ≡ l! − c(_!)`!\!$%,     (3.40) 
where lL! denotes net investment, l! denotes gross investment and lNN denotes the steady 
state of gross investment. The c(_!)`!\!$% denotes the quantity of depreciated capital. The 
gross investment l! is determined by following the law motion of capital  \! as follow, l! = \! − \!$%`!(1 − c(_!)).   (3.41) 
As shown above, the capital acquired to produce output at period (! + 1) depends on the 
effective capital in period ! and the gross investment. The first order condition from the 
optimisation problem in equation (3.34) and (3.35) gives the function of capital price '* as 
follow, 
'* = 1 + h+2 + ,,* + ,--,,*./ + ,-- − 1.0 + h+ + ,,* + ,--,,*./ + ,-- − 1.+ ,,* + ,--,,*./ + ,--. −,! n/F!,!#%h" 0M'!"##M))M'!#M)) − 150M'!"##M))M'!#M)) 5Oo,       (3.42) 
where hP denotes the elasticity of investment adjustment cost. 
3.3.6 Final Goods Producers 
There is a continuum of final good producers (retailers) that sums at unity in the economy. 
Final good producers acquire intermediate output from intermediate good firms to be 
repackaged as final output. The retailers simply repackage intermediate output by the rule 
that it requires one unit of intermediate output to produce one unit of retail output. The 
retailers then aggregate final output through the CES composite aggregator which is given 
by 
]! = p∫ ]Q,!(2&#)2%* r 2(2&#),      (3.43) 
where ]Q,! is the final output produced by retailer f at period ! and s is the elasticity of 
substitution. Maximising total output ]! given in equation (3.43) with respect to the total 
expenditure t! = ∫ bQ!%* ]Q!u% results in a relationship between the individual retailer final 
output and the aggregate final output as follow ]Q! = 0F4!F! 5$R ]! ,                (4.44) 
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b! = 0∫ bQ!%$R%* u%5 #(#&2).       (3.45) 
Furthermore, the retailers are assumed to operate in a monopolistic environment with 
nominal rigidities ala Calvo. Specifically, in each period retailers are able to adjust price 
optimally with probability (1 − v) with the price indexation follows the lagged rate of 
inflation. The retailers then set the reset price b!∗to solve the following optimisation problem ,! -∑ v"/"F!,!#" - F!∗F!"(∏ (1 + x!#3$%)T6 − b=!#""3)% 7 ]Q!#"(")* 7.    (3.46) 
The first order condition is given by  ,! -∑ v"/"F!,!#" - F!∗F!"(∏ (1 + x!#"$%)T6 − 0 RR$%5b=!#""3)% 7 ]Q!#"(")* 7 = 0.    (3.47) 
By the law of large numbers, the evolution of the price level can be derived as given by 
b! = p(1 − v)b!∗(%$R) + vEx!$%T6 b!$%G(%$R)r #(#&2),     (3.48) 
which can be simplified into 
x! = p(1 − v)x!∗(%$R) + vEx!$%T6 G(%$R)r #(#&2),      (3.49) 
which defines inflation.   
3.3.7 Resource Constraint 
In the resource constraint, the production of output is divided into private 
consumption, investment, government consumption, adjustment cost of capital and the 
government intermediation. The resource constraint is given by the following equation ]! = *! + l! + y! + zM!I!\! + ( M'!#M))M'!&##M)) − 1)O(lL! + lNN),   (3.50) 
where M!I!\!denotes the amount of government intermediation, which is generated by the 
authority to be supplied to financial intermediaries. The model also assumes that the 
efficiency cost by z per unit supplied exists during the government intermediation process. 
This cost basically reflects activities during the lending process such as the cost of raising 
funds via government debt or the cost of selecting the eligible private firms. Furthermore, y! denotes the government consumption, which is set purposively fixed as y! = yNN,           (3.51) 
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where yNN is the steady state of government consumption, which is defined as 0.2 times of 
output. Furthermore, government expenditures are financed by lump sum taxes and 
government intermediation. Specifically,  yNN + zM!I!\! = ?! + (C3! − C!)>2!$%,             (3.52) 
where >2!$% denotes government bonds which finance total government intermediated 
assets,	M!I!\!. 
3.3.8 The Central Bank 
It is assumed that there is a central bank that manages two economic policies in the economy 
namely the conventional monetary policy and the quantitative easing policy simultaneously. 
In managing the monetary policy, the central bank is assumed to follow a simple Taylor rule 
with the interest rate smoothing {", which is given by 
CL! = (1 − {") |}Ux! + }V pWX!	Z2&#2 [r~ + {"CL!$% + s!\ ,    (3.53) 
where CL! denotes the nominal interest rate, *! is marginal cost at period ! and s!\ 	is 
monetary policy shock. It is important to note that marginal cost and intermediate goods 
price have an inverse relationship *! = %F$!	.           (3.54) 
The nominal interest rate also needs to follow the Fisher equation, which is given by CL! = C!,!(x!#%)	.             (3.55) 
On the other hand, the central bank manages the quantitative easing policy by setting up the 
level of the credit injection ratio M! in the economy by following a credit policy rule which 
is given by M! = M + }E123(C3!#%) − 123(C!#%) − (123C3 − 123C)G + !!"	,    (3.56) 
where !#$ denotes credit injection shock and M is the steady state of the credit injection ratio. 
Hence, under the simple policy rule regime, the credit injection ratio is defined as a change 
of spread between lending rate and deposit rate towards their steady state. 
3.3.9 Exogenous Shock 
The economy is assumed to be hit by four different exogenous shocks namely technology 
shock (!!"), capital quality shock (!!#), banking net worth shock (!!$), monetary policy shock (!!%) and credit injection shock (!#$). Two of shocks with a persistence are technology shock 
and capital quality shock, which are given as follows 
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 ^! = 0.95^!$% + s!]																																				  (3.57) `! = 0.66`!$% + s!H ,																																			  (3.58) 
where ^! is technology and `! is capital quality. On the other hand, banking net worth shock 
and monetary policy shock have no persistence. 
3.3.10 Parameter Values 
The model is calibrated following the U.S. economic parameter values on the quarterly basis. 
The parameter values used in the model are shown in the Table 3.1, which mostly follow 
those in the original model of Getler and Karadi (2011). However, some parameters are 
emphasised. For example, we set the steady state of the credit injection ratio in the economy 
by zero which reflects that under normal condition, no quantitative easing policy is 
necessary. In other words, under normal condition, all credit in the economy come from the 
banking sector.  
Table 3-1: Model Parameters 
Parameters Values Description 
b 0.99 Discount rate 
s 1 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
h 0.815 Habit formation parameters 
c 3.4 Starting value for the labour utility weight 
j 0.276 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply 
h 7.2 Elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to the utilisation rate 
l 0.3815 Starting value of divertible fraction 
w 0.002 Starting value of proportional starting up funds 
q 0.971 The survival probability 
a 0.33 Capital share 
d 0.025 Depreciation rate 
hi 1.728 Elasticity of investment adjustment cost 
e 4.167 Elasticity of substitution between goods  
g 0.779 Calvo parameter 
gp 0.241 Price indexation parameter 
ri 0 Interest rate smoothing parameter 
kp 1.5 Inflation coefficient in simple monetary rule 
ky -0.125 Output gap coefficient in simple monetary rule # 10 Credit Parameter 
t 0.001 Costs of credit policy !#% -0.01 Shock on technology !#& -0.05 Shock on capital quality !#' -0.01 Shock on banking net worth !#( 0.25 Shock on nominal interest rate !#$ 0.072 Shock on credit injection 
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In this chapter, we also assume that the interest rate smoothing parameter in the simple 
monetary policy rule to be zero, which reflects that the central bank does not prefer to smooth 
interest rate when setting the monetary policy instrument. Although a non-zero interest rate 
smoothing parameter is also possible, we only present the case when the central bank is not 
smoothing the policy rate. Finally, in the simple policy rule regime, the central bank 
implements a credit policy rule with credit parameter 10. This credit parameter is important 
as it represents the central bank’s level of aggressiveness in combatting crisis. Other 
parameter values are standard. For example the discount rate is 0.99, the capital share is 0.33, 
and the habit formation parameter is 0.815. 
3.4 Result and Analysis 
3.4.1 Scenario Map 
This section explains the simulation map of policy interaction between conventional 
monetary policy (MP) and quantitative easing (QE) policy. The scenario map is described 
in Figure 3.1 below. 
 
 
 
 The simulation is classified into two scenarios: the cooperation scenario and the 
independent scenario. The cooperation scenario is the situation where conventional 
monetary policy and quantitative easing policy cooperate; meaning that the two policies 
pursue a single objective function of the central bank. This situation contrasts with the 
independent scenario where the two policies pursue different objective 
Figure 3-1: The Map of Simulation 
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functions. Throughout this study, the terms ‘policy objective’, ‘loss function’, and ‘objective 
function’ have the same meaning and are used interchangeably. We suppose this separation 
of objective functions under the same institution is possible due to crisis circumstances. The 
construction of objective functions for the two policies will be provided in the subsequent 
section. 
 Within the cooperation scenario, we present four policy regimes. The first policy 
regime is the fully optimal commitment policy regime (commitment regime). Under this 
regime, the central bank optimises the nominal interest rate and the credit injection ratio 
simultaneously according to a fully optimal commitment policy regime. The fully optimal 
commitment policy regime means that the central bank is assumed to adhere to all policy 
rules from the initial period and implement all rules in all subsequent periods without 
reoptimising. In the end, the optimal rule for the nominal interest rate and the credit injection 
ratio will contain all endogenous information from the economic model, the shocks, and the 
lagrange multipliers. Lagrange multipliers are present in the commitment rule to indicate the 
cost that the central bank must bear from implementing the commitment policy (Dennis, 
2007). The commitment regime allows the central bank to extract all available information 
from the economic model completely. In contrast, the second policy regime within the 
cooperation scenario is the discretionary policy regime (discretion regime). We describe 
discretion as where the policymaker optimising today is the Stackelberg leader, and the 
private sector agents and future policymakers are the Stackelberg followers (Dennis, 2007). 
Differing from the commitment regime, the discretion regime assumes the central bank 
reoptimises in every period. 
 The third policy regime under the cooperation scenario is the simple policy rule 
regime. In this policy regime, we assume the central bank implements non-optimal simple 
rules in setting the level of policy instruments. That is, the central bank implements a simple 
taylor rule to determine the level of nominal interest rate and uses the credit policy rule in 
setting up the level of credit injection ratio. The simple Taylor rule follows the equation 
(3.48) while the credit policy rule follows the equation (3.51). Hence, we assume that the 
nominal interest rate is determined based on the deviation of inflation and output from their 
steady state. As for the credit injection ratio, its level is determined based on the deviation 
of return on capital and real interest rate from their steady state. All parameters in the two 
simple rules are adopted from the original model of Gertler and Karadi (2011). For instance, 
no interest rate smoothing parameter is given in the simple taylor rule, which means that the 
policy rate that the central bank determines today is independent from the policy rate that 
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the central bank set yesterday. In the non-optimal simple quantitative easing rule (i.e., credit 
policy rule), the level of central bank’s aggressiveness is set to be 10.  
 In the cooperating-leadership regime, we assume that the central bank sets the level 
of one policy instrument earlier, which is then followed by another policy instrument. Due 
to the cooperation, the follower has full information regarding the leader’s movement and 
hence incorporates the information to set up its policy instrument. The cooperating-
leadership regime consists of two regimes. The first one is the monetary policy regime, 
where the nominal interest rate is set before the credit injection ratio. The second one is the 
quantitative easing policy regime, where the nominal interest rate, as a follower, is optimised 
after the credit injection ratio is determined. Under the cooperating-leadership regime, the 
two policies have their own policy objectives, but the structure of their policy objectives is 
identical. 
 The independent scenario consists of two policy regimes. The first is the 
independent-simultaneous regime. In this regime, we suppose that the two policies target 
different loss functions, but are optimised simultaneously. Hence, although the same 
authority optimises the two policies simultaneously, the independence of the two policies is 
plausible because they have different policy objectives. Similarly, in the independent 
leadership regime, the two policies also target different loss functions. This independent-
leadership regime consists of two types of regimes, namely the monetary policy leadership 
regime and the quantitative easing leadership regime. In the monetary leadership policy 
regime, the central bank first determines the level of the nominal interest rate, which is then 
followed by optimising the level of the credit injection ratio. In this regime, the follower 
remains to incorporate information from the leader but will use that information to pursue a 
different objective function.  
 In summary, there are eight policy regimes entering the simulation in our study. 
Namely, (1) the fully optimal commitment regime; (2) the discretionary policy regime; (3) 
the simple policy rule regime; the cooperating-leadership regime ((4) monetary policy 
leadership and (5) quantitative easing leadership); (6) the independent-simultaneous regime, 
and the independent-leadership regime ((7) monetary leadership and (8) quantitative easing 
leadership). 
3.4.2 Loss Function 
This section explains the basic construction of the loss function used in the study. As 
explained previously, we introduce two scenarios, namely the cooperation and the 
independent scenarios. Under cooperation, the central bank holds dual mandates: to stabilise 
inflation and to achieve credit stability. In the loss function, credit stability is represented by 
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the fluctuation of credit spread, while inflation stability is represented by the fluctuation of 
inflation. Under the fully optimal commitment regime, the discretionary policy regime, and 
the simple rule regime, these dual mandates are constructed as a single loss function to reflect 
the importance of maintaining cooperation between the two policies. Hence, in addition to 
output and inflation, the loss function also includes the quadratic sum of the squared 
deviation from the credit spread, nominal interest rate, and credit injection ratio from their 
steady state, as shown below: 
+ÉJJ = ,* ÑÖ/!Ex!O + X?]j!O + X^gi!O + X\LCjL!O + X:Mj!OG(!)* Ü,													(f. áà) 
where X? , X^ , X\L, and X: are weights assigned to the corresponding variables relative to 
inflation. Under this study, those weights are set equal to one, which assumes that the central 
bank equally prioritises all variables in the loss function. Assigning the same weights also 
mean that credit stability is as important as inflation stability. The loss function under the 
cooperating-leadership regime also follows equation (3.59).  
 Given the simulation is conducted under different scenarios, the loss function is 
adjusted to capture the interaction between conventional monetary policy and quantitative 
easing policy. If both policies are working cooperatively, the construction of the loss 
function follows the loss in (3.59). However, when the two authorities work independently, 
the loss function between the two policies is designed differently. That is, the loss function 
(3.59) is split into two different functions as given in equation (3.60) and (3.61). 
+ÉJJWF = ,* ÑÖ/!Ex!O + X?]j!O + X\'CjL!O G(!)* Ü																													(f. âä) 
+ÉJJ5, = ,* ÑÖ/!EXi?]j!O + Xi^gi!O + Xi:Mj!OG(!)* Ü,																												(f. âã) 
where the notations in the loss function (3.60) and (3.61) are defined similarly to the loss 
function in equation (3.54). The equation (3.60) is the loss function for the conventional 
monetary policy, while equation (3.61) is the loss function given for quantitative easing 
policy. The two loss functions above imply that when conventional monetary policy and 
quantitative easing policy work independently, the composition of the loss function is 
different. The different composition reflects a different goal from each policy. Conventional 
monetary policy focuses on minimising the fluctuation of inflation, output, and policy rate. 
On the other hand, quantitative easing policy focuses on minimising the fluctuation of 
output, credit spread, and credit injection ratio. We set both independent policies to target 
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minimising output in their loss function, as real sector growth is always a top priority during 
an economic crisis. 
There are some assumptions made to the loss function above. First, the loss function 
is purposively designed to contain observed variables. Unlike the fully optimal loss function 
that harnesses the full information of the model, the ad-hoc loss function is built by assuming 
that not all endogenous variables in the economy can be observed by the central bank. For 
example, some variables like the marginal utility of consumption, depreciation rate, or 
capacity utilisation rate are harder to observe than output or inflation. Hence, only focusing 
on key observed variables makes the ad-hoc loss function more realistic and implementable. 
Second, the loss function is categorised with two objectives: inflation stability and credit 
stability objective. As explained in Woodford (2011), the target criterion (3.59) implies that 
the central bank should be willing to sacrifice a certain degree of inflation stability to gain 
greater credit stability, and vice versa. Therefore, an ad-hoc loss function encompassing the 
two policy instruments can illustrate this welfare transfer in a straightforward yet traceable 
way.  
Third, the use of credit spread to represent credit stability is provided to suit the 
model from Gertler and Karadi (2011), who claims that the only source that amplifies the 
financial imbalance in the model is moral hazard, which is triggered by ambitious bankers 
to gain higher profits. Therefore, the movement of credit spread in the economy influences 
the path of credit intermediation from banks; that is., the credit spread above (below) its 
steady state can incentivise bankers to excel (dampen) credit. Hence, we believe that 
stabilising credit spread is preferred to maintain credit stability in the financial markets. 
Finally, the quantitative easing policy instrument, that is, the credit injection ratio, is 
included in the loss function because the central bank would always want to minimise the 
amount of credit injection. This study does not explicitly state where the credit injection 
comes from: it could be from the central bank reserves, banking fees, or even from printing 
money. Regardless of its sources, over credit injection will expand the central bank’s balance 
sheet and potentially expose the economy to the risk of detrimental future consequences. 
Therefore, the existence of the credit injection ratio in the loss function works as a penalty 
that reduces policy performance if the central bank injects credit too aggressively.  
The disadvantage of excessive credit injection is mentioned in studies such as Cui 
and Sterk (2018); Kiley (2008); and Fernandez, Bortz, and Zeolla (2018). The incorporation 
of the policy instrument in the loss function also appears in Paoli and Paustian (2013), even 
though the study is about macroprudential policy. They found that incorporating 
macroprudential instruments in the loss function can reduce welfare loss. Hence, we submit 
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that incorporating the quantitative easing policy instrument is possibly able to minimise the 
loss. Similarly, the presence of a monetary instrument in the loss function enhances certainty 
for bankers in operating their business by minimising the fluctuation of the official interest 
rate (a highly fluctuating policy rate can punish the central bank with a smaller policy 
performance). Finally, since this study utilises an ad-hoc loss function, it is very important 
to note that the result of simulation is highly dependent on the weights assigned to the 
variables in the loss function. The simulation can deliver different results for different 
weights assigned. Hence, the result from this study is valid under the assumption that the 
central bank equalises its concern towards all variables in the loss function, and where the 
weight given to inflation is equal to that of other variables. 
3.4.3 Policy Performance Under the Cooperation Scenario 
The comparison of performance across all policy regimes is conducted based on a measure 
called the unconditional loss value, also known as policy performance. Hence, the terms 
‘loss value’ or ‘policy performance’ are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. The 
smaller number of the loss value indicates a better policy performance. The loss is called as 
unconditional as it is calculated based on all innovations in the model, in which in our model 
consists of five types of shocks: technology shock, capital quality shock, net worth shock, 
monetary policy shock, and credit injection policy shock. The last two shocks only present 
in the simple policy rule regime. For commitment and discretion regime, the calculation of 
the loss value under cooperation scenario follows the method from Dennis (2007), while the 
method that calculates the loss in independent simultaneous and leadership regime follows 
the method from Dennis and Ilbas (2016). Based on these methods, Table 3.2 provides the 
simulation result of policy performance under the cooperation scenario. 
Table 3-2: The Simulation Result Under the Cooperation Scenario 
Policy Regime LOSS 
Fully optimal commitment 0.2973 
Simple policy rule 4.9035 
Discretionary policy 6.1530 
Monetary policy leadership  6.1530 
Quantitative easing leadership 6.1530 
 The loss in the fully optimal commitment regime is 0.2973, which is much smaller 
than the other two policy regimes. The simple policy rule regime is the second best with a 
loss at 4.9035, while the discretionary policy regime ranked the worst of the previous two 
with a loss value of 6.1530. Finally, the two cases of leadership with cooperation produce 
identical policy performance to the discretion regime at 6.1530. These results suggest that 
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having the central bank managing two policy instruments simultaneously under the 
commitment regime is superior to the other policy regimes. The result also implies that 
setting up the policy instruments without commitment can deteriorate policy performance 
significantly. For instance, the loss in the simple rule regime is twenty times higher than that 
of the fully optimal commitment regime. On the other hand, optimising the policy instrument 
under the discretionary policy regime results in a policy performance that thirty times worse 
than that of the fully optimal commitment regime. Similarly, policy performance declines 
substantially when the two policies interact under a leadership manner, although the two 
policies target a single objective function. 
 The positive impact of commitment in quantitative easing is similar to what was 
argued by Ugai (2007), Beriel and Mendes (2015), Khrisnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2011), and Oda and Ueda (2007), among others, who argue that commitment is an essential 
factor in the operation of quantitative easing policy. Our finding regarding the important role 
of commitment also support the argument from Woodford (2012) who argues that 
quantitative easing is not only about the large-scale asset purchased by the central bank, but 
also reflects the central bank’s effort in signalling its commitment to the public. However, it 
is natural that the commitment regime produces the best policy performance. Under 
commitment, the central bank can extract all available information from the economy and 
observe all exogenous shocks thoroughly. Unfortunately, having a central bank that can 
harness information in the economy completely is not something relevant in practice, 
especially under an economic crisis. Therefore, the fully optimal commitment regime should 
ideally work only as a benchmark. Accordingly, if the commitment regime is a benchmark, 
then an interesting result is shown between the simple policy rule regime and the 
discretionary policy rule regime.  
 The comparison of policy performance between these two regimes reveals that the 
simple policy rule regime can perform 20% better than the discretionary policy regime. This 
result suggests that using a non-optimal simple rule for monetary policy and quantitative 
easing policy is better than letting the central bank to reoptimise in every period. The result 
is interesting because in practice quantitative easing is not determined based on a simple rule 
but rather is based on a balance-sheet target from a committee meeting. This finding is valid 
under the assumption of the non-optimal simple rule, which is adopted from the orginal 
model of Gertler and Karadi (2011). Therefore, the superiority of the simple policy rule 
regime to the discretion regime indicates that there could be an optimal simple rule to 
represent the quantitative easing policy. 
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           Although the simple policy rule regime performs better than the discretionary policy 
regime, this result is only conditionally valid on a specific credit parameter }. Recall that the 
simple quantitative easing rule used in the simulation is defined as M! = M + }E123(C3!#%) − 123(C!) − (123C3 − 123C)G + å!N	.    (3.62) 
The result of our simulation is when the credit parameter } in the simple rule is 10. The 
credit parameter in the simple quantitative easing rule in the model reflects the central bank’s 
aggressiveness to combat the crisis, which means that a higher value of credit parameter 
indicates that the central bank is more aggressive in combatting the crisis. Considering that 
the level of the central bank’s aggressiveness in combatting the economic crisis is an 
exogenous factor, we need to see what happen when the simple policy rule regime counts 
on the degree of the central bank’s aggressiveness. Table 3.3 illustrates the policy 
performance of the simple policy rule regime when the credit parameter in the simple 
quantitative easing rule is gradually changed. Under this simulation, we assume that the the 
central bank does not smooth the policy rate (that is, the interest rate smoothing parameter 
in the simple monetary policy rule is set to be zero). 
Table 3-3: Simple Policy Rule Regime Under Various Credit Parameters 
Credit parameter LOSS 
1 3.7372 
10 4.9035 
15 6.2565 
50 19.8216 
100 51.5304 
 As shown in the table above, the policy performance in the simple policy rule regime 
varies when the credit parameter is gradually changed. More precisely, the policy 
performance worsens when the credit parameter in the simple quantitative easing rule rises. 
And, policy performance deteriorates quickly. For example, the loss when the credit 
parameter is equal to one is 3.7372, while in the case when the central bank is very aggressive 
(that is, when credit parameter is 100), the loss significantly jumps to 51.5394, which is 16 
times worse than the former. Hence, at this rate the discretionary policy regime performs 
better than the simple policy rule regime. Equivalently, the result in Table 3.3 implies that a 
finding that the loss in the simple policy rule regime is better than that of the discretionary 
policy regime is conditional on the level of the central bank’s aggressiveness in combatting 
a crisis. The more aggressive the central bank in combatting a crisis, the smaller policy 
performance of a simple policy rule regime will be. 
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           Another insight from the finding in Table 3.2 is that the gap between the fully optimal 
commitment regime and other policy regimes is expansive. For example, the loss difference 
between the commitment regime and that of the discretionary policy regime is enormous, 
which is 0.2973 and 6.1530, respectively. To further observe which policy instrument drives 
such a significant difference, we disentangle the fully optimal commitment regime into two 
cases. The first case is when the central bank only minimises the loss function using the 
nominal interest rate according to a fully optimal commitment, while the level of the credit 
injection ratio is determined by a simple quantitative easing policy rule from equation (3.62). 
In the second case, the central bank minimises loss function by optimising only the credit 
injection ratio under a fully optimal commitment, while the nominal interest rate is 
determined by the simple monetary Taylor rule. Table 3.4 demonstrates the comparison 
between these two cases. 
Table 3-4: The Simulation Result Under One Institutional Setting 
Optimal Commitment Regime LOSS 
Case I  : optimising nominal interest rate 0.4177 
Case II : optimising credit injection ratio 3.4163 
As shown in Table 3.4 above, in the first case, which is the case when the central 
bank only optimises the nominal interest rate and has the credit injection ratio determined 
by a simple quantitative easing rule, policy performance is delivered at 0.4177. In the second 
case, which is the case when the central bank only optimises the credit injection ratio and 
determines the nominal interest rate through the simple monetary Taylor rule, policy 
performance deteriorates to 3.4163. Therefore, policy performance significantly deteriorates 
when the central bank neglects to optimise the conventional monetary policy under the 
commitment regime and only focuses on optimising the quantitative easing policy alone. 
Comparing this result to the policy performance of the fully optimal commitment regime in 
Table 3.2, this result suggests that optimising the nominal interest rate alone (monetary 
policy) without optimising the credit injection ratio (quantitative easing policy) can worsen 
policy performance by 40.49%, which is derived from 
$%&''()(&%)* = ,1 − &'((!"##$%#&'%&'((!()&	+ / = ,1 − ).+,-.)./0--/ 	1	100% = 40.49%						 (3.63) 
 On the other hand, using a similar method (3.58) to the second case in Table 3.4, we 
can find that optimising quantitative easing policy alone without monetary policy can worsen 
the policy performance 10.49 times worse than that of the fully optimal commitment regime. 
Based on the policy performance, this result suggests that optimising monetary policy 
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instrument remains superior to optimising the quantitative easing policy alone, even amid 
an economic crisis when the monetary policy is theoretically less functional. Hence, the large 
gap between the performance of the fully optimal commitment regime with the other policy 
regimes ultimately occurs because the impact of optimal monetary policy is more significant 
than the impact of quantitative easing policy on the economy. This finding suggests that 
monetary policy should still be the primary tool in the economy, even when it interacts 
simultaneously with quantitative easing policy. 
 Although the loss value derived in the second case is worse than the first case, 
optimising the credit injection ratio alone outperforms the discretionary policy regime. 
Specifically, the loss from optimising quantitative easing policy alone is 3.4163, while the 
loss from the discretionary policy regime is 6.1530. Similarly, the policy performance of the 
second case is also better than the performance of the simple policy rule regime in Table 3.2. 
That is, given that the loss value of the simple policy rule regime is 4.9035, the method (3.58) 
in the second case improves policy performance by 30.32% over that of the simple policy 
rule regime. This finding suggests that although quantitative easing is less powerful than 
conventional monetary policy, optimising quantitative easing policy alone under fully 
optimal commitment is still better off than leaving it nonoptimally under discretion, in a non-
optimal simple policy rule regime, or a cooperating-leadership regime. 
 The third insight from the simulation is that the leadership under the coordination 
setting equals performance of the discretionary policy regime. This result suggests that 
leadership does not contribute anything to policy performance as long as the two policies 
pursue the single objective function. Hence, no matter which policy instrument the central 
bank optimises first, the final policy performance will be identical to the case when the two 
policy instruments interact under the discretionary policy regime. However, this result 
differs when the two policies are independent, as will be explained subsequently. 
3.4.4 Policy Performance in the Independent Scenario 
In this scenario, we allow a situation where conventional monetary policy and quantitative 
easing policy interact independently. As explained previously, the independence is defined 
as a situation when each policy pursues a different objective function. That is, monetary 
policy aims to stabilise inflation, the nominal interest rate, and output, while quantitative 
easing policy aims to stabilise credit spread, output, and the credit injection ratio. We allow 
the two policies to stabilise output to emphasise the importance of output growth during an 
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economic crisis2. However, although the two loss functions contain output, their 
independence is well maintained because the central bank does not have a single objective 
function.  
 This scenario introduces three policy regimes: the independent-simultaneous regime, 
the independent monetary policy leadership regime, and the independent quantitative easing 
leadership regime. In the simultaneous interaction, the two independent policies optimise 
their own policy instrument at the same time. In contrast, in the leadership interaction, the 
two policies do not move simultaneously, but one policy instrument is optimised after the 
optimisation of the other. The policy acting as a follower optimises its policy instrument by 
importing information from the leader’s policy instrument into the optimisation problem. 
Using the method from Dennis and Ilbas (2016), the simulation of these three policy regimes 
is given in Table 3.5. 
Table 3-5: The Simulation Result Under One Institutional Setting 
Policy Regime Independent 
LOSSMP LOSSQE 
Simultaneous 5.7868 6.0693 
Monetary policy leadership  5.7849 6.0670 
Quantitative easing leadership 6.0722 5.7888 
 As shown in the table above, when the two policies interact independently, the 
simulation demonstrates that the performance of the two policies is no longer identical. 
Under independent-simultaneous policy regime, conventional monetary policy performs 
better with a loss value of 5.7868, which is smaller than that of the quantitative easing policy 
at 6.0693. If conventional monetary policy has a chance to move first, it still performs better 
than quantitative easing policy. In our study, the monetary policy loss value is 5.7849, which 
is better performance than that of quantitative easing at 6.0670. Finally, when quantitative 
easing acts as a leader, the situation is reversed. That is, quantitative easing policy performs 
better with a loss of 5.7888, which outperforms monetary policy at 6.0722.  
           The simulation result delivers some critical findings. First, interacting two 
independent policies is slightly better than operating the two policies simultaneously under 
discretion and cooperation, although it is still worse than the performance of the fully optimal 
commitment regime. For instance, the policy performances of monetary policy and 
 
2 The ad-hoc loss function for conventional monetary policy generally contains inflation and output, as given 
in Gali (2008). On the other hand, quantitative easing policy intends to reduce the cost of borrowing (Gertler 
and Karadi, 2011), which eventually is expected to increase economic growth. Thus, both policies eventually 
expect to revive real sector activity, and output is a measure that indicates how effective the two policies 
perform. 
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quantitative easing policy under the independent-simultaneous regime are 5.7868 and 
6.0693, respectively, and both results are better than the loss value under discretion at 
6.1530. However, in comparison to the simple policy rule regime, the independent scenario 
is underperforming. That is, the simple policy rule regime can deliver loss at 4.9305, which 
is better than having them interact independently under leadership. Note that the simple 
quantitative easing rule is assumed to use the credit parameter by 10. 
           Second, the impact of monetary policy on the economy remains stronger than that of 
the quantitative easing policy even when the two policies are independent yet move 
simultaneously. Recall from the previous section that when the central bank only optimises 
the nominal interest rate, their policy performance is 0.4177, which confirms that monetary 
policy remains more impactful than quantitative easing policy. A similar finding resulted 
even when the two independent policies interact simultaneously. Under this circumstance, 
the monetary policy’s performance is 5.7868, while quantitative easing policy performs at 
6.0693. However, the superiority of monetary policy no longer holds when quantitative 
easing overtakes the leadership, as explained subsequently. 
 Third, switching from a simultaneous to an independent-leadership regime can make 
the leading policy better off. The simulation on the leadership regime illustrates that the 
leading policy can earn higher benefit in the form of a smaller loss value than the case when 
the two independent policies interact simultaneously. For instance, the loss value of 
quantitative easing policy decreases from 6.0693 to 5.7888 (4.62%) when the policy regime 
is switched from simultaneous to a quantitative easing leadership regime. On the other hand, 
the monetary policy loss value only declines from 5.7868 to 5.7849 (0.03%) when the policy 
regime is switched from simultaneous to the monetary policy leadership regime. Therefore, 
the improvement of quantitative easing policy under leadership is better than monetary 
policy. However, as shown in the example, the improvement is only modest. 
 Fourth, in the independent-leadership regime, our simulation demonstrates that the 
policy leader performs better than the follower. For instance, when the central bank 
optimises the nominal interest rate before optimising the credit injection ratio, conventional 
monetary policy performs with loss 5.7849, which is better than that of quantitative easing 
policy with a loss of 6.0670. Equivalently, when the central bank optimises the credit 
injection ratio in the first period, quantitative easing policy also performs better than 
monetary policy. That is, quantitative easing policy performs with a loss of 5.7888, while  
monetary policy performs with a loss of 6.0722. Besides indicating that the leader is superior, 
this finding also indicates that incorporating information from the first mover does not 
automatically cause the follower better off. This is most likely because now the follower’s 
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policy instrument must now face another extra constraint from the presence of the first 
mover. On the contrary, the leader is superior because it faces less constraint from the 
absence of the follower in the initial period. 
 In conclusion, the comparison of simulation between the cooperation scenario and 
the two independent scenario presents some findings. First, having monetary policy and 
quantitative easing policy to interact cooperatively under commitment is superior to all 
policy regimes. The positive impact of commitment in quantitative easing is similar to what 
was argued by Ugai (2007), Beriel and Mendes (2015), Khrisnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011), and Oda and Ueda (2007), among others, who argue that commitment is 
an essential factor in the operation of quantitative easing policy. Our finding regarding the 
important role of commitment also support the argument from Woodford (2012) who argues 
that quantitative easing is not only about the large-scale asset purchased by the central bank, 
but also reflects the central bank’s effort in signalling its commitment to the public. 
 Second, conditional on the level of the central bank’s aggressiveness, the simple 
policy rule regime offers second-best performance. Our simulation demonstrates that the 
simple policy rule regime performs better than the discretionary policy regime if the credit 
parameter in the simple quantitative easing policy rule is below 15, everything else equal. 
The simple quantitative easing policy rule used is the original credit policy rule adopted from 
the model of Gertler and Karadi (2011). In contrast, when the credit parameter is higher than 
15 (i.e., when the central bank’s aggressiveness increases), the policy performance is 
declining. Our finding regarding the falling policy performance, which also reflects the 
declining economic welfare, is in line wit the study from Cui and Sterk (2018) who state that 
although quantitative easing is a powerful instrument to stabilise inflation and output, it can 
substantially lower social welfare.  
 Third, interacting two independent policies is less recommended than having them 
managed under cooperation with commitment or a simple policy rule regime. However, the 
independent interaction setting, in either a simultaneous or a leadership setting, performs 
almost identically to that of the discretionary policy regime. This finding indicates that 
differing the two policies’ loss function with leadership will not give significant result to the 
case when the central bank manages a single loss function under discretion regime. Fourth, 
the role of leadership is beneficial for the policy leader. However, when the two independent 
policies interact simultaneously, conventional monetary policy remains superior. This result 
contributes to the literature indicating that quantitative easing policy is not meant to replace 
conventional monetary policy, which is in accordance the studies from Cui and Sterk (2018), 
Sheedy (2016), Kiley (2018), Curdia and Woodford (2018), among others. 
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3.4.5 Unconditional Variances 
This section decomposes the policy performance into the unconditional variances of the 
variables in the loss function. Table 3.6 illustrates the detailed unconditional variances for 
three policy regimes under the cooperation scenario.  
Table 3-6: Unconditional Variance Under One Institution Setting 
Regime Unconditional Variances ! "# $# %#1 &#  
Fully optimal commitment 0.0789 0.2184 0.0030 0.0473 0.0102 
Simple policy rule  0.0292 2.5834 0.0289 0.0898 2.6393 
Discretionary policy 0.1684 3.9857 0.4614 1.7295 0.0000 
The simple policy rule in te table is the case when the central bank implements Taylor rule 
and credit policy rule, respectively, as follows: 
CL! = (1 − {") |}Ux! + }V pWX!	Z2&#2 [r~ + {"CL!$% + s!\ ,    (3.62) M! = M + }E123(C3!#%) − 123(C!#%) − (123C3 − 123C)G + !!"	,    (3.63) 
We only simulate the cooperation scenario since the discretionary policy regime and the 
regimes under leadership scenario produce similar policy performance. Recall that the loss 
function contains two objectives. The first one is the inflation objective, which contains the 
quadratic of inflation, and the second one is the credit stability objective, which is 
constructed by the quadratic of credit spread. 
As shown from the table above, variables in the loss function fluctuate with different 
variances across different policy regimes. For instance, in the fully optimal commitment 
regime, the unconditional variance for inflation is 0.0789, which is higher than 0.0292 in the 
simple policy rule regime, and it is 0.1684 in the discretionary policy regime. Although the 
commitment regime is the best performing policy regime, the simple policy rule regime 
outperforms the other two policy regimes when it comes to the role of minimising inflation 
fluctuation.  
The fully optimal commitment regime is also best stabilising output credit spread, 
and the nominal interest rate. As an illustration, the variance of output under commitment is 
0.2184, which is much reduced volatility compared to fluctuations under the simple policy 
rule regime and the discretionary policy regime. Therefore, the commitment regime results 
in more stabilised output relative to the simple policy rule regime and the discretionary 
policy rule regime. The commitment regime also works effectively to dampen the fluctuation 
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of the nominal interest rate and credit spread. The variances for these two variables are 
0.0030 and 0.0473, respectively, which are also smaller than those in the other policy 
regimes. Finally, the credit injection ratio displays low volatility in the discretionary policy 
regime, which is the smallest value out of all the policy regimes. This tiny fluctuation 
suggests that quantitative easing policy is underperforming under discretion.  
Despite the differences mentioned above, the simulation also provides some 
similarities. First, except in the simple policy rule regime, output has the highest volatility 
out of all variables in the loss function. For instance, under the fully optimal commitment 
regime, output fluctuates with a variance by 0.2184, which is higher than the other variables 
in the loss function. Similarly, the fluctuation of output in the discretionary policy regime is 
3.9857, which is the highest of all variables in the loss function. Second, another finding is 
that credit injection ratio largely fluctuates in the simple policy rule regime. This result 
implies that the presence of the simple quantitative easing rule in the economy forces the 
authority to inject considerably more credit into the economy, which is far more significant 
than under the commitment regime and the discretion regime. However, everything else 
equal, this higher credit injection dampens the fluctuation of inflation more effectively than 
other policy regimes. 
3.4.6 Impulse Response Functions 
This section illustrates the impulse response function for the economy under various shocks. 
This part only introduces policy regimes under the cooperation scenario, because the impulse 
response function under the independent scenario is similar to that under discretion. Five 
types of shocks are present in the simulation – namely, minus one percent technology shock, 
minus five percent capital quality shock, minus one percent net worth shock, one percent 
increase of the nominal interest rate, and 7.2% increase of credit injection. The last two 
shocks are called monetary policy shock and credit injection shock, respectively, which are 
only present in the simple policy rule regime. 
• Technology Shock 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the impulse response function for key economic variables when a minus 
one percent technology shock, or also known as productivity shock, hits the economy. As 
show in equation (3.52), technology ^! is given in the form of first autoregressive as follows ^! = 0.95^!$% + s!]          (3.64) 
The only channel through which the technology shock can affect the economy is the 
production function.  
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Figure 3-2: Impulse Response Function of Economy Under Minus One Percent Technology Shock 
 By affecting this function, the adverse productivity shock decreases output across all 
policy regimes. The fall of output under the discretion regime is the deepest, while it is 
moderate under the simple policy rule regime, and the softest under commitment. This 
response of output is in line with the unconditional variances in Table 3.6.  
 All else equal, decreasing production also affects firms’ profitability, which can 
generate several impacts. First, smaller profits can reduce the amount of dividends sent to 
households. Consequently, households will earn less dividend revenues and also consume 
less, everything else equal. This explains why consumption falls at a similar extent across 
all policy regimes. Second, besides affecting households, smaller profits also attenuate 
firms’ ability to repay loans and hence diminish their creditworthiness. Given that debt is 
the chief source of financing for firms to purchase new capital, a productivity shock thus 
hampers firms from purchasing more new capital, which explains why investment across all 
policy regimes declines. Furthermore, everything else equal, the falling investment activity 
also triggers capital stock to decline. 
Smaller household income and weakening loan repayments from firms causes the 
banking sector to supply fewer loans to the economy because banks become more selective 
in choosing their borrowers. Considering that the supply of loans in the model is equal to 
capital stock, credit supply behaves similarly to the response of capital, which declines in all 
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policy regimes. This falling credit supply inevitably reduces banking profitability and erodes 
banks’ net worth, everything else equal. The impulse response function illustrates that banks’ 
net worth under the discretion regime plummets deeper than those under the commitment or 
the simple policy rule regime.  
As a result of the increasing losses, banks’ lending rates elevate, which widen the 
credit spread, all else being equal. The rising credit spread from its steady state is substantial 
in the discretion regime but is very modest under the commitment regime. The higher 
lending rate corresponds to a higher return on capital and lower capital prices. Falling capital 
prices then reduces the profitability of capital goods producers and disincentivizes them from 
creating more new capital in the economy. Without new capital goods produced, production 
falls even more and then reduces inflation. The impulse response function illustrates that 
inflation tends to decline under the commitment and simple policy rule regime, while it 
initially increases under the discretion regime before it gradually declines. 
 In managing an economy back to equilibrium, a banking authority optimises policy 
instruments employing conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing policy. The 
central bank implements monetary policy by increasing the nominal interest rate. Everything 
else equal, following the Fisher equation, a higher nominal interest rate is followed by a rise 
in the real interest rate, which further stimulates households to save more deposits and thus 
provides more funds for intermediaries to expand credit. Additionally, the central bank 
increases credit by elevating the credit injection ratio. These two countercyclical policies are 
expected to guide banks net worth back to its steady state, which subsequently empowers 
credit activity, increases new capital purchases, and stimulates production in the economy. 
Eventually, higher production corresponds to increased profitability for firms and raised 
household incomes, which sparksand consumption.  
 In conclusion, although each policy regime demonstrates a different response to the 
shock, they tend to move in a similar pattern. The impulse response function shows that 
output, inflation, credit spread, tnominal interest rate rate, and the credit injection ratio move 
consistently with the unconditional variances in our simulation. Variables under the 
commitment predominantly express less volatility than those under the discretion and simple 
rule regimes. For quantitative easing policy, the central bank in the simple policy rule regime 
injects the most credit into the economy, which is much more aggressive than other policy 
regimes. In contrast, the role of this ratio is hardly observed under discretion, which may 
explain why the economy under this regime recovers slowly. 
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• Capital Quality Shock 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the impulse response function of some key economic variables in the 
economy under a minus five percent capital quality shock. As show in equation (3.53), 
technology `! is given in the form of first autoregressive as follows `! = 0.66`!$% + s!H        (3.65) 
The adverse capital quality shock is an exogenous factor that diminishes the amount of 
productive capital used in the economy. One example of this shock is broken physical capital 
sold in the market. 
 
Figure 3-3: Impulse Response Function of Economy Under Minus Five Percent Capital Quality Shock 
Compared to the other shocks, the adverse capital quality shock has the most channels to 
affect an economy. These channels include the production function, capital accumulation 
equation, new bankers’ net worth accumulation, return on capital, and the optimal capacity 
utilisation rate. Overall, as will be shown, the impact of the shock is minimal under the 
commitment regime but is severe under the discretion regime. In the real sector, the shock 
diminishes capital acquired by firms across the three policy regimes. Capital in the simple 
policy rule regime falls almost three times deeper than that in the discretion regime, and it 
declines by two times deeper under the commitment regime. 
The fall in capital stock negatively affects firms’ production activity, and hence 
reduces output. Under discretion and the simple policy rule regime, output notably falls 
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under the discretion and simple policy rule regimes, but is relatively unaffected under 
commitment. The falling output also reduces firms’ profitability and thus decreases 
dividends for households. Everything else being equal, smaller income from dividends will 
corresponds to lower consumption. This explains why consumption falls across all policy 
regimes. The reduction of consumption is the deepest under the simple policy rule regime. 
The adverse capital quality shock also impacts capital prices negatively. That is, capital 
prices in all policy regimes plummet, with the discretionary policy regime posing the most 
significant fall. Reduced capital prices disincentivises capital good producers from 
producing new capital since falling capital prices curtail profits. As a result, investment in 
all policy regimes deteriorates. Investment also plummets deeply under the discretion regime 
due to the most profound decline of capital prices. 
In the financial sector, reductions in new capital production and capital purchased by 
firms hinder banks from intermediating more credit into the economy, which reduces banks’ 
profitability. Everything else equal, declining profit margin for banks triggers banks’ net 
worth to fall, which occurs across all policy regimes. Banks’ net worth falls most 
significantly under the discretion regime. Furthermore, the credit spread responds to 
declining net worth for banks by widening the range between the return on capital and the 
real interest rate, meaning the credit spread is widened. The credit spread reaches its highest 
deviation from the steady state under the discretionary policy regime. 
In normalising the economy, the central bank under the discretion regime elevates 
the nominal interest rate, which is then followed by a higher real interest rate, everything 
else equal. The higher real interest rate then stimulates households to save more deposits in 
banks, which allows banks to expand more credit, achieve higher profit, and improve net 
worth accumulation. On the contrary, the central bank under the simple policy rule regime 
normalizes the economy by cutting the nominal interest rate, which then suppresses the real 
interest rate, everything else equal. However, quantitative easing policy takes a prominent 
role in this regime. That is, the central bank in the simple rule regime injects more credit into 
the economy than under the commitment or discretion regimes. 
In conclusion, every policy regime responds to a capital quality shock in different 
ways. The fully optimal commitment regime is the least affected regime by the shock, while 
the discretion regime is the most affected. As for economic recovery after the shock, the 
commitment regime recovers more quickly than the other two policy regimes. Under the  
commitment regime, output, inflation, credit spread, nominal interest rate, and the credit 
injection ratio return to their steady state more quckly than those in other policy regimes. 
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Regarding the role of policy instruments, quantitative easing is the most active under the 
simple policy rule regime. 
• Net Worth shock 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the impact of a minus one percent of net worth shock on the economy. 
Net worth shock comes to the economy without persistence. The adverse net worth shock is 
as an exogenous factor that decreases banking capital. An example of this shock is a high 
non-performing loan that erodes banking capital. The net worth shock comes through one 
channel, namely the existing bankers' net worth accumulation.  
 
Figure 3-4: Impulse Response Function of Economy Under Minus One Percent Net Worth Shock 
The new bankers’ net worth declines across all policy regimes when an adverse net woth 
shock emerges. Everything else being equal, the fall in new bankers' net worth decreases the 
total net worth for banks as well. This decline in banking net worth then elevates risk in 
banks, which can result in a higher leverage across all policy regimes. Leverage in the simple 
policy rule regime increases to a higher degree than in the commitment and discretionary 
policy regimes. 
 In a net worth shock, credit activity is not affected substantially in the initial period, 
but gradually decreases as time passes. Depending on the response of capital prices, 
reductions in banking net worth influence the way banks intermediate credit. For instance, 
in the simple policy rule regime, the shock pressures capital prices downward which then 
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disincentivises capital goods producers from creating more new capital. As a result, credit 
intermediation weakens, which can be seen in the decline in capital purchased up to -15% 
below its steady state. In contrast, capital prices under the commitment and discretion 
regimes initially rise when the shock is present but then gradually declines in subsequent 
periods. We contend that this situation indicates that the fully optimal commitment regime 
and discretionary policy regime can delay investment from falling.  
 The positive response of capital prices under the commitment and discretion regimes 
encourage capital good producers to introduce more new capital into the economy. As a 
result, credit activity under these two policy regimes is not affected substantially. Thus, the 
credit spread rises only modestly to keep banks profitable. On the contrary, the credit spread 
must increase significantly in the simple policy rule regime because the credit supply is 
affected considerably. The different response among policy regimes is also seen in the output 
variable. Output under the commitment and discretion regimes respond positively to the 
shock in the initial period, but then declines below the steady state after some periods. 
Everything else equal, the positive response of output in the initial period also drives 
consumption temporarily at the beginning, but then declines to a level below the steady state 
in subsequent periods.  
 In normalising the economy, the central bank under three policy regimes manages 
the nominal interest rate and the credit injection ratio. From the monetary policy perspective, 
the central bank across regimes behave similarly, which is to cut the policy rate. This 
decision causes real interest rate to fall, everything else equal. However, from a quantitative 
easing perspective, the credit injection ratio rises substantially only under the simple policy 
rule regime. In contrast, credit injection is very small under the commitment and discretion 
regimes. Thus, under this type of shock, the role of quantitative easing is minuscule and the 
central bank relies more on monetary policy to stabilise the economy. 
 In conclusion, each policy regime responds to the net worth shock in different ways. 
The commitment regime remains superior, either regarding variable fluctuation or speed of 
recovery. The impact of shock is very small under the commitment and discretion regimes, 
but substantial under the simple policy rule regime. Credit activity is less affected under the 
commitment and discretion regimes, but fall substantially in the simple policy rule regime. 
Based on the volatility of most key economic variables, the economy under the fully optimal 
commitment regime and discretionary policy regime performs better than the simple policy 
rule regime when the adverse net worth shock is present in the economy. 
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• Interest Rate Shock 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the impulse response function for some key economic variables under 
the impact of one percent increase of nominal interest rate on the economy. Interest rate 
shock comes to the economy without persistence. The interest (!!" ) shock only affects the 
economy through the non-optimal Taylor simple rule as follows: CL! = (1 − {") |}Ux! + }V p _!	Z2&#2 [r~ + {"CL!$% + s!\          (3.66) 
 
Figure 3-5: Impulse Response Function of Economy Under One Percent Interest Rate Shock 
 This type of shock is only present under the simple policy rule regime, as the sudden 
increase of the nominal interest rate comes to the economy only through a simple monetary 
policy rule. In practice, an example of this shock is the unanticipated increase of a policy 
rate from the central bank, which elevates the nominal interest rate. This shock also 
represents a situation where the central bank committee decision is totally beyond market 
expectation. By the Fisher equation, the higher nominal interest rate corresponds to the 
higher real interest rate, holding inflation unchanged. 
 Given higher real interest rates increase the return on deposits, the return on capital 
should also increase to keep banks remaining profitable. As a result, everything else equal, 
the credit spread increases by 25% from the steady state when the shock emerges. The higher 
return on capital also suggests that borrowing costs now become more expensive. Therefore, 
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firms can only purchase fewer capital than usual. As shown, capital acquired by firms 
declines up to 30% below the steady state after some periods, although it is relatively 
unchanged in the initial period. Everything else equal, a higher return on capital reduces 
capital prices, which then disincentivises capital good producers from generating more new 
capital. As a result, investment in the economy plummets when the shock occurs. Another 
impact from decreasing investment is that banks now issue less debt to firms due to the lower 
capital availability in the economy. Moreover, since credit is the primary source of banking 
profit, this situation pressures banks’ net worth as well. Also, given that banking credit is the 
primary source for firms to purchase capital, this shock also negatively affects production, 
which subsequently reduces inflation. 
 In normalising the economy, the central bank implements quantitative easing policy 
by injecting credit into the economy. Notably, the credit injection ratio is not optimised but 
is determined by a simple quantitative easing rule, which is adopted from the original credit 
rule from Gertler and Karadi (2011). When the interest rate shock presents, the credit 
injection ratio increases by 60% of the total credit. From the monetary policy perspective, 
the central bank cuts the nominal interest rate to slightly below zero percent in a few periods 
after the shock emerges, which then suppresses the real interest rate, everything else equal. 
The lower real interest rate can help lower future lending rates and also narrow the credit 
spread. As the credit spread goes down, lending rates decline and loans become more 
affordable for firms. As an effect, firms can purchase more new capital to increase 
production. Everything else equal, more capital acquired is helpful to improve production, 
increase output, and drives consumption. Expanding credit also improves banking capital 
and capital prices upward.  
           In conclusion, the presence of a positive monetary policy shock in the simple policy 
rule regime generates a negative impact on the economy. The shock disturbs economic 
equilibrium by making credit less affordable for firms, which subsequently pressures capital 
prices, investment, output, and consumption. Under the simple policy rule regime, the role 
of quantitative easing is observable in the form of a higher credit injection into the economy. 
However, since this shock only holds in the simple policy rule regime, it is hard to compare 
the impulse response of key economic variables under this shock to the other policy regimes. 
• Credit Injection Shock 
Figure 3.6 depicts the impulse response function for some key economic variables under a 
7.2% credit injection shock. A credit injection shock is a sudden increase of credit provided 
to the economy, or,  a sudden quantitative easing decision. Credit injection shock comes the 
economy in the form of first autoregressive process as follows 
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`!6 = 0.66`!$%6 + s!H ,        (3.67) 
where `!6 represents credit injection shock. Although a surprising injection of quantitative 
easing is not commonplace (because quantitative easing must always be preannounced), we 
provide the impulse response function under this shock for for thoroughness in our 
simulation. The only channel for this shock to enter the economy is through the simple credit 
policy rule. Hence, this shock is only valid under the simple policy rule regime.  
The credit policy shockt (!#$) shock only affects the economy through the non-optimal Taylor 
simple rule as follows: M! = M + }E123(C3!#%) − 123(C!#%) − (123C3 − 123C)G + !!"        (3.68) 
 
Figure 3-6: Impulse Response Function of Economy Under Adverse Macroprudential Policy Shock 
The first variable affected when the shock comes to the economy is the credit 
injection ratio, which jumps positively in the initial period. This credit injection to financial 
intermediaries affects banking net worth positively, such that banking capital increases up 
to four times higher than its steady state. Subsequently, higher banking net worth enables 
intermediaries to inject more credit into the economy. Besides affecting banking net worth, 
the shock also rises capital prices. Higher capital prices reduce the return on capital, which 
means credit becomes more affordable due to a lower lending rate. The higher capital prices 
also incentivise capital goods producer to generate more new capital in the economy, which 
then stimulates investment. With rising banking net worth and higher production of new 
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capital, banks are able to expand lending to the economy. Therefore, the capital acquired by 
firms also increases. Everything else equal, having more capital in the economy also helps 
firms to hire more labors and increase output. This positive rise in output then drives up 
consumption, everything else equal. As consumption is growing, inflation also rises above 
its steady state.  
In conclusion, the presence of a credit policy shock in the form of significant credit 
injection contributes positively for some macroeconomic variables. For financial 
intermediaries, the shock can help banks expand credit, which then accelerates production 
and subsequently induces positive, investment, output, and consumption. However, as 
explained in the previous section, although a high quantitative easing injection can benefit 
an economy, its presence can deteriorate policy performance. 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This study focuses on the interaction between conventional monetary policy and quantitative 
easing policy in the economy using the unconventional monetary policy model from Gertler 
and Karadi (2011). There are two scenarios presented in this study: the cooperation scenario 
and the independent scenario. The cooperation scenario offers four policy regimes: the fully 
optimal commitment regime, the simple policy rule regime, the discretionary policy regime, 
and the cooperating-leadership regime. The cooperating-leadership regime consists of the 
monetary policy leadership regime and the quantitative easing leadership regime. 
Furthermore, two policy regimes are introduced in the independent scenario, namely the 
independent-simultaneous regime and the independent-leadership regime. The independent-
leadership regime consists of the monetary policy leadership regime and the quantitative 
easing leadership regime.  
 The loss function used in the model is an ad-hoc loss function constructed by 
quadratic deviation of output, inflation, credit spread, nominal interest rate, and the credit 
injection ratio from their steady state. Under the cooperation regime, both conventional 
monetary policy and quantitative easing policy pursue a single central bank’s objective 
function, while under the independent scenario, the central bank uses a different objective 
function for each policy. The interaction algorithm and performance measurement across 
regimes are conducted by following studies from Dennis (2007) and Dennis and Ilbas 
(2016).   
 This work demonstrates that the commitment regime under the cooperation scenario 
produces the best policy performance while the discretion regime performs the worst. This 
finding is in line with studies by Woodford (2012), Ugai (2007), Beriel and Mendes (2015), 
Khrisnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), and Oda and Ueda (2007), among others, who 
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argue that commitment is an essential factor in the operation of quantitative easing policy. 
Moreover, the conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing policy that interact 
under the leadership setting perform identically and similar to the performance of the 
discretionary policy regime.  
 However, when they interact independently using leadership, the study found that 
the leading policy performs better than the follower, but their difference in performance 
relative to the discretionary policy regime is unremarkable. The finding that quantitative 
easing is better off when it plays as a leader (i.e., when it is optimised before the presence of 
monetary policy) supports the finding from Cui and Sterk (2018) who argue that an optimal 
rule of quantitative easing is welfare enhancing when conventional policy is unavailable. 
Overall, we argue that the simple policy rule regime could be the second-best choice, in that 
its performance is the second best after the commitment regime. However, this second-best 
policy performance is conditional on the level of the central bank's aggressiveness in 
combatting the crisis. Our simulation shows that the simple policy rule regime outperforms 
the discretionary policy regime as long as the credit parameter is below 15. 
 The study also measures the unconditional variances for the variables in the loss 
function under the cooperation scenario. We argue that although commitment regime offers 
the best policy performance (which means the smallest loss value), its ability to stabilise 
inflation is less potent than the simple policy rule regime. In other words, the simple rule 
regime outperforms the commitment and discretion regimes when it comes to the job of 
stabilising inflation. Although its ability to dampen inflation is not significant, the 
commitment regime is superior in stabilising output, credit spread, and the nominal interest 
rate to other policy regimes. Finally, the fluctuation of the credit injection ratio is found to 
be the smallest in the discretionary policy regime but causes this regime to recover slowly 
after a crisis. 
 The findings from this study generate some policy recommendations. Under this 
model, the cooperation between conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing policy 
is more advantageous than interacting the two policies independently. However, this only 
applies when the central bank can be committed to policy rules. If the central bank is unable 
to commit and implements a discretionary policy regime instead, cooperation becomes less 
valuable. Unfortunately, managing the fully optimal commitment regime is not possible in 
practice because the central bank is of course unable to observe complete information and 
exogenous shocks in an economy. Hence, an alternative policy is to implement a simple 
policy rule managing the two policy instruments. Under this study, the non-optimal simple 
rules from the original model of Gertler and Karadi (2011) perform better than the 
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discretionary policy regime but worse than having no quantitative easing policy in the model. 
This finding opens the possibility for future research regarding the optimal simple rule for 
the quantitative easing policy, especially considering that most liquidity injections are rarely 
conducted using a rule.  
 Finally, this study suggests that under this model, conventional monetary policy is 
more impactful than quantitative easing policy. This finding echoes current literatures stating 
that quantitative easing policy is not meant to replace conventional monetary policy (Curdia 
and Woodford, 2018; Cui and Sterk, 2018; Sheedy, 2016; Kiley, 2018). However, 
quantitative easing can work as a secondary tool to employ when the traditional monetary 
policy is underperforming. The simulation of impulse response functions under various 
shocks demonstrates that credit injection under a commitment or a discretion is minimal but 
the size is substantial under the simple policy rule regime. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 OPTIMAL SIMPLE RULE FOR QUANTITATIVE EASING POLICY 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the optimal simple rule for quantitative easing policy when the 
conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing policy cooperate simultaneously. The 
reference model in this study is the model from Gertler and Karadi (2011), in which the 
credit injection ratio is the quantitative easing instrument, and the nominal interest rate is the 
monetary policy instrument. The loss function in this study is an ad-hoc loss function 
constructed by the squared deviation of output, inflation, credit spread, nominal interest rate, 
and credit injection ratio from their steady states. This study generates three optimal simple 
rules for quantitative easing: the optimal simple rule based on lagged information (past time 
horizon), the optimal simple rule based on current information (current time horizon), and 
the optimal simple rule based on future expectation (future time horizon). This study 
identifies that the optimal simple rule under a past time horizon, which is optimally 
constructed by past leverage, capital price, and credit spread, produces the best policy 
performance. Furthermore, incorporating macroeconomic variables such as inflation and 
output only modestly improves the performance of the optimal simple rule. Finally, this 
study argues that an increased credit injection into the economy can dampen the fluctuation 
of some economic variables but at the cost of a worsened policy performance. 
Keywords: Optimal simple rule, Quantitative easing policy, Monetary policy 
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4.1 Introduction 
Quantitative easing played a prominent role in combatting the financial imbalance resulting  
from the 2008 global financial crisis. During the crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board 
implemented unconventional monetary policies by injecting more than $1.75 trillion to 
purchase public and private bonds, particularly mortgage-backed securities. In 2010, a 
further injection of approximately $600 billion entered the financial market, which 
contributed to reduced lending rates and reinforced credit intermediation. Although 
economists and policymakers have concerns regarding the negative long-run consequences 
of the policy, credit injection is inarguably a useful tool that recuperated the U.S. financial 
system from the crisis. Since then, awareness and studies regarding quantitative easing have 
been growing, with a focus on assessing the effect of the policy on the economy, for example 
the studies by Albu, Lupu, Calin, and Popovici (2014); Bhattarai and Neely (2016); Chen, 
Filardo, He, and Zhu (2016); Curcuru, Kamin, Li, and Rodriguez (2018); Maggio, Kermani 
and Palmer (2016); Fisher, Ramcharan, and Yu (2015); and Kapetanios, Mumtaz, Stevens, 
and Theodoridis (2019), among others. 
           In addition to focusing on the impact of the policy, the increasing importance of 
quantitative easing policy also drives some studies to assess its optimal rule, especially when 
it interacts with the conventional monetary policy (Sheedy, 2016; Curdia and Woodford, 
2010; Quint and Rabanal, 2017). The role an optimal policy rule plays in the economy has 
widely been studied within the framework of monetary policy or fiscal policy, but 
unfortunately its  application to quantitative easing policy only attracted little attention. One 
reason for the lack of studies on this topic could be that this policy is only active during 
economic crises, and it is usually implemented when the conventional monetary policy is 
functioning poorly. Consequently, unlike the Taylor rule of conventional monetary policy, 
consensus regarding an optimal simple rule for quantitative easing policy is not available. 
 An optimal policy is a policy that aims to minimise economic loss by harnessing all 
available information in the economy. The optimal policy is usually considered the best 
choice of policy as it utilises all constraints of the economic model. However, the optimal 
policy is sometimes considered complicated and non-implementable as it contains 
unobserved economic variables. Hence, implementing a simple policy rule is becoming 
more preferable because it is considered more implementable and robust than the fully 
optimal policy rule. Also, the optimal simple rule is popular because it provides a compact 
representation of the policymaker's decision rule (Dennis, 2004).  
 Unfortunately, the performance of a simple policy rule is questioned as it only 
harnesses a subset rather than complete information of the economic model. Therefore, it is 
 94 
necessary to construct an optimal simple policy rule that can replicate or approach the 
performance of the fully optimal policy. Within a monetary policy framework, various 
authors have conducted studies regarding the topic, such as Levin, Wieland, and Williams 
(1998); Dennis (2004); Williams (2003); Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2006); and Taylor and 
Williams (2011), among others. In general, these studies demonstrate that developing a 
simple policy rule that performs as efficiently as the optimal policy rule is possible by 
customising the feedback coefficients in the simple rule equation.  
 This study presents an effort to contribute to the literature on quantitative easing by 
focusing on developing an optimal simple rule for a quantitative easing policy. The reference 
model used in this study is the unconventional monetary policy model from Gertler and 
Karadi (2011), which is specifically designed to accommodate the economic model under 
financial distress. Under this model, the economy contains a single authority, the central 
bank,  that manages both the conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing policy. 
The monetary policy instrument in the economy is the nominal interest rate, while the 
quantitative easing policy instrument is the credit injection ratio. The latter is defined as the 
fraction of the central bank’s direct credit in the banking sector relative to the total credit in 
the economy. 
 This study examines the optimal simple quantitative easing rule under commitment 
where the central bank adheres to initial policy rules, never reoptimises, and implements the 
rules in all subsequent periods. The central bank manages the nominal interest rate using the 
simple Taylor rule, which is the simple monetary policy rule adopted from Gertler and 
Karadi (2011). The central bank also manages credit injection through the optimal simple 
quantitative easing rule, the construction of which is the objective of this study. The method 
for determining the optimal simple rule in the study is adopted from Dennis (2004). Finally, 
the loss function in this study is the ad-hoc loss function assembled by the quadratic 
deviation of inflation, output, credit spread, policy rate, and credit injection ratio from their 
steady states. The benchmark of this study is the fully optimal commitment rule where the 
central bank only optimises the credit injection ratio using all economic variables in the 
model, but does not optimise the nominal interest rate. 
 Among many similar papers in the area of unconventional monetary policy, this 
study is closely related to Sheedy (2017). However, our study is different in terms of the 
way we formulate the optimal simple rules. First, we construct the optimal simple rule as a 
linear combination of the deviation of some endogenous variables in the economic model 
from their steady states. Second, this chapter is also different from most similar studies in 
the way we construct various alternatives of optimal simple rules by presenting the rule 
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under three time horizons: past, present, and future time horizons, which we believe is a 
more comprehensive method. Finally, our study is also different in the the way we measure 
the simple rule performance. This study measures the performance of an optimal simple rule 
based on the unconditional loss value. The unconditional loss value is a single number 
reflecting the total variation of variables in the loss function that incorporates multiple 
exogenous shocks coming into the economy, not only conditional on a specific shock. The 
higher policy performance (or the lower loss value) of an optimal simple rule indicates the 
more efficient that simple rule. The method to measure the policy performance (or loss 
value) is adopted from the algorithm developed by Dennis (2004). 
 We introduce two approaches in constructing the optimal simple rule: when the 
central bank only relies on banking variables and when the central bank also incorporates 
additional information from macroeconomic variables, namely, inflation and output. Both 
approaches present three time horizons: a past time horizon, a current time horizon, and a 
future time horizon. A past time horizon is a scenario in which the central bank constructs 
the optimal simple quantitative easing rule based on lagged information regarding banking 
variables and macroeconomic variables. The scenario of a current time horizon is when the 
central bank uses current information about banking variables and macroeconomic variables. 
Finally, a future time horizon scenario is when the central bank only incorporates future 
information when constructing the optimal simple rule.  
 Compared to the fully optimal commitment rule, this study found that the optimal 
simple quantitative easing rule under past time horizon (lagged endogenous variables), 
which is optimally constructed by lagged deviation of leverage, capital price, and credit 
spread from their steady states, delivers the best policy performance. However, this study 
also demonstrates that incorporating information from inflation and output can also improve 
the policy performance, but the improvement is not significant. We also present the optimal 
simple rule under two conditions: when the central bank smooths the policy rate and when 
it does not. Our simulation demonstrates that the variables the central bank must consider 
when constructing the optimal simple rule remain the same regardless of the value of the 
interest rate smoothing parameter. Based on our simulation of the unconditional variances 
of the variables in the loss function, output significantly causes the economic loss increases. 
We also argue that the central bank's aggressiveness is useful to stabilise the economy but 
worsens policy performance. Finally, we also argue that productivity shocks play a 
significant role in the optimal simple rule across all time horizons, but the impact is minimal. 
 The contribution of this chapter are as follow. First, this study contributes to the 
literature regarding the formulation of quantitative easing rule and the literature on the 
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convensionalisation of unconventional monetary policy (sheedy, 2016; Curdia and 
Woodford, 2018; Quint and Rabanal, 2017). Second, this study also contributes to the set of 
literature supporting the negative impact of massive quantitative easing, as argued by Cui 
and Sterk (2018); Kiley (2008); and Fernandez, Bortz, and Zeolla (2018). Third, the study 
shows that managing quantitative easing based on banking variables is sufficient, which is 
in line with argument frm Borio and Zabai (2016). Finally, the finding regarding the benefit 
from introducing quantitative easing policy in the economy is also in line with studies from 
Bhattarai and Neely (2016); Chen et al. (2016); Curcuru et al. (2018); Maggio, Kermani and 
Palmer (2016); Fisher, Ramcharan, and Yu (2015); and Kapetanios et al. (2019), among 
others. 
 The rest of the paper is presented as follows. Section two consists of the literature 
review. Section three describes the detailed reference model. Section four presents the results 
and analyses, including the loss value report and the simulation of impulse response 
functions. The concluding remarks are presented in section five. 
4.2 Literature Review 
The literature regarding the optimal simple rule for quantitative easing is not abundant, but 
it is closely related to efforts to conventionalise the policy to operate routinely rather than 
only during crises. A recent investigation in this area is given in a study by Quint and 
Rabanal (2017), which questions whether unconventional monetary policy should become 
conventional. Using the general equilibrium model based on Justiniano et al. (2013), Quint 
and Rabanal (2017) formulate a rule for unconventional monetary policy that targets credit 
spread. The study demonstrates that there are welfare benefits derived from using this policy 
rule to address the effects of financial shocks on the economy. The results presented by Quint 
and Rabanal (2017) are comparable to the design of the non-optimal simple quantitative 
easing rule in Gertler and Karadi (2011), by which the percentage of direct lending from the 
central bank is affected by the deviation of credit spread from its steady state. The preference 
for using the rule for unconventional monetary policy is also discussed in Kuttner (2018). In 
his study, Kuttner explains that unconventional monetary policy should be conducted in a 
rule-like manner rather than by involving significant and infrequent discrete adjustments to 
the balance sheet targets.  
           However, attempts to generate a formal rule for unconventional monetary policy are 
rare. Sheedy (2016) explores the challenges to formulating the rules of unconventional 
monetary policy. The author develops a simple economic model that can adopt various types 
of unconventional monetary policy instruments and argues that following such a rule is 
difficult because the unconventional monetary policy has more significant distributional 
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effects than the conventional policy. Furthermore, even when a policy adopts various 
unconventional instruments, the policy is still less effective in stabilising the economy than 
conventional instruments. Consequently, unconventional monetary policy is a poor 
substitute for the conventional nominal interest rate policy.  
 Curdia and Woodford (2010) argue that there are at least two main reasons why 
thinking of quantitative easing as a substitute for interest rate policy is dangerous. First, this 
thinking directs attention away from the most relevant costs and benefits when considering 
the appropriate scale, timing, and allocation of active quantitative easing policy. Second, this 
thinking can allow the central bank to adjust the target criterion for interest rate policy as a 
result of zero lower bound. Hence, rather than formulating a simple rule built by endogenous 
variables, Curdia and Woodford (2010) and Cui and Sterk (2018) develop unconventional 
monetary policy rules using reserve targeting. 
           The debate regarding conventionalising quantitative easing policy is ongoing. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that efforts to develop an optimal simple rule for 
quantitative easing are futile. Many empirical studies demonstrate that the impact of 
quantitative easing on specific financial and macroeconomic variables is substantial. The 
idea is that if unconventional monetary policy can significantly affect particular economic 
variables, then incorporating the information from such variables into a simple rule can be 
useful to determine the path of unconventional monetary policy itself.  
 For example, a survey conducted by Bhattarai and Neely (2016) indicates that the 
U.S. unconventional policy announcements have strongly influenced the global bond yields, 
exchange rates, and equity prices. Also, the policy has had a significant impact on 
macroeconomic variables, such as output and inflation. Yao (2014) further demonstrates that 
the successful transmission of quantitative easing policy to achieve its ultimate targets 
significantly relies on reducing the cost of borrowing and interbank lending rates. 
Furthermore, Pereira (2016) studies the effectiveness of quantitative easing policy in the 
euro area and demonstrates that the policy has a significant impact on the real and nominal 
interest rate.  
           Casiraghi, Gaiotti, Rodano, and Secchi (2016) assess the impact of unconventional 
monetary policy from the European Central Bank on the financial sector and macroeconomic 
conditions in Italy. The results suggest that in the financial sector, quantitative easing has a 
substantial impact that counteracts the increase in government bond yields, increases credit 
supply, and improves money market conditions. Meanwhile, in the macroeconomic sector, 
the policy has a substantial positive effect on output through the credit channel. Fisher, 
Ramcharan, and Yu (2015) investigate the impact of unconventional monetary policy on 
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firm financing constraints and found that the policy helps to relax financing constraints and 
stimulate economic activity in part by affecting the pricing of risk in the bond market.  
 Furthermore, although some studies have reflected on the positive assessment of 
unconventional monetary policy regarding macroeconomy, Borio and Zabai (2016) argue 
that the policy has a substantial influence in the financial sector but that its ultimate impact 
on output and inflation is less obvious. Their results suggest that information provided by 
financial sector variables send more critical information regarding the optimal simple rule 
than information provided by macroeconomic variables. 
 In conclusion, developing an optimal simple rule for a quantitative easing policy is 
rarely conducted in the literature of unconventional monetary policy today. However, the 
efforts of some studies in conventionalising quantitative easing policy, as well as  the 
expanding research question of whether the policy can replace the conventional monetary 
policy in a normal economic situation, indicate that it is possible to develop  an optimal 
simple rule for quantitative easing policy. Moreover, according to some of the the literature 
mentioned above, some financial and economic variables have the potential to provide useful 
information to help the central bank determines the size of liquidity injection through an 
optimal simple policy rule.    
4.3 Model 
The model reference in this study is the unconventional monetary policy model developed 
by Gertler and Karadi (2011). The economy under this model contains seven agents namely 
households, financial intermediaries, intermediate goods firms, final goods firms (retailers), 
capital good producers, government, and the central bank. In the absence of credit policy 
rule, the model contains four types of shocks, namely, technology shock, capital quality 
shock, net worth shock, and monetary policy shock. 
4.3.1 Households 
There is the continuum of identical households in the economy with the sum of unity. Each 
household consists of two members with different occupation as workers and bankers. The 
workers supply labour in the intermediate good firms, while the bankers manage financial 
intermediaries. In each period, the members may switch their occupation, i.e. households 
can be a banker and vice versa, regardless of how often they changed their job previously. 
Households are the owner of both intermediate good firms and financial intermediaries. 
Correctly, the profit that workers receive is returned to households. Likewise, the bankers 
also transfer any earnings from financial intermediaries back to households. Each family 
additionally consumes and save besides supplying labour. There is perfect consumption 
insurance within each household that both workers and bankers are guaranteed to consume. 
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Furthermore, each household saves fund in the financial intermediaries. The fund is then 
channeled to firms. 
In each period, members in the household can switch their occupation. In the 
aggregate level, at each period !, the fraction of (1 − %)are workers, and the fraction of % 
are bankers. There is a probability ' for each banker at period ! to remain as a banker at 
period (! + 1), regardless their previous occupation. Nevertheless, in ensuring that no 
bankers can fund all investments from their capital, (1 − %)% bankers exit and become 
workers at each period. In the same way, their job is also replaced by the quantities of 
workers switching to be bankers by the rule that the relative proportion of workers and 
bankers in the economy is fixed all the time. Consequently, there are two types of bankers 
in the economy: the existing bankers and the new bankers. The new bankers start working 
by receiving the endowed start-up funds from households. 
In each period of !, household ) chooses the level of consumption (*!)  and labour 
(+!) to maximise the utility, which is given by ,! -∑ /" 0123(*!#" − ℎ*!#"$%) − &%#' +!#"%#'5		(")* 7,                                 (4.1) 
where 0 < / < 1 is the discount factor, 0 < ℎ < 1 is the consumption habit formation, ; >0 is the relative utility weight of labour and = > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. 
In aggregate level, households maximise their preference subject to the budget constraint, 
which is given by *! + >! + ?! = A!+! + B! + C!>! ,               (4.2) 
where A! is the real wage in period !, >! is the amount of saving in period	!, ?! is the lump 
sum tax paid and C! is the real return of bonds from period (! − 1) to period !. Note that the 
bonds are one period riskless bonds that pays the gross real return C! in one period. This 
budget constraint implies that the source of income that households receive come from the 
workers labour income (A!+!), the dividend from the ownership of financial intermediaries 
(B!), and the interest income from the previous saving in bonds (C!>!). Furthermore, the 
income is then used for consumption (*!), saving in one period bonds (>!) and pay lumpsum 
taxes (?!). 
The first order condition on labour and consumption from the above optimisation 
problem results in the labour market equilibrium and marginal utility of consumption, 
respectively, as given below D!A! = ;+!' ,             (4.3) 
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D! = (*! − ℎ*!$%)$% − /ℎ,!(*!#% − ℎ*!)$%,          (4.4) 
where D! denotes the marginal utility of consumption at period !. Furthermore, the first order 
condition with respect to saving delivers the optimal real interest rate as follow /,!EF!,!#%GC! = 1,       (4.5) F!,!#% ≡ ,(.!"#).! 	,               (4.6) 
where F!,!#% denotes the growth of marginal utility of consumption. As shown above, the 
marginal utility of consumption in period	!. depends on the current, past and the expectation 
of future consumption. 
4.3.2 Financial Intermediaries 
Financial intermediaries in the model are the whole banking sector that covers both 
commercial banks and investment banks. The intermediaries operate to channel funds from 
depositors to non-financial firms. Specifically, they convert short-term liabilities into long-
term assets through a lending activity. Under this model, perfect information is assumed to 
hold between financial intermediaries and non-financial firms. The amount of credit 
obtained by firms are equal to the number of financial claims held by financial 
intermediaries. The constraint of financial intermediaries during their operation is given by,  I!J0! = K0! + >0!,                  (4.7) 
where J0! denotes the number of financial claims held by intermediary L at period !, I! is 
the relative price of each claim and K0! is the amount of net worth of intermediary L  at the 
end of period !.  
It is also important to note that financial claims held by the intermediaries can be 
coming from households EJ1!G and macroprudential authority EJ2!G. Macroprudential 
authority is assumed to inject funds to the intermediaries at period ! by the fraction of M! of 
the total intermediated assets. Hence, I!J0! = I!J10! + M!I!J0! ,         (4.8) 
which implies (1 − M!)I!J0! = I!J10!.        (4.9) 
Equation (4.9) implies that the authority injects funds to financial intermediaries by the 
percentage M! from the total credit in the economy. The authority intermediates credit by 
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issuing bonds to households that gives households riskless rate at C! and requires non-
financial firms as a lender to pay back the authority at market lending rate C3!#%. 
 The model assumes that the objective of the financial intermediaries is to maximise 
the banking net worth N!, which is given by N! = ,!O∑ (1 − ')'"/"#%F!,!#%#"EK0!#%#"G(")* P,                 (4.10) 
where the banks net worth is defined as the difference between earnings on asset and interest 
payments on liabilities, that is K0!#% = C3!#%I!J10! − C!>0!.             (4.11) 
Furthermore, recall from (4.7) that the deposit funds received by bank L is equal to the 
amount of credit given and the banks net worth, then the above equation can be decomposed 
into K0!#% = ,!(C3!#% − C!)I!J10! + C!K0! .                     (4.12) 
As shown in equation (12), banking net worth depends on the premium (C3!#% − C!) 
and the amount of financial claim I!J0!. Thus, the preference of the financial intermediaries 
in the economy can be expressed in greater detail as N! = ,! -∑ (1 − ')'"/"F!,!#" 0(C3!#%#" − C!#")I!#"J0!#" + C!#"K0!#"5(")* 7.    (4.13) 
Furthermore, in aggregate terms, the value of banks net worth above can be expressed as the 
linear combination as follow N! = R!I!J! + S!K! ,                (4.14) 
where R! is defined as the marginal gain from expanding assets and S! is the marginal gain 
from adding one unit of net worth. The R! and S! are defined as R! = ,!T(1 − ')/F!,!#%(C3!#% − C!) + '/F!,!#%U!,!#%R!#%V,          (4.15) S! = (1 − ') + ,!E/F!,!#%'W!#%S!#%G,      (4.16) 
where R! denotes the marginal gain received by the intermediary for increasing the asset J!, 
holding net worth K! constant. While S! denotes the marginal gain received by the 
intermediary for increasing net worth K!, holding asset constant. Moreover, W!,!#% denotes 
the growth of banking net worth and U!,!#% denotes the growth of intermediation fund which 
are respectively defined as follow W!,!#% = 4!"#4! 			,              (4.17) 
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U!,!#% = 5!"#6!"#5!6! 		.      (4.18) 
As shown in equation (4.15), the optimisation problem for financial intermediaries 
depends on the discounted risk adjusted premium /"#%F!,!#%#"(C3!#%#" − C!#")I!#". To the 
extent that the discounted risk adjusted premium is positive, the model assumes that the 
intermediary will always intend to broaden its assets indefinitely by borrowing additional 
funds from households. Specifically, everything else equal, the intermediaries will keep 
expanding asset by borrowing funds from depositors and channel it as credit to non-financial 
firms until the marginal gain from doing so, R!, is zero.  
4.3.3 Agency Problems 
The model introduces a moral hazard problem in the banking sector which creates friction 
between households and financial intermediaries. This moral hazard is introduced in such a 
way that bankers always have an option to divert the fraction X of the total asset back to 
themselves than channeling the fund to non-financial firms. This moral hazard can force the 
banks into bankruptcy due to the decreasing banking profitability. Therefore, in minimising 
the possibility of moral hazard, the intermediaries are obligated to satisfy an incentive 
constraint to enable them obtain funds from households. Specifically, the incentive 
constraint is formulated such that depositors can only lend funds to banks as long as the 
value of banks capital is higher or equal to the gain from doing the moral hazard. That is, N! ≥ XI!J1!,         (4.19) 
which implies that N! = R!I!J1! + S!K! ≥ XI!J1!.         (4.20) 
Recall that (1 − M!)I!J! = I!J1! , then the equation above can be expressed as I!J! ≤	 7!4!(8$9!)(%$:!)	.              (4.21) 
Therefore, if the constraint binds, then the assets that bankers can acquire from households 
must at least satisfy I!J! = [!K!,                                        (4.22) 
where [! = 7!(8$9!)(%$:!) denotes the leverage, which is simply known as the ratio of privately 
intermediated assets to equity. 
This constraint limits the intermediaries leverage ratio to the extent that bankers’ 
incentive to cheat is exactly balanced by the cost. Thus, given the net worth K! > 0, the 
constraint is binding as long as 0 < R! < X, which is the range where expanding assets is 
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profitable. The leverage shows that higher value of  R! corresponds to lower probability for 
bankers to conduct the moral hazard. In case the value of R! is larger than X, the constraint 
does not bind (i.e., that the gain from expanding asset is always higher than the gain from 
doing moral hazard). Given the definition of leverage above, the relationship of banking net 
worth can then be expressed as follow K!#% = E(C3!#% − C!)(1 − M!)[! + C!GK!.      (4.23) 
Using the new evolution of banking net worth, the growth of banking net worth W!,!#% and 
the growth of intermediation funds U!,!#% can be expressed in the more specific form as 
follow W!,!#% = 4!"#4! = (C3!#% − C!)(1 − M!)[! + C! ,           (4.24) 
which now the banks net worth depends on the leverage ratio [;! and the realization of 
premium (C3!#% − C!). Furthermore, the expression of credit growth can be derived as 
follow U!,!#% = 5!"#6!"#5!6! = 0<!"#<! 5 W!,!#%,       (4.25) 
which now is expressed as the function of leverage and the growth of banking net worth.  
4.3.4 Intermediate Goods Producers 
Intermediate goods firms produce intermediate goods in the economy which then are sold to 
final goods firms.  That is, at the end of period !, intermediate good firms receive credit from 
financial intermediaries and use the fund to acquire capital \! to produce intermediate output 
in subsequent period. Once the intermediate outputs are produced in period (! + 1), 
intermediate good firms have an option to sell the remaining capital to capital good 
producers. Intermediate good firms are assumed to operate in a competitive market. Perfect 
information is assumed to hold between financial intermediaries and intermediate goods 
firms. Hence, no agency problem or friction exists between the two agents. For the firms, 
the amount capital acquired is exactly equal to the amount of credit given, that is I!\! = I!J!.                    (4.26) 
 In each period !, intermediate good firms produce intermediate output by following 
the Cobb-Douglas production function as follow ]=! = ^!(_!`!\!$%)>+!%$> ,                (4.27) 
where ]=! denotes intermediate output produced at period !, _! denotes the capacity 
utilisation rate chosen at period !, `!\!$% denotes the effective capital acquired in period 
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(! − 1) and a is the effective capital share. Furthermore, there are two stochastic 
disturbances within the production function namely technology shock ^! and the capital 
quality shock `!. The capital quality shock in this model is defined as economic depreciation 
of capital. Taking the first derivative of the production function towards labour results in the 
labour demand as follow  b=!(1 − a) ?$!@! = A! ,       (4.28) 
where b=! is the price of intermediate output. Furthermore, the optimal capacity utilisation 
rate can also be derived by taking the first derivative of the production function towards _!, 
which is given by b=!a ?$!A! = cB(_!)`!\!$%.       (4.29) 
Since c(_!) the reference model defines depreciation rate as c(_!) = c; + C%%#D_!(%#D),       (4.30) 
where d is the elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to the utilisation rate and eE 
is defined as  eE = >FG$?G$HI .         (4.31) 
Then, cB(_!) is given as cB(_!) = eE_!D .                                           (4.32) 
Accordingly, the capacity utilization rate is given by 
_!(%#7) = b=!a]=!eE`!\!$% .																																																			(ç. ff) 
Next, given that the intermediate good firms operate in the perfect competitive market, hence 
the optimal profit for the firms in each period ! is zero. Recall that the profit for firms B!J 
can be formulated as follow B!J = ab=!]! + (I! − c(_!))`!\! − C3!I!$%\! ,         (4.34) 
where ab=!]! is the capital share of revenue, (I! − c(_!))`!\! is the effective capital that 
left over and C3!I!$%\! is the credit cost that firms must pay to financial intermediaries. 
Since in the competitive market the profit for firms is equal to zero state by state, the market 
lending rate that firms need to pay to financial intermediaries in period ! can be defined as 
follow 
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0 = ab=!]! + (I! − c(_!))`!\!$% − C3!I!$%\! ,                      (4.35) 
hence, C3! = F$!>?!H!5!&# + K!5!&# EI! − c(_!)G.     (4.36) 
Given this return on capital information, we can define the credit spread g! as follows g! = ,!\7!"#\! ,	     (4.37) 
which represents the difference between lending rate and deposit rate when the formula is 
loglinearized as gi! = ,!ECj3!#% − Cj!G.                                         (4.38) 
4.3.5 Capital Goods Producers 
Recall that at the end of period !, intermediate good firms have an option to sell used capital 
to capital producing firms. Capital producing firms will purchase the capital and harness it 
to refurbish the depreciated capital as new capital, which then are sold back to intermediate 
good firms. The model assumes that there is flow adjustment cost associated with producing 
new capital. The capital producing firms will maximise their preference, which is given by  ,! -∑ /!F!," k(I! − 1)lL! − % 0 M'(#M))M'(&##M))5 (lL" + lNN)m(")! 7,   (4.39) 
subject to lL! ≡ l! − c(_!)`!\!$%,     (4.40) 
where lL! denotes net investment, l! denotes gross investment and lNN denotes the steady 
state of gross investment. The c(_!)`!\!$% denotes the quantity of depreciated capital. The 
gross investment l! is determined by following the law motion of capital  \! as follow, l! = \! − \!$%`!(1 − c(_!)).   (4.41) 
As shown above, the capital acquired to produce output at period (! + 1) depends on the 
effective capital in period ! and the gross investment. The first order condition from the 
optimisation problem in equation (4.34) and (4.35) gives the function of capital price '* as 
follow, 
'* = 1 + h+2 + ,,* + ,--,,*./ + ,-- − 1.0 + h+ + ,,* + ,--,,*./ + ,-- − 1.+ ,,* + ,--,,*./ + ,--. −,! n/F!,!#%h" 0M'!"##M))M'!#M)) − 150M'!"##M))M'!#M)) 5Oo,       (4.42) 
where hP denotes the elasticity of investment adjustment cost. 
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4.3.6 Final Goods Producers 
There is a continuum of final good producers (retailers) that sums at unity in the economy. 
Final good producers acquire intermediate output from intermediate good firms to be 
repackaged as final output. The retailers simply repackage intermediate output by the rule 
that it requires one unit of intermediate output to produce one unit of retail output. The 
retailers then aggregate final output through the CES composite aggregator which is given 
by 
]! = p∫ ]Q,!(2&#)2%* r 2(2&#),      (4.43) 
where ]Q,! is the final output produced by retailer f at period ! and s is the elasticity of 
substitution. Maximising total output ]! given in equation (4.43) with respect to the total 
expenditure t! = ∫ bQ!%* ]Q!u% results in a relationship between the individual retailer final 
output and the aggregate final output as follow ]Q! = 0F4!F! 5$R ]! ,                (4.44) 
b! = 0∫ bQ!%$R%* u%5 #(#&2).       (4.45) 
Furthermore, the retailers are assumed to operate in a monopolistic environment with 
nominal rigidities ala Calvo. Specifically, in each period retailers are able to adjust price 
optimally with probability (1 − v) with the price indexation follows the lagged rate of 
inflation. The retailers then set the reset price b!∗to solve the following optimisation problem ,! -∑ v"/"F!,!#" - F!∗F!"(∏ (1 + x!#3$%)T6 − b=!#""3)% 7 ]Q!#"(")* 7.    (4.46) 
The first order condition is given by  ,! -∑ v"/"F!,!#" - F!∗F!"(∏ (1 + x!#"$%)T6 − 0 RR$%5b=!#""3)% 7 ]Q!#"(")* 7 = 0.    (4.47) 
By the law of large numbers, the evolution of the price level can be derived as given by 
b! = p(1 − v)b!∗(%$R) + vEx!$%T6 b!$%G(%$R)r #(#&2),     (4.48) 
which can be simplified into 
x! = p(1 − v)x!∗(%$R) + vEx!$%T6 G(%$R)r #(#&2),      (4.49) 
which defines inflation. 
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4.3.7 Resource Constraint 
In the resource constraint, the production of output is divided into private 
consumption, investment, government consumption, adjustment cost of capital and the 
government intermediation. The resource constraint is given by the following equation ]! = *! + l! + y! + zM!I!\! + ( M'!#M))M'!&##M)) − 1)O(lL! + lNN),   (4.50) 
where M!I!\!#%denotes the amount of government intermediation, which is generated by 
the authority to be supplied to financial intermediaries. The model also assumes that the 
efficiency cost by z per unit supplied exists during the government intermediation process. 
This cost basically reflects activities during the lending process such as the cost of raising 
funds via government debt or the cost of selecting the eligible private firms. Furthermore, y! denotes the government consumption, which is set purposively fixed as y! = yNN,           (4.51) 
where yNN is the steady state of government consumption, which is defined as 0.2 times of 
output. Furthermore, government expenditures are financed by lump sum taxes and 
government intermediation. Specifically,  yNN + zM!I!\! = ?! + (C3! − C!)>2!$%,             (4.52) 
where >2!$% denotes government bonds which finance total government intermediated 
assets,	M!I!\!#%. 
4.3.8 Policy Authority 
It is assumed that there is a central bank that manages two economic policies in the economy 
namely the conventional monetary policy and the quantitative easing policy simultaneously. 
In managing the monetary policy, the central bank is assumed to follow a simple Taylor rule 
with the interest rate smoothing {", which is given by 
CL! = (1 − {") |}Ux! + }V pWX!	Z2&#2 [r~ + {"CL!$% + s!\ ,    (4.53) 
where CL! denotes the nominal interest rate, *! is marginal cost at period ! and s!\ 	is 
monetary policy shock. It is important to note that marginal cost and intermediate goods 
price have an inverse relationship *! = %F$!	.           (4.54) 
The nominal interest rate also needs to follow the Fisher equation, which is given by 
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CL! = C!,!x!#%	.             (4.55) 
On the other hand, the central bank manages quantitative easing policy by setting up the 
level of the credit injection ratio M! in the economy. The construction of simple policy rule 
that manages M! is the objective of this study. 
4.3.9 Exogenous Shock 
The economy is assumed to be hit by four different exogenous shocks namely technology 
shock (!!"), capital quality shock (!!#), banking net worth shock (!!$)	 and monetary policy 
shock (!!%). The formulation of shocks is given as follow. 72 = 837240 + :3!23,      (4.56) ;2 = 85;240 + :5!26 ,     (4.57) 
where ^ ! is technology, ` ! is capital quality, is 83 the shock persistence of technology shock, 85  is the persistence of capital quality shock, é] is a productivity shock multiplier, and éK  is 
a capital quality shock multiplier. On the other hand, banking net worth shock, and monetary 
policy shock have no persistence. 
4.3.10 Parameter Values 
The parameter values used in the model are shown in the Table 4.1. The model is 
parameterised using the quarterly frequency. The parameter values utilised in this study 
mostly follow those in the original model of Getler and Karadi (2011) but some differences 
are added to represent the operation of macroprudential policy. For example, we assume that 
the steady state of the credit injection ratio in the economy is 10%, which is logically small 
for the central bank’s contribution in the credit market. The small value of steady state, rather 
than zero, indicates that the central bank’s liquidity has already existed in the economy. This 
pre-existing credit injection from the central bank suggests that a small portion of credit in 
the economy might be present from the activities of central bank under normal condition, 
for example an open market operation. Furthermore, in this chapter, we also offers two ways 
of the central bank when managing monetary policy. The first one is when the interest rate 
smoothing parameter is zero, and the second one is when the interest rate smoothing 
parameter is 0.8. This way, we will investigate whether the structure of the optimal simple 
rule is invariant to the changed interest rate smoothing parameter. We consider this issue is 
important because the structure of the optimal simple rule should be stable regardless the 
interest smoothing rate value. Other parameter values are standard, such as the discount rate 
is 0.99, the capital share is 0.33, and the habit formation parameter is 0.815. 
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Table 4-1: Model Parameters 
Parameters Values Description 
b 0.99 Discount rate 
h 0.815 Habit formation parameters 
c 3.4 Starting value for the labour utility weight 
j 0.276 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply 
h 7.2 Elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to the utilisation rate 
l 0.3815 Starting value of divertible fraction 
w 0.002 Starting value of proportional starting up funds 
q 0.971 The survival probability 
a 0.33 Capital share 
d 0.025 Depreciation rate 
hi 1.728 Elasticity of investment adjustment cost 
e 4.167 Elasticity of substitution between goods  
g 0.779 Calvo parameter 
gp 0.241 Price indexation parameter 
r 0 Interest rate smoothing parameter 
kp 1.5 Inflation coefficient in simple monetary rule 
ky -0.125 Output gap coefficient in simple monetary rule 
t 0.001 Costs of credit policy 
G/Y 0.2 Steady state proportion of government expenditures !8 0.95 Persistence of technology shock !9 0.66 Persistence of capital quality shock /8 1 Technology shock multiplier /9 1 Capital quality shock multiplier 0*8 -0.01 Shock on technology 0*: -0.05 Shock on capital quality 0*; -0.01 Shock on banking net worth 0*< 0.01 Shock on nominal interest rate 
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4.4 Result and Analysis 
4.4.1 Scenario Map 
The study introduces two approaches: the banking variables approach and the 
macroeconomic variables approach. Under each approach, three scenarios take place – 
namely the scenario of past information, current information, and future information. A 
detailed scenario map is shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
In the first approach, we assume that the central bank designs the optimal simple 
quantitative easing rule only based on information from the banking sector. Hence, seven 
banking variables are involved in the simulation: capital (amount of credit), banking net 
worth, asset prices, leverage, credit spread, deposit rate, and lending rate. These banking 
variables are the variables related to the financial sector in the reference model. In the second 
approach, in addition to banking variables, we inspect whether adding macroeconomic 
variables can improve the performance of the optimal simple rule. Thus, in the second 
approach, inflation and output will enter the simulation in addition to banking variables. The 
ultimate objective of these two approaches is to check whether information from the banking 
sector is sufficient to construct the optimal simple rule or whether overseeing broader 
macroeconomic variables can provide more significant benefits. 
 In the past time horizon scenario, the central bank is situated to construct the optimal 
simple rule by harnessing information from variables of past periods, which are lagged 
banking variables or with additional lagged macroeconomic variables. Similarly, under the 
current time horizon scenario, the central bank constructs the optimal simple rule by only 
Figure 4-1: Scenario Map 
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using the current state of banking variables or with additional macroeconomic variables. 
Finally, in the case of the future time horizon, the central bank constructs the optimal simple 
rule using future expectation of banking variables or with additional macroeconomic 
variables. These three time horizons aim to ensure that the simulation covers all possible 
scenarios when the central bank operates the quantitative easing policy. This study does not 
simulate the optimal simple rule with the cross-time horizon. All simulations assume that 
the central bank is committed to implementing the optimal simple rule using endogenous 
variables from the same time horizon. The performance of the optimal simple policy rule is 
calculated relative to that of the fully optimal commitment rule using the following formula:  
,%%)è)åêèë = í1 − +6\+X ì U100%	,																																													(ç. áï) 
where +6\ denotes the loss of the optimal simple policy rule, and +X  denotes the loss of the 
fully optimal commitment rule. Since +X  is always less than +6\, the sign of efficiency will 
always be a negative in percentage, which means that the simple policy rule is less efficient 
by some percentage value than the loss in the fully optimal commitment rule. 
In summary, in the banking variables approach, seven banking variables are 
considered in the simulation: capital (the amount of credit), leverage, banking net worth, 
capital price (the value of credit), credit spread, real interest rate, and lending rate (return on 
capital). In the macroeconomic variables approach, the simulation involves two additional 
variables: output and inflation. The performances of the simple rules are compared based on 
the level of policy performance, where the best optimal simple rule is the one that produces 
the lowest loss value (i.e., the highest policy performance).  
4.4.2 Loss Function 
This section explains the construction of the loss function utilised in the study. Recall that 
this study formulates the optimal simple quantitative easing rule when the central bank 
optimises the credit injection ratio under fully optimal commitment while setting the nominal 
interest rate based on the simple Taylor rule. Thus, as a single authority, the central bank 
holds dual mandates: to stabilise inflation and to achieve credit stability. In the loss function, 
the sum of squared deviation of credit spread from its steady state represents credit stability, 
while the sum of quadratic deviation of inflation from its steady state represents price 
stability. The loss function is given in the following equation: 
+ = ,* ÑÖ/!Ex!O + X?]j!O + X^gi!O + X\LCjL!O + X:M!OG(!)* Ü,																						(ç. áà) 
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where X? = X^ = X\L = X: = 1 denotes the weight given to the output, credit spread, 
nominal interest rate, and credit injection ratio, respectively, relative to inflation. When the 
same weights are given, this implies that the central bank prioritises all variables in the loss 
function equally, which also means that credit stability is as important as inflation stability.  
 The loss function contains some assumptions. First, the loss function is designed 
purposively to contain observed variables. Unlike the fully optimal loss function, which 
harnesses full information of the model, the ad-hoc loss function is built by assuming that 
the central bank is practically unable to observe all endogenous variables in the economy. 
For example, some variables, including the marginal utility of consumption, depreciation 
rate, or capacity utilisation rate, are harder to observe than output or inflation. Hence, 
focusing only on critical observed variables makes the ad-hoc loss function more realistic 
and implementable.  
 Second, we purposively combine the dual mandates for the central bank – namely 
the inflation stability objective and the credit stability objective – in a single loss function to 
observe whether a trade-off between the two objectives exists. As explained in Woodford 
(2011), the target criterion (4.53) implies that the central bank should be willing to sacrifice 
a certain degree of inflation stability to gain greater credit stability, and vice versa. Therefore, 
the ad-hoc loss function containing the two policy instruments can illustrate this welfare 
transfer in a straightforward yet traceable way. 
Third, credit spread is used in the loss function to suit the model proposed by Gertler 
and Karadi (2011), who determine that the only source of financial imbalance in the model 
is a moral hazard, which is triggered by ambitious bankers who wish to increase their profits. 
The movement of credit spread in the economy influences the path of credit intermediation 
from banks. That is, a credit spread of above (or below) its steady state can incentivise 
bankers to excel (or dampen) credit. Hence, we assume that stabilising credit spread is 
sufficient to maintain credit stability in the financial market.  
Finally, we assume that the credit injection ratio should be present in the loss function 
to support empirical evidence that excessive quantitative easing is detrimental to the 
economy (Cui and Sterk, 2018; Fernandez, Bortz, and Zeolla, 2018). Therefore, placing this 
variable in the function works as a penalty that reduces policy performance if the central 
bank begins to inject credit too aggressively. Similarly, the policy rate is present in the loss 
function as a penalty to avoid the excessive fluctuation of policy rate by punishing the central 
bank with a greater loss. This way, the stable policy rate can give the banking sector a 
certainty to operate their business. 
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4.4.3 The Fully Optimal Commitment Rule 
The benchmark used in this study is the fully optimal commitment rule, which when the 
central bank optimises quantitative easing policy instrument subject to all available 
information in the model. As for the monetary policy, the central bank adopts the non-
optimal simple Taylor rule from the original model. Thus, the fully optimal quantitative 
easing rule incorporates all endogenous variables and exogenous shocks in the model. 
Following Dennis’s (2007) method, the policy performance and some variables to consider 
when constructing the fully optimal commitment rule are given in Table 4.2. 
Table 4-2: The Fully Optimal Commitment Macroprudential Policy Rule (x10-2) !,-. ",-. #,-. $/,-. %/,-. &,-. ',-. (,-. ),-. *,-. +,0 +,1 +,2 +,3 LOSS 
0.30 -0.36 -0.08 -0.77 0.27 -0.53 -1.06 0.30 2.55 1.42 2.68 2.15 0.30 -0.70 265.72 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 362.31 
The first row in Table 4.2 above illustrates the policy performance and feedback coefficients 
in the optimal simple quantitative easing rule under commitment. In contrast, the second row 
in the table illustrates the situation when quantitative easing does not exist in the model, 
which means that the central bank only manages the economy using the conventional 
monetary policy where the instrument is determined by a simple Taylor rule. It is necessary 
to mention that the fully optimal commitment rule in the table above also contains some 
feedback coefficients related to Lagrange multipliers, but these are not shown in the 
equation. These Lagrange multipliers’ coefficient represents the cost that the central bank 
must bear due to the commitment policy. 
Some results from the fully optimal quantitative easing rule above stand out. First, 
the fully optimal commitment rule delivers a policy performance of 2.6572. Note that this 
number reflects the performance when the central bank optimises the credit injection ratio 
and manages the policy rate using a simple Taylor rule. Second, with respect to the absence 
of quantitative easing rule in the economy (i.e., the second row of the table), the simulation 
produces a policy performance of 3.6231. Therefore, the comparison of the two policy rules 
above suggests that the nonexistence of quantitative easing policy can worsen the economy 
by 36.35% relative to the fully optimal commitment rule (i.e., if the quantitative easing 
policy is present), which is calculated using the following equation: 
+2ññ = p1 − +ÉJJ		`"!abc!	dceL!"!e!"9f	feN"L2+ÉJJ	`"!a	dceL!"!e!"9f	feN"L2 r U100%.																									(ç. âä) 
Third, the simulation results indicate that the fully optimal commitment rule depends 
on 14 variables, eight of which are lagged endogenous variables. The endogenous variables 
 114 
in the rule are banking net worth, capital, inflation, policy rate, net investment, price 
dispersion, asset prices, and consumption. Of these eight endogenous variables, only 
banking net worth, capital, and asset prices are closely related to the operation of financial 
intermediaries. Finally, the fully optimal commitment rule above also contains information 
about exogenous shocks. Regarding these exogenous shocks, technology shocks are found 
to be the shocks that have the most powerful effect on the credit injection ratio, other things 
being equal. 
           The fully optimal commitment rule above performs best when the central bank has 
access to all information in the economy. Unfortunately, this rule is not the best choice for 
several reasons. First, the fully optimal commitment rule is less realistic. That is, the central 
bank will not able to observe all information in the economy completely. Second, the fully 
optimal commitment rule above is dependent on exogenous shocks, while in reality the 
central bank should not be able to observe them. Third, the simplicity of the fully optimal 
commitment rule does not hold up, as seen from the number of variables in the rule. A simple 
rule usually contains only a few variables. For instance, a simple Taylor rule in the original 
model from Getler and Karadi (2011) only contains three variables: policy rate, inflation 
rate, and output gap. Moreover, the model only uses three variables in its credit policy rule, 
namely the credit injection ratio, lending rate, and deposit rate. Also, too many variables in 
the simple rule can complicate how the central bank communicates the optimal simple rule 
to the public. Finally, the fully optimal commitment rule only incorporates variables from a 
past time horizon, while the central bank could have achieved a similar level of performance 
using the current or future expectations of endogenous variables. Therefore, in this study, 
the fully optimal commitment rule only works as a benchmark. 
4.4.4 The Optimal Simple Quantitative Easing Policy Rule 
This part presents the final results of the simulation regarding the best candidates for the 
optimal simple quantitative easing rule. In this study, the simulation is conducted under three 
different time horizons: a past time horizon, a current time horizon, and a future time 
horizon. More precisely, for instance, the optimal simple quantitative easing rule under a 
past time horizon aims to explain what lagged endogenous variables can optimally explain 
the central bank’s decision to inject credit into the present economy. Similarly, for the 
optimal simple quantitative easing rule under a current time horizon, the simulation will only 
include the current state (contemporaneous) of endogenous variables within the rule. 
Likewise, the optimal simple rule operating under a future time horizon aims to explain what 
future expectation of variables that optimally construct the level of credit injection in the 
present.  
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• Approach I:  Banking Variables 
In the first approach, we simulate all possible combinations of the optimal simple rule using 
seven banking variables. The number of simple rule candidates formed using the variable n 
is equal to 7Cn. For example, when we construct the optimal simple rule using two variables 
(which means ê = 2, there will be 42 candidates for the optimal simple rules. Thus, for     	ê = 2, we have 126 candidates for the simple rule that cover three time horizons. We stop 
the simulation when the marginal performance as a result of adding one more variable to the 
rule is less than when the variable is not added. Suppose + denotes the loss value; in that 
case, we stop the simulation when the following condition is satisfied:  |+L#O − +L#%| < |+L#% − +L|,																																														(4.61) 
where ê denotes the initial number of variables. For example, suppose we start the simulation 
using one variable (ê = 1), then we stop the simulation when the change of loss (i.e., 
marginal loss) between ‘the simple rule using three variables (+L#O) and the the simple rule 
using two variables (+L#%)’ is less than the marginal loss between ‘the simple rule using two 
variables (+L#%) and the simple rule using one variable (+L)’. Using this method, we found 
that lagged leverage ($), capital price (%), and credit spread (&') are the most critical variables 
for constructing the optimal simple rule under this approach. Table 4.3 illustrates the optimal 
simple rule across three-time horizons in detail. 
Table 4-3: The Optimal Simple Quantitative Easing Rule Without Macroeconomic Variables 
Time horizon Simple Rule Loss Efficiency 
Past time $')*+ %')*+ &')*+ 2.6654 0.308% 
-0.0624 0.3354 5.0009 
Current time $' ) %') &') 2.7085 1.930% 
0.0314 0.0946 0.0000 
Future time ()($' ),+) ()(%'),+) ()(&'),+) 2.7088 1.941% 
0.0322 0.1619 0.0000 
 As shown in the table above, the rule when the central bank relies on the lagged 
deviation of leverage, capital price, and credit spread from their steady states delivers a 
policy performance of 2.6654, which is only 0.308% less efficient than that of the 
commitment rule. Of the three variables in the optimal simple rule, credit spread shows the 
largest feedback coefficient. Everything else equal, the 1% increase of past credit spread 
from its steady state corresponds to the present credit injection ratio that is approximately 
5% higher than its steady state. Recall that the steady state of credit injection ratio in this 
chapter is 10% of the total credit in the economy. Hence, everything else equal, the 1% 
increase of past period capital price from its steady state corresponds to the increase of credit 
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injection ratio, which is 0.3354% higher than its the steady state. Finally, the 1% increase of 
past leverage corresponds to the decline of the central bank’s credit injection in the present 
economy by 0.0624% higher than its steady state, everything else being equal. 
 Credit spread is only present in the rule using past information, and its impact is 
minuscule under the current and future time horizons. Thus, leverage and capital prices are 
the only two variables that are present in the current and future optimal simple rules. No 
other banking variables can significantly improve the policy performance of these two 
simple policy rules . The case when the rule relies on current information produces a loss 
value of 2.7085, which is 1.930% less efficient than that of the commitment rule. Finally, 
the simple rule performs worse when the central bank relies on future information with a 
loss of 2.7088, which is 1.941% less efficient than that of the commitment rule. Therefore, 
based on the policy performance, these two simple rules are less performing than the rule 
under the past time horizon. The current and future optimal simple rules also demonstrate 
that capital price is more influential than leverage in affecting credit injection. However, the 
impact of capital price on the current and future simple rules is smaller than under the past 
time horizon. 
• Approach II: Macroeconomic Variables  
This approach explains the simulation when the central bank also considers macroeconomic 
variables, namely inflation and output, in the design of the optimal simple rule for 
quantitative easing policy. Given that the first approach is stopped at three variables, this 
second approach further investigates whether additional macroeconomic variables can 
improve policy performance. There are several reasons this second approach is necessary. 
First, in practice, inflation and output are two major macroeconomic indicators 
observed intensively during an economic crisis. Although there are other potential variables, 
such as investment or consumption, these two variables (investment and consumption) have 
been incorporated within output by the resource constraint in the equation (4.45). Hence, the 
output already includes information regarding investment and consumption. Second, 
inflation and output are also present in the loss function. Considering the loss function 
contains the quadratic deviation of inflation, output, credit spread, nominal interest rate, and 
credit injection ratio, incorporating inflation and output into the simulation can enable the 
simple rule to capture all information in the loss function comprehensively.  
Third, inflation and output are two variables in the simple monetary rule used in the 
model. In practice, suppose two different departments in the central bank manage the 
conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing policy; the central bank would want 
to coordinate the two departments before announcing the policy. Hence, output and inflation 
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have a greater chance of being incorporated into optimal simple quantitative easing rule than 
other possible macroeconomic variables. Table 4.4 shows the simulation results when output 
and inflation are present in the simulation. Overall, the simulation demonstrates that the 
presence of output and inflation only minimally improves the policy performance of the 
optimal simple rule. Relative to the simple rule under past time horizon, incorporating output 
and inflation into the rule only improves the policy performance from 0.308% to 0.297%, 
which is only 0.011%. We argue that this number is not significant.  
Table 4-4: The Optimal Simple Quantitative Easing Rule in the Second Approach 
Time 
horizon 
Simple Rule 
 
Loss Efficiency 
Past time $' )*+ %')*+ &')*+ *')*+ +,)*+ 2.6651 0.297% 
-0.0612 0.2778 4.2288 -0.1477 -0.0738 
Current 
time 
$' ) %') &') *') +,) 2.6658 0.323% 
0.0022 0.2308 0.0000 -1.4842 -0.2202 
Future 
time 
()($' ),+) ()(%'),+) ()(&'),+) ()(*'),+) ()(+,),+) 2.6653 0.304% 
0.0025 0.4336 0.0000 -1.6292 -0.2339 
 However, more substantial improvement is found when output and inflation are 
present in the rule under current and future time horizons. That is, relative to the first 
scenario, incorporating output and inflation under a current time horizon can improve policy 
performance from 1.930% to 0.323%. Similarly, under a future time horizon, the second 
scenario can improve performance from 1.941% to 0.304%. However, although the 
improvement rates in the current and future time horizons are substantial, we argue that the 
chosen rule from the first scenario remains superior because it can deliver a similar 
performance (i.e. 0.308%, see Table 4.3) with a smaller number of variables. The latter 
maintains the simplicity aspect of an optimal simple rule. Thus, we argue that information 
from the banking sector is sufficient for the central bank to formulate an optimal simple 
quantitative easing rule. 
           Table 4.4 also demonstrates that feedback coefficients of output and inflation in the 
optimal simple rule are all negative, which indicates that these two macroeconomic variables 
are inversely related to the credit injection ratio. For instance, under the past time horizon, 
the 1% decline in lagged output from its steady state incentivises the central bank to elevate 
credit injection today by 0.1477% higher than its steady state, everything else equal. 
Similarly, under the current time horizon, the 1% output contraction corresponds to the 
increase of credit injection ratio by 1.4842% higher than its steady state, everything else 
equal. Finally, under the future time horizon, the 1% percent contraction in the expectation 
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of output corresponds to a 1.629% increase of the central bank’s credit injection from its 
current steady state. The simulation also demonstrates that the presence of output and 
inflation does not change the sign of feedback coefficients of leverage, capital price, and 
credit spread.  
           Finally, it would be interesting to evaluate what happens if the central bank neglects 
banking variables entirely and only focuses on output and inflation when managing 
quantitative easing. Table 4.5 illustrates this result.  
Table 4-5: The Optimal Simple Quantitative Easing Rule with Output and Inflation 
Time horizon Simple Rule Loss Efficiency 
Past time *')*+ +,)*+ 2.6732 0.602% 
-0.1746 -0.8486 
Current time *') +,) 2.6906 1.256% 
-0.1656 -0.5254 
Future time ()(*'),+) ()(+,),+) 2.6968 1.490% 
-0.1703 -0.4307 
The result demonstrates that when the central bank only focuses on output and 
inflation, policy performance worsens compared to when the central bank adheres to 
information regarding banking variables. For example, under the past time horizon, the 
optimal simple rule performs at 2.6732, which is 0.602% less efficient than that of the fully 
optimal commitment rule or approximately twice than that of the optimal simple rule with 
banking variables. This result confirms that the optimal simple quantitative easing rule 
constructed by past leverage, capital price, and credit spread is sufficient for the central bank 
when executing the quantitative easing policy. 
In conclusion, simulating the optimal simple quantitative easing rule with two 
different approaches delivers some important results. First, knowledge regarding the banking 
sector is crucial for the central bank when managing the quantitative easing policy. This is 
reflected by the fact that incorporating macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and 
output, insignificantly improves policy performance. Second, past information is superior to 
current and future information when it comes to managing the quantitative easing policy, 
meaning that wide access to historical data would be beneficial for the central bank when 
managing the quantitative easing policy.  
Third, credit spread has the largest feedback coefficient, in absolute value, in the 
optimal simple quantitative easing rule. This result is in line with the fact that credit spread 
is a variable that significantly influences moral hazard in the banking sector, which is the 
main source of risk in the financial sector (Gertler and Karadi, 2011). Hence, the increase of 
credit spread, which activates higher credit injection, is also beneficial for decreasing 
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instances of moral hazard behaviour in the banking sector. Lastly, the optimal simple 
quantitative easing rule using past information is able to deliver policy performance that is 
almost as efficient as that of the fully optimal commitment rule, which would help the central 
bank to communicate this simple rule to the public. 
4.4.5 Unconditional Variances 
This section investigates the contribution of variables in the loss function to the policy 
performance when the central bank implements the optimal simple quantitative easing rule 
using lagged deviation of leverage, capital price, and credit spread. We also intend to 
determine which variables contribute significantly to the policy performance. We measured 
the unconditional variance of the variables in the loss function when the discount factor 
approaches one. Table 4.6 details the result. 
Table 4-6: Unconditional Variances of the Loss Function  
Time horizon Approach I 1 23 43 53= - 
The fully optimal commitment rule 0.0322 2.6807 0.0442 0.0996 0.1040 
The optimal simple rule under past time horizon 0.0326 2.6927 0.0458 0.1007 0.0955 
As shown in the table, relative to the fully optimal commitment rule, the optimal 
simple rule can lead the central bank to stabilise credit injection, which consequently injects 
amounts of credit that are less than they ideally should be. The variance of the credit injection 
ratio falls from 0.1040 in the commitment rule to 0.0955 in the optimal simple rule, which 
is a decrease of 8.17%. However, less credit injection consequently leads to greater 
fluctuation in the rest of the variables in the loss function than those in the fully optimal 
commitment rule. For example, the variance in output increases from 2.6807 to 2.6927 
(0.80%); from 0.0442 to 0.0458 (3.61%) for the credit spread;  from 0.0322 to 0.0326 
(1.24%) for the inflation, and from 0.0996 to 0.1007 (1.104%) for the policy rate. In 
conclusion, the results indicate that other variables in the loss function tend to fluctuate more 
when credit injection decreases. Output is found to be the most fluctuating variable in the 
loss function. This finding also suggests that the central bank could have achieved better 
policy performance if the weight assigned to output relative to inflation in the loss function 
is reduced. 
4.4.6 The Optimal Simple Rule Under Interest Rate Smoothing 
Recall that the optimal simple quantitative easing rule generated previously assumes that the 
central bank does not smooth the policy rate, meaning that the central bank determines the 
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current state of the policy rate without using its lagged value (i.e., the interest rate smoothing 
parameter in the simple Taylor rule (4.48) is set at zero).  
 However, not smoothing the policy rate is not the only option for the central bank 
when managing the economy. During a crisis, the central bank has a choice in managing the 
policy rate: either to use information from  the lagged policy rate ({" ≠ 0) or set an entirely 
new policy rate without harnessing its past information ({"=0). In this part, we investigate 
what happens to the optimal simple quantitative easing rule when the interest rate smoothing 
parameter in the simple monetary policy rule is set at 0.8 ({"=0.8). This way, we will 
investigate whether the structure of the optimal simple rule is invariant to the changed 
interest rate smoothing parameter. We consider this issue is important because we 
hypothesize that the structure of the optimal simple rule should be stable regardless the value 
of interest smoothing parameter. 
           Changing the interest rate smoothing parameter inevitably changes the loss of the 
fully optimal commitment rule. Table 4.7 illustrates the policy performance of the fully 
optimal commitment rule (first row) and policy performance when quantitative easing is 
absent (second row). It is necessary to mention that in addition to the feedback coefficients 
displayed above, there are also some feedback coefficients related to the Lagrange 
multipliers, which are not shown in the table. The Lagrange multipliers coefficients function 
as the cost that the central bank must bear due to the commitment policy. 
 
Table 4-7: The Fully Optimal Commitment Macroprudential Policy Rule (x10-2) when ,4 = 0.8 !,-. ",-. #,-. $/,-. %/,-. &,-. ',-. (,-. ),-. *,-. +,0 +,1 +,2 +,3 LOSS 
0.37 -0.58 -0.09 -4.36 0.32 -0.56 1.33 0.41 2.76 1.52 2.91 2.31 0.37 -4.25 269.45 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 394.38 
As shown in Table 4.7, a change in the interest smoothing parameter from 0 to 0.8 
corresponds a loss value that slightly increases from 2.6572 to 2.6945, where the difference 
is only small. Similarly, the loss when quantitative easing is not present in the model is 
3.9438, which is also higher than when no smoothing action is taken. Hence, using formula 
(4.54), the benefit from introducing quantitative easing policy with a non-zero smoothing 
interest parameter is 31.66% better than having no use of quantitative easing in the economy. 
Compared to te case when the central bank implements a zero interest smoothing parameter, 
the fully optimal commitment rule is slightly more beneficial by 5%.3  
 
3 According to Table 4.2, the benefit in the case when the central bank implies a zero interest smoothing 
parameter is 26.66% better off than having no macroprudential policy. Hence, the difference between 
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 In the first approach, the simulation shows that leverage, capital price, and credit 
spread continue to play the critical roles in the optimal simple rule. Table 4.8 illustrates the 
simple rule across three time horizons in detail. 
Table 4-8: The Optimal Simple Quantitative Easing Rule with Banking Variables when ,4 = 0.8 
Time horizon Simple Rule Loss Efficiency 
Past time $')*+ %')*+ &')*+ 2.7088 0.527% 
-0.0422 0.2373 3.7703 
Current time $' ) %') &') 2.7397 1.677% 
0.0325 0.1118 0.0000 
Future time ()($' ),+) ()(%'),+) ()(&'),+) 2.7390 1.651% 
0.0329 0.1884 0.0000 
As shown in Table 4.8, in the first approach, the best optimal simple quantitative easing rule 
is when the central bank uses the lagged deviation of leverage, capital price, and credit spread 
from their steady states. This optimal simple rule delivers a policy performance of 2.7088, 
which is only 0.527% less efficient than that of the fully optimal commitment rule. 
Furthermore, the rule under the current time horizon can deliver a higher loss of 2.7397, 
which is 1.677% less efficient than that of the fully optimal commitment rule. Finally, the 
loss in the optimal rule under the future time horizon is 2.7390, which is 1.651% less efficient 
than that under commitment. Therefore, based on the policy performance, the optimal simple 
rule with the past time horizon is still superior to those under the current and future time 
horizons even though the smoothing interest rate parameter is changed.  
 Furthermore, in the case when the central bank incorporates output and inflation, the 
result demonstrates that adding the two variables can improve policy performance, as shown 
in Table 4.9. 
Table 4-9: The Optimal Simple Quantitative Easing Rule with Banking Variables when ,4 = 0.8 
Time 
horizon 
Simple Rule 
 
Loss Efficiency 
Past time $')*+ %')*+ &')*+ *')*+ +,)*+ 2.7072 0.471% 
-0.0601 0.2290 3.7415 -0.0818 -0.1132 
Current 
time 
$' ) %') &') *') +,) 2.7251 1.135% 
0.0100 0.1727 0.0000 -0.8334 -0.1959 
Future 
time 
()($' ),+) ()(%'),+) ()(&'),+) ()(*'),+) ()(+,),+) 2.7218 1.013% 
0.0103 0.3418 0.0000 -1.1987 -0.2248 
 
31.66% and 26.66% is 5%. However, this comparison does not conclude that a non-zero interest smoothing 
parameter is better than a zero smoothing parameter. 
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 Under the past time horizon, the optimal simple quantitative easing rule constructed 
using lagged deviation of leverage, capital price, credit spread, output, and inflation only 
performs at 2.7072, which is 0.471% less efficient than that under commitment. This result 
suggests that involving output and inflation can increase the optimal simple rule performance 
from 0.527% to 0.471%, which means 0.056% of improvement. We argue that this level of 
improvement, i.e. 0.056%, is insignificant. A similar result also occurs under current and 
future time horizons. Under the current time horizon, the optimal simple rule can improve 
the policy performance from 1.677% to 1.135%, which means 0.542% of improvement. We 
consider this improvement is small. Furthermore, under future time horizon, the rule 
improves policy performance from 1.651% to 1.013%, which means 0.516% of 
improvement, which is considered small. Overall, since considering output and inflation in 
the optimal simple rule under the past time horizon only results in insignificant 
improvement, we argue that incorporating information from these two variables is not 
influential when the central bank smooths the policy rate. Besides, the policy performance 
of the optimal simple rule without smoothing the interest rate remains superior.  
 Compared to the case of the zero interest-rate smoothing parameter, these findings 
indicate that the critical information gleaned from banking variables remains the same, 
namely leverage, capital price, and credit spread. Likewise, the simulation demonstrates that 
incorporating output and inflation into the simple rule has no significant impact.  
Furthermore, the simulation illustrates that the value of feedback coefficients under a non-
zero interest rate smoothing parameter are generally lower than those under a zero parameter. 
However, although the feedback parameters in the simple rule are changed, credit spread 
remains having the greatest feedback coefficient in the simple rule, followed by capital price 
and leverage. Therefore, in conclusion, this part confirms that the structure of the optimal 
simple rule is invariant to the the central bank’s decision to smooth the policy rate. 
4.4.7 The Impact of Exogenous Shock on Policy Performance 
This section investigates the effect of exogenous shocks on the policy performance of the 
optimal simple quantitative easing rule. There are four types of exogenous shocks introduced 
in the model: capital quality shock, technology shock (productivity shock), banking net 
worth shock, and interest rate shock (monetary policy shock). Exogenous shocks are 
naturally unobserved and ideally should not present in the formal presentation of the optimal 
simple policy rule. However, below we argue why this section is necessary.  
 First, although exogenous shocks are naturally unobserved, the central bank may still 
able to prevent shocks from bursting. In practice, most central banks own surveillance teams 
that regularly and comprehensively monitor the development of the domestic economy. We 
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argue that these surveillance teams would be able to detect the presence and approximate the 
shocks. Although the shock magnitude is not estimated accurately, the central bank would 
be able to approximate the shock to improve the policy performance. Hence, we believe that 
incorporating shocks into the optimal simple rule should benefit the central bank. 
 Second, information regarding which shock would most substantially affect policy 
performance can help the central bank to formulate the optimal simple rule more efficiently 
than neglecting all shocks in the economy. For instance, suppose the central bank observes 
the threat of a negative productivity shock; then the central bank could gain more benefit by 
implementing the optimal simple rule containing a productivity shock in the equation.  
 Third, it would be theoretically interesting to understand the role of exogenous 
shocks in the optimal simple rule, mainly to determine whether the shocks can affect 
feedback coefficients in the rule or not. If they can, it would be interesting to observe to what 
extent the coefficients are changed and whether such changes occur in the optimal simple 
rules across all time horizons. Table 4.10 illustrates the simulation result regarding the 
impact of exogenous shocks on the optimal simple quantitative easing rule. 
Table 4-10: Impact of Shock on the Optimal Simple Macroprudential Rule $')*+ %')*+ &')*+ .) /) 0)- 0). LOSS 
-0.0624 0.3354 5.0009     2.6654 
-0.0609 0.3309 4.9150 -0.0542    2.6653 
-0.0627 0.3312 5.0336  0.0209   2.6653 
-0.0624 0.3354 5.0009   0.0031  2.6654 
-0.0624 0.3354 5.0009    -0.0072 2.6654 
 Some results from Table 4.10 above are notable. First, no exogenous shocks 
significantly affect the optimal simple quantitative easing rule. The simulation reveals that 
the policy performances are almost identical when all shocks are present in the rule, for 
instance, the case when the central bank’s response to a technology shock delivers a policy 
performance of 2.6653, which is very similar to the cases of optimal simple rules without 
shocks. Likewise, policy performances under other exogenous shocks remains similar when 
the simple rules do not contain any shocks.  
 Second, although the policy performances are not significantly affected, the feedback 
coefficient of credit spread is slightly affected. For example, the feedback coefficient of 
credit spread in the case when the central bank observes a technology shock is 4.9150, which 
is smaller than that when no shock is present, which is 5.0009. However, the difference is 
minor. This finding confirms that even if the central bank has a chance to respond to a 
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particular shock, responding to exogenous shocks will not significantly affect the 
performance of the optimal simple rule. 
4.4.8 The Impact of Central Bank’s Aggressiveness  
This section examines whether the central bank should be aggressive when managing the 
optimal simple quantitative easing rule or not. The aggressiveness is characterised by the 
presence of a constant called a credit parameter (<) in the optimal simple rule. Hence, a 
higher credit parameter reflects a situation when the central bank more aggressively injects 
credit for banks. This type of aggressiveness is also used in the Gertler and Karadi’s (2011) 
original model.  
 However, the presence of a credit parameter in the optimal simple rule has one 
significant consequence, which is that it will inevitably unbind the optimality of the simple 
quantitative easing rule, as the feedback coefficient in the optimal simple rule will be 
changed. An inspection of the impact of aggressiveness is carried out in this section by 
comparing unconditional variances among variables in the loss function for various levels 
of credit parameters. Specifically, the optimal simple rule used in the simulation is given in 
equation (4.56) below. M! = }O	−0.0422	[j!$% + 	0.3354Ij!$% + 5.0009	gi!$%P																					(ç. âú) 
Accordingly, Table 4.11 provides the simulation of unconditional variances under the 
chosen optimal simple quantitative easing rule for various levels of credit paramaters. 
Table 4-11: Unconditional Variances of The Optimal Simple Rule Under Various Credit Parameter 
Credit 
parameter (>) Unconditional variance LOSS ù → ã ? @A BA CA1 DA  
1 0.0326 2.6927 0.0458 0.1007 0.0955 2.9672 
5 0.0272 2.5388 0.0325 0.0849 0.0325 3.1406 
10 0.0257 2.4524 0.0264 0.0803 0.7754 3.3602 
50 0.0245 2.4618 0.0246 0.0768 0.8208 3.4085 
100 0.0243 2.4572 0.0240 0.0763 0.8517 3.4335 
Some findings from the simulation above are of note. First, increasing aggressiveness 
deteriorates policy performance. As shown in Table 4.11, policy performance increases 
when the credit parameter rises from 1 to 100. At this rate, optimality is no longer binding, 
and the policy performance is worsening. The credit injection ratio itself mainly contributes 
to the worsening of policy performance, which means that the loss function penalizes central 
bank with greater extent when its aggressiveness elevates. That is, this ratio fluctuates 
considerably as the credit parameter increases. The increasing credit injection reflects the 
central bank's increased aggressiveness when injecting abundant credit into the economy. 
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 Second, however, although it worsens policy performance, a higher credit injection 
into the economy stabilises the variables in the loss function. We found that the variance of 
output, inflation, credit spread, and the nominal interest rate all decline when the credit 
parameter increases from 1 to 100. For instance, the inflation fluctuation falls from 0.0326 
to 0.0243 (25.46%). The fluctuation of output also declines from 2.6927 to 2.4572 (8.73%). 
Similarly, credit spread and policy rate are also stabilised by 47.59% and 24.23%, 
respectively. When aggressiveness increases from 1 to 100, the credit injection ratio’s 
variance soars from 0.0955 to 0.8517 (791.83%), and policy performance deteriorates from 
2.9672 to 3.4335 (15.71%). Considering that policy performance deteriorates more quickly 
than the improvement of variables in the loss function, we argue that over-aggressiveness is 
detrimental to the economy. Although increased aggressiveness can benefit macroeconomic 
stabilisation, this benefit is accompanied by worsened policy performance. 
            The main point from this finding is that aggressiveness can promote inflation and 
credit stabilisation but at the cost of worsened policy performance. Also, increased credit 
injection can dampen the fluctuation of output and policy rate. Figure 4.2 illustrates an 
example of the economic response for two level of central bank’s aggressiveness (} = 10 
and } = 100) when a negative five percent capital quality shock enters the economy. 
 
Figure 4-2: Impulse Response Under Minus Five Percent Capital Quality Shock 
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Figure 4.2 illustrates three simulations: the fully optimal commitment rule, the 
optimal simple quantitative easing rule with a credit parameter of 10, and the optimal simple 
quantitative easing rule with a credit parameter of 100. Precisely, the optimal simple 
quantitative easing rule with a credit parameter 10 is defined as  M! = O	−0.422	[j!$% + 	3.354Ij!$% + 50.009	gi!$%P																		(ç. âf) 
while the the optimal simple quantitative easing rule with a credit parameter of 100 is defined 
as M! = O	−4.22	[j!$% + 	33.54Ij!$% + 500.09	gi!$%P.																		(ç. âç) 
As shown in the figure, in general, being aggressive causes the central bank to inject 
more abundant credit into the economy. The central bank injects the highest amount of credit 
when it is very aggressive with a credit parameter of 100. This injection can moderate the 
negative impact of the shock on macroeconomic variables.  
For instance, in the first period, the variables like capital, inflation, consumption, 
investment, output, and asset prices are more stable than those under commitment. However, 
this stabilisation is a consequence of a massive liquidity injection into the economy, which 
could have brought negative consequences in the future. Recall that the loss function (4.59) 
contains the credit injection ratio within its structure, which serves as a penalty for an 
excessive quantitative easing decision: thus, over-aggressiveness inevitably deteriorates 
policy performance. 
In conclusion, this simulation illustrates that over-aggressiveness unbinds optimality 
in the simple quantitative easing rule. This occurs because the presence of a credit parameter 
increases the feedback coefficients in the rule, which consequently worsens loss value due 
to higher credit injection into the economy. However, as demonstrated by the unconditional 
variance and the example of impulse response function in Figure 4.2, although excessive 
aggressiveness when combatting a crisis deteriorates policy performance, the decision helps 
stabilise the fluctuation of economic variables in the loss function and also benefits the 
macroeconomy in general. That is, output, inflation, credit spread, and policy rate fluctuate 
less. However, this occurs at the cost of worsened policy performance. 
4.4.9 Impulse Response Function 
This section explains the simulation of impulse response functions under various shocks. 
The impulse describes the response of the economy under the best optimal simple 
quantitative easing rule, which is the optimal simple rule that is constructed by the past 
deviation of leverage, capital price, and credit spread. The simulation introduces four types 
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of shocks: minus five percent capital quality shock, minus one percent technology shock, 
minus one percent net worth shock, and one percent increase of nominal interest rate shock. 
• Capital Quality Shock 
Figure 4.3 depicts the impact of a minus five percent capital quality shock on the 
economy under the optimal simple rule, relative to the fully optimal commitment rule. 
Precisely, the optimal simple quantitative easing rule presented with this figure is the one 
constructed by past deviation of endogenous variables defined as  M! = O	−0.0422	[j!$% + 	0.3354Ij!$% + 5.009	gi!$%P																		(ç. âá) 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Impulse Response Under Minus Five Percent Capital Quality Shock  
A capital quality shock enters the economy through various channels, namely the capital 
accumulation equation, the production function, new bankers net worth accumulation, and 
investment. In comparison to the other types of shocks, this shock has the most channels by 
which it can affect the economy. 
 Under the adverse capital quality shock, the economic responses of the two policy 
rules are identical. In the real sector, firms experience a decline of capital purchased by five 
percent from its steady state when the shock presents. In the labour market, the shock on 
capital quality also decreases labour hired. Thus, everything else equal, the fall in capital and 
labour contributes to the decline of production and causes output in the economy declines. 
Everything else equal, the fall in production corresponds to the fall of intermediate good 
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prices and hence inflation. The simulation demonstrates that inflation falls by –3% when the 
shock presents, which is identified either in the fully optimal commitment rule or in the 
optimal simple rule. 
The declining production activity also causes firms to gain less profit, which means 
less dividend given to households. This then results in less funds available for consumption 
and less deposit creation in intermediaries. Therefore, consumption decreases by –1%  below 
the steady state when the shock hits the economy. The simulation also shows that the shock 
negatively affects capital good producers and pressures investment by more than 20% from 
its steady state. Hence, under this shock, production declines because capital producers can 
only contribute less new capital to the economy. However, given that capital purchased by 
firms is equal to the amount of credit given by banks, the fall of purchased capital also 
attenuates credit activity in the banking sector. Consequently, banking profitability falls. 
Everything else equal, falling banking profit reduces the total banking net worth. The 
fall of banking net worth under commitment and the optimal simple rule are identical. From 
a monetary policy perspective, the presence of shock causes the central bank to cut the policy 
rate, which subsequently decreases the real interest rate (deposit rate). The fall in deposit 
rate then disincentivises households from creating more deposits, which then negatively 
affects banking credit activity. From the quantitative easing perspective, the central bank 
responds to the adverse capital quality shock by increasing the credit injection ratio. The 
shock increases the credit injection ratio identically under both commitment and the optimal 
simple rule. This higher injection provides additional funds for intermediaries to accelerate 
their credit activity. As credit progresses positively, credit spread gradually decreases and 
reduces bankers’ incentive to divert funds.  
A higher credit supply also enables firms to demand more capital in the economy, 
which stimulates capital good producers to produce more new capital for firms. As more 
new capital is produced, credit becomes more affordable, which further increases output. 
These more affordable credit gradually increases the future expectation of the lending rate 
and thereby increases credit spread positively. As the credit spread increases gradually, 
banking profitability also advances and brings banking net worth back to its steady state. 
Moreover, the growing production also drives firm’s profit, increases dividends for 
households, and enhances consumption. Accelerating economic activity gradually increases 
inflation. Overall, the economic recovery speed of the fully optimal commitment rule and 
the optimal simple rule under this shock is identical. 
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• Technology Shock 
Figure 4.4 depicts the impact of the minus one percent technology shock on the economy 
under the optimal simple rule relative to the fully optimal commitment rule. The only 
channel through which the shock can affect the economy is through production function of 
intermediate good firms. In general, under this shock, the two policy rules behave similarly, 
but not identically. Precisely, the optimal simple quantitative easing policy rule presented in 
this figure is the one constructed by past deviation of endogenous variables defined as  M! = O	−0.0422	[j!$% + 	0.3354Ij!$% + 5.009	gi!$%P																		(ç. ââ) 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Impulse Response Under Minus One Percent Technology Shock 
In the real sector, the shock reduces output in both policy regimes. Everything else 
equal, the weakening production disincentivises capital goods producers from creating more 
new capital, which reduces investment. The falling investment causes capital prices to 
decline. Hence, when only less capital are available in the economy, production is affected. 
The falling production then increases intermediate goods prices, which then triggers inflation 
to rise, everything else equal. This weaker production activity generates less profitability for 
firms and less dividends for households to consume. Therefore, consumption also decreases. 
In the financial sector, less dividends received by households corresponds to less deposit 
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creation in intermediaries, and hence less funds for credit intermediation. Reduced credit 
intermediation then negatively affects banking net worth. Furthermore, less credit activity 
raises the future expectation of the lending rate, which then significantly increases credit 
spread.  
The shock triggers the central bank to expand credit injection. The credit injection 
under commitment increases up to 23%, while it only increases up to 10% under the optimal 
simple rule. In contrast, the monetary policy responds to the shock by increasing the policy 
rate above its steady state, which subsequently incentivises households to create more 
deposits and provides more funds. The credit injection also helps intermediaries increase 
their credit activity.  Given that banks now intermediate more credit into the economy, firms 
can receive more credit to purchase new capital for their production. Everything else equal, 
as purchased capital increases, firms can produce more goods and increase output.  
Simultaneously, more credit received by firms for purchasing capital also strengthens 
their demand for capital and incentivises capital goods producers to produce more new 
capital in the economy. Increasing capital demand also stimulates the growth of capital 
prices. Everything else equal, when credit accelerates, the future expectation of lending rate 
falls and gradually returns the credit spread to its steady state. Furthermore, increased output 
also pressures intermediate goods prices and reduces inflation. Inflation then rebounds 
positively when the economy accelerates. 
• Net Worth Shock 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the impact of a minus one percent net worth shock on the economy 
under the optimal simple rule relative to the fully optimal commitment rule. The adverse net 
worth shock affects the economy through the financial sector, specifically via the channel of 
the existing bankers’ net worth accumulation. Precisely, the optimal simple quantitative 
easing policy rule presented in this figure is the one constructed by past deviation of 
endogenous variables defined as  M! = O	−0.0422	[j!$% + 	0.3354Ij!$% + 5.009	gi!$%P																		(ç. âh) 
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Figure 4-5: Economic Response Under Minus One Percent Net Worth Shock 
The economic response under the optimal simple rule is identical to that under commitment, 
with the exception of the response of the credit injection ratio. In the following section, the 
terms banking net worth and banking capital are used interchangeably. Everything else 
equal, the fall in existing bankers net worth decreases total banking capital, which attenuates 
banking credit intermediation. Hence, the amount of credit given to firms is falling. Given 
that credit supply is equal to capital purchased by firms, the shock also causes capital stock 
to fall.  
 In the real sector, less credit intermediation from banks causes capital purchased by 
firms to decline. Everything else equal, less purchased capital results in a deceleration of 
production activity. Falling production activity causes firms’ demand for capital to decline, 
which subsequently disincentivises capital goods producers from creating more new capital 
in the economy. The latter explains why investment falls. Falling investment then pressures 
capital prices, raises the expectation of lending rate, and hence elevates credit spread. In 
protecting banking credit from further decline, the central bank expands the credit injection 
ratio. The central bank elevates the ratio twice as high as it does under commitment. The 
central bank also cuts the policy rate to respond to the shock, which then reduces the deposit 
rate in both rules, everything else equal. Thus, a lower deposit rate prompts deposit creation 
in the economy.  
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 Quantitative easing helps banks promote credit activity. Given that banks now 
intermediate more credit into the economy, firms can receive more credit to purchase new 
capital for their production. Everything else equal, as purchased capital increases, firms can 
produce more goods and increase output. Simultaneously, it strengthens the firms’ demand 
for capital and incentivises capital goods producers to produce more new capital in the 
economy, which then increases investment. Increasing capital demand also stimulates the 
growth of capital prices, which then positively affects the lending rate, everything else equal. 
As credit is accelerating, the future expectation of lending rate is falling and gradually 
reduces credit spread back to its steady state. Higher production activity then gives firms 
more profit, increases dividends for households, and boosts consumption. 
• Interest Rate Shock 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the impulse response under monetary policy shock, namely a sudden 
increase of the nominal interest rate by one percent. The economic response under the 
optimal simple rule is identical to that under commitment, with the exception the response 
of the credit injection ratio. Precisely, the optimal simple quantitative easing policy rule 
presented in this figure is the one constructed by past deviation of endogenous variables 
defined as  M! = O	−0.0422	[j!$% + 	0.3354Ij!$% + 5.009	gi!$%P																		(ç. âï) 
 
Figure 4-6: Economic Response Under One Percent Interest Rate Shock 
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The shock in the nominal interest rate hits the economy through the simple monetary 
policy rule, i.e., the Taylor rule, implemented by the central bank. Moreover, according to 
the Fisher equation, the increase of the nominal interest rate will influence the deposit rate 
and affect the amount of deposit created in the banking sector. Given the higher deposit rate, 
households will trade their consumption for more significant deposit in the future such that 
consumption in the initial period falls, where the fall of consumption under the optimal 
simple policy rule and the commitment rule are identical. 
In the financial sector, intermediaries anticipate the shock by elevating the lending 
rate in order to gain more profits. As a consequence, the lending rate rises, which makes 
credit become more expensive. The expectation of a higher future lending rate elevates credit 
spread and causes credit intermediation to fall. Given that credit is equal to capital purchased 
by firms, this explains why capital diminishes. Everything else equal, by production 
function, the output decreases. When firms receive less credit, their demand for new capital 
decreases, which then reduces investment and capital prices. 
The central bank injects more loans into the economy by raising the credit injection 
ratio. This injection helps banks increase their lending to firms such that firms can purchase 
more capital for their production. Everything else equal, as purchased capital increases, firms 
can produce more goods and increase output. At the same time, more loans received by firms 
also strengthen their demand for capital and incentivises capital goods producers to create 
more new capital in the economy, followed by an increase in investment. Increasing 
investment then stimulates capital prices and reduces the lending rate and credit spread. 
Finally, accelerated production also increases firms’ profitability, dividends given to 
households, and consumption. 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
This study investigates the optimal simple rule for quantitative easing policy. The reference 
model in this study is the unconventional monetary policy model from Gertler and Karadi 
(2011). The study uses the credit injection ratio as the quantitative easing policy instrument, 
which represents the share of credit injected from the central bank relative to the total credit 
in the economy. The central bank optimises the credit injection ratio under commitment 
while implementing a monetary policy using the simple Taylor rule.  
 The loss function in the study is the ad-hoc loss function constructed by the deviation 
of output, inflation, credit spread, nominal interest rate, and the credit injection ratio from 
their steady states. The simulation illustrates two approaches. The first approach is when the 
central bank only focuses on banking variables, and the second approach is when the central 
bank also incorporates macroeconomic variables. For each approach, this study generates 
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three optimal simple rules: the optimal simple rule under anpast time horizon, under a current 
time horizon, and under a future time horizon. 
 This study contributes to the literature regarding the formulation of quantitative 
easing rule and the literature on the convensionalisation of unconventional monetary policy 
(sheedy, 2016; Curdia and Woodford, 2018; Quint and Rabanal, 2017). This study 
demonstrates that in the first approach, the optimal simple rule is optimally constructed by 
lagged deviation of leverage, capital price, and credit spread from their steady states. In the 
second approach, the study shows that incorporating output and inflation only minorly 
improves policy performance. By comparing these two approaches, using the fully optimal 
commitment rule as a benchmark, this study identifies that the optimal simple rule under a 
past time horizon is superior. Furthermore, when the central bank utilises a non-zero interest 
rate smoothing parameter, the structure of the optimal simple rule under the first approach 
remains the same, which is constructed by past leverage, capital price, and credit spread, and 
incorporates information regarding output and inflation is still insignificant. Relative to the 
fully optimal commitment rule, the optimal simple rule corresponds to less credit injection 
than under commitment. However, less credit injection consequently leads to higher 
fluctuations in output and credit spread. Across all variables in the loss function, output is 
the most fluctuating variable that contributes significantly to level of policy performance. 
 Some other findings also stand out. First, knowledge of the banking sector is crucial 
for the central bank when managing the optimal simple rule for quantitative easing, which 
is in line with argument from Borio and Zabai (2016). Second, past information is superior 
to current and future information, which means that ample access to historical data would 
be beneficial for the central bank when managing quantitative easing. Third, credit spread 
has the greatest feedback coefficient in the simple quantitative easing rule. This result is in 
line with our reference model, which indicates that credit spread is a variable that 
significantly influences moral hazard in the banking sector. Hence, the increase of credit 
spread, which activates higher credit injection, is also beneficial for decreasing instances of 
moral hazard behaviour in the banking sector. Lastly, the optimal simple quantitative easing 
rule using past information can deliver policy performance almost as efficiently as the fully 
optimal commitment rule, which would help the central bank communicates the simple rule 
to the public. 
 This study also investigates the impact of an exogenous shocks on the policy 
performance of the optimal simple quantitative easing rule. Some conclusions from this 
section are notable. First, no exogenous shocks significantly affect the optimal simple 
quantitative easing rule. The simulation reveals that when any particular shock is 
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incorporated into the optimal simple rule, the policy performances are almost identical. 
Second, although policy performance is not significantly affected, the feedback coefficient 
of credit spread is slightly affected. However, the difference is just minuscule. Thus, even if 
the central bank were aware of a particular shock, the knowledge of shock would not change 
how the optimal simple quantitative easing rule performs. 
 This study also found that the central bank’s aggressiveness creates a trade-off 
between optimality and stability in the economy, which is similar to argument by Cui and 
Sterk (2018); Kiley (2008); and Fernandez, Bortz, and Zeolla (2018). The aggressiveness 
unbinds the optimality under the optimal simple rule because a higher credit parameter 
changes the feedback coefficients in the optimal simple rule. A higher credit parameter 
consequently leads to higher loss due to higher credit injection into the economy. However, 
although aggressiveness deteriorates policy performance, it reduces the fluctuation of the 
variables in the loss function – except the credit injection ratio – and benefits the 
macroeconomy. In the example in which a minus five percent capital quality shock hits the 
economy, the impulse shows that higher aggressiveness (higher credit parameter) moderates 
macroeconomic fluctuation, such as output and inflation, but causes the credit injection ratio 
to soar. Thus, we argue that excessive aggressiveness is not recommended in quantitative 
easing policy. Finally, the finding regarding the benefit from introducing quantitative easing 
policy in the economy is also in line with studies from Bhattarai and Neely (2016); Chen et 
al. (2016); Curcuru et al. (2018); Maggio, Kermani and Palmer (2016); Fisher, Ramcharan, 
and Yu (2015); and Kapetanios et al. (2019), among others. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY WITH MULTIPLE POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the interaction between conventional monetary policy and 
macroprudential policy in a macroeconomic model where credit supply plays a prominent 
role. The model reference in this study is the one outlined by Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and 
Signoretti (2010) that provides three macroprudential policy instruments: capital adequacy 
ratio, loan-to-value ratio for households, and loan-to-value ratio for entrepreneurs. The study 
presents two scenarios: the scenario with a single policy instrument and the multiple policy 
instruments. We measure policy performance based on the ad-hoc loss function constructed 
by the summed quadratic of deviaton of output, inflation, nominal interest rate, loan-to-
output ratio, and macroprudential policy instruments from their steady states. The findings 
demonstrate that the presence of macroprudential policy can benefit the economy by 
ensuring financial stability. Furthermore, optimising multiple policy instruments can deliver 
a better performance than a single instrument optimisation, but there is a risk of there being 
conflict among the policy instruments. The study also demonstrates that the substitution 
effect among macroprudential instruments can occur under multiple policy instruments 
interaction. 
 
Keywords: Macroprudential policy, Policy instrument, Capital adequacy ratio, Loan to 
value ratio 
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5.1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of the U.S. global financial crisis, the need for macroprudential policy to 
protect the financial system from systemic crisis was paramount. Macroprudential policy is 
understood as a policy that aims to generate stability and reduce risk in the financial sector 
(Gallati and Moissner, 2003). This policy focuses on the stability of the broad financial 
sector rather than an individual institution. However, as it is a new and evolving policy, the 
implementation of macroprudential policy still requires many improvements. 
           For instance,  there is no formal consensus on whether the mandate of 
macroprudential policy should be given to a single or separate institution. Every country has 
different guidelines for uniting or separating the institutions receiving the macroprudential 
policy mandate. In Europe, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is separate from the 
central bank, but the central bank plays a prominent role in decision making process. In the 
U.S., macroprudential authority is mandated to a new institution, namely the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), while monetary policy remains in the U.S. Federal 
Reserve. Lastly, the U.K. mandates both monetary and macroprudential policies within the 
Bank of England. Although it is not an absolute rule, many studies assume that 
macroprudential policy should be mandated into a single institution and simultaneously 
managed with monetary policy, for example, studies conducted by Angeloni and Faia 
(2013); Bianchi (2010); Meh and Mohran (2009); Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci, and 
Young (2011); Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012); Quint and Rabanal (2013); Rubio and 
Carrasco-Gallego (2015); Collard, Dellas, and Loise (2014), and Zhang and Zoli (2016), 
among others.  
 In addition, there is no consensus regarding macroprudential policy’s primary 
instrument. One reason for this issue is that because the scope of the policy itself is broad. 
For instance, the policy aims to reduce the impact of systemic risk, while the systemic risk 
itself is broadly defined. Systemic risks can emerge in many forms, such as moral hazard, 
productivity shock, or asset price bubble. Therefore, no single macroprudential policy 
instrument can wholly represent the causes of a systemic crisis. However, although no formal 
consensus is available, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) 
are two of the most popular instruments in macroprudential policy. The Bank of International 
Settlement (BIS) regulates these two ratios in the Basel Accord, which has become an 
international standard. 
 The LTV is the ratio between the loan and its market collateral value, while the CAR 
is the ratio between the capital and weighted risked assets. Some studies employ one of these 
types of policy instrument. For example, the study carried out by Angelini, Neri, and Panetta 
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(2014) focusing on using time-varying CAR as a macroprudential instrument. Gerali, Neri, 
Sessa, and Signoretti (2010) also use the LTV ratio with a stochastic process, but the CAR 
is designed as a constant. Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2012) also design a macroprudential 
instrument that allows the central bank to change the CAR. Other similar studies include 
those by Lambertini, Mendizino, and Punzi (2013) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014), 
among others. However, one significant gap in the literature, found across the studies, is that 
most studies only use a single macroprudential policy instrument in their models.  
 Macroprudential policy covers a wide range of policy instruments. Therefore, using 
multiple macroprudential policy instruments in the economy should be possible. However, 
it is rare to find studies that focus on multiple macroprudential instruments in their models. 
This study is interested in filling this gap in the literature by focusing on the interaction 
between conventional monetary policy and macroprudential policy, when the latter 
simultaneously implements more than one policy instrument. There are three research 
questionss in this study. Firstly, how much does the economy benefit from implementing 
macroprudential policy relative to a scenario in which the policy does not exist? Secondly, 
to what extent macroprudential policy with multiple policy instruments can benefit the 
economy, relative to the performance with a single instrument?  Finally, is there a trade-off 
between policy instruments when they are optimised simultaneously? 
 The reference model used in this study was taken from Gerali et al. (2010), which is 
also the model used by Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2014). However, this study adopts the 
reference model from Gerali et al. (2010) with a small modification. In this study, a minor 
modification was applied to the model. We set the CAR in the model to be time-varying 
rather than constant, and we designed LTVs not to be dependent on exogenous shocks. This 
model is chosen for various reasons. Firstly, the fundamental issue motivating the 
implementation of macroprudential policy in this model is considered to be relevant in 
practice, which is to create financial soundness and stabilise credit supply. Secondly, this 
model also provides a representative banking-oriented model that allows multiple 
macroprudential instruments to interact, which suits our research questions. Thirdly, and 
interestingly, the reference model also provides heterogeneous households and allow 
macroprudential authority to implement two different LTVs: LTV for impatient households, 
and LTV for entrepreneurs.  
 Among many similar papers in macroprudential policy, this study is closely related 
to a study by Angelini et al. (2011). However, our study is different in the way the number 
of policy instruments being optimised. This study is also different in terms of loss function 
used, where we assume that the mandate of macroprudential policy is given to a single 
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institution, namely the central bank which manages both monetary and macroprudential 
policies simultaneously, while Angelini et al. (2011) differentiates the authority into two 
separate institutions. Our study is also different from Angelini et al. (2011) where we 
optimise all macroprudential policy instruments under commitment and introduce a joint 
LTV ratio as a new instrument. Finally, our study is different in the way we measure 
optimality level of the interaction between policy instruments. That is, this study measures 
optimality of the interaction based on the unconditional loss value. The unconditional loss 
value is a single number reflecting the total variation of the variables in the loss function that 
incorporates multiple exogenous shocks coming into the economy, not only conditional on 
a specific shock. The highest policy performance (or the lowest loss value) indicates the 
better performance of a macroprudential policy instrument. Finally, the method to measure 
the policy performance (or loss value) is adopted from the algorithm developed by Dennis 
(2007). 
 We allow the central bank to optimise the CAR and the LTVs under fully optimal 
commitment and manages monetary policy through a non-optimal simple Taylor rule. 
Therefore, the central bank only optimises macroprudential policy instruments to minimise 
the loss function. The loss function for this study is the one used by Angelini et al. (2011), 
which is designed as an ad-hoc loss function constructed by the variation of inflation, output, 
loan-to-output ratio, monetary policy instruments, and macroprudential policy instruments.  
 Our study demonstrates some critical findings. Firstly, implementing 
macroprudential policy can benefit the economy. Our simulation demonstrates that the 
policy shows an improvement in performance of up to 72.75% higher than in the case when 
there is no macroprudential policy active. The benefit from implementing macroprudential 
policy is derived from its ability to promote financial stability through loan-to-output ratio 
stabilisation. Secondly, we argue that optimising multiple macroprudential policy 
instruments is better than only optimising a single policy instrument. The study also 
demonstrates that the substitution effect among macroprudential policy instruments can 
occur when multiple policy instruments optimisation take place. However, although 
optimising multiple policy instruments performs positively, it can also introduce a risk of 
there being in conflict between the instruments. In other words, the presence of one 
macroprudential policy instrument can affect the efficacy of another instrument. Finally, we 
found that LTV is more impactful than CAR, especially when minimising the fluctuation of 
the loan-to-output ratio. 
 This chapter contributes through several ways. First, this study contributes to the 
literature regarding the positive impact of macroprudential policy on welfare, which support 
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studies by Boar et al. (2017); Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015); Lim et al. (2011), Dell’ 
Ariccia et al. (2012); Galati and Moessner (2014); Quint and Rabbanal (2013); Angelini, 
Neri and Panetta (2012); Kannan and Rabanal (2012); Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2016), 
Mendicino and Punzi (2014), and Basto, Gomes, and Lima (2018), among others. 
Specifically, the efficacy of macroprudential policy in stabilising macroeconomy through 
loan-to-output ratio is also in line with Basel III recommendation, and some studies such as 
Angelini et al. (2014), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), and Borio and Drehman (2009). Second, 
the study also contributes to the literature by presenting the finding that trade-off among 
policy instruments is present when the central bank manages multiple macroprudential 
policy instrument under a single objective function. Finally, this study also contributes to 
the literature arguing the efficacy of LTV ratio for macroeconomic stabilisation, which is a 
similar argument to studies by Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014); Basto, Gomes, and Lima 
(2018), and Lambertini, Mendicino, and Punzi (2013), among others. 
The rest of the paper is presented as follows: Section two describes the literature 
study. Section three describes the reference model in detail. Section four contains the results 
and analyses, including the loss value report and the simulation of the impulse response 
function. Section five is the conclusion. 
5.2 Literature Review 
One of the main differences between macroprudential policy and the other stabilisations 
policy is their respective scopes. Macroprudential policy aims to limit system-wide distress, 
and, hence, creates financial stability, not only concerning on individual institutions but also 
all institutions within the financial sector at the same time. This wide scope nature means 
that the operation of macroprudential policy cannot be supported by only one policy 
instrument, for instance like policy rate in monetary policy. Hence, as part of a recently 
growing policy, alternative policy instruments are being developed to support 
macroprudential policy. This section describes literature that has focused on three areas, 
namely, the formal regulation on macroprudential policy, the role of CAR, and the role of 
LTV ratio. 
5.2.1 Formal Regulation on Macroprudential Policy 
The formal law regulating the standard practices for banks in the banking industry was 
created by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), from the Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS), in the form of the Basel Capital Accord. The first Basel 
Capital Accord (“Basel I”) was published in July 1988 and was based on the work of the 
BCBS. It was enacted in the U.S. by the end of 1992. The second accord (“Basel II”) was 
finalised by the BCBS in June 2004 to overcome some major shortcomings of the previous 
 141 
standard, most notably with reference to the risk-weighting system (Masera, 2013). Basel I 
and II required a minimum CAR of 8%.  
After the global financial crisis, the BIS strengthened Basel II and classified 
macroprudential policy instruments into ten important categories, namely risk measurement 
methodologies, financial reporting, regulatory capital, funding liquidity standards, collateral 
arrangements, risk concentration limits, compensation schemes, profit distribution 
restrictions, insurance mechanisms, and managing failures and resolution. Among the ten 
categories, regulatory capital and collateral arrangements stand out as the two most 
prominent aspects of macroprudential policy.  
Regulatory capital is concerned with the strength of banking capital in relation to 
buffer risks on credit intermediation. Regarding this, the BIS (2008) strengthened Basel II, 
which is the international regulatory framework for banks, as a response to the global 
financial crisis. Subsequently, the strengthened accord Basel III was produced to increase 
regulatory capital requirements for particular exposure types, which provides greater risk 
weights than Basel II, for macroprudential reasons. Basel III adds a dynamic 
macroprudential element in the form of a countercyclical capital buffer of up to another 2.5% 
of capital, which requires banks to hold more capital in good times to prepare for downturns 
in the economy. Basel III also introduces a mandatory capital conservation buffer of 2.5%, 
which elevates the capital requirement buffer to 10.5% (Rubio, and Carrasco-Gallego, 
2016). On the other hand, the collateral arrangement is related to the borrowers’ repayment 
capacity, which is measured as the ratio of loans to collateral value. Regarding this, the BIS 
(2008) advises firms to design a time-varying loan-to-value for collateral based on 
appropriate valuation methodologies. Hence, among all macroprudential policy instruments, 
the CAR and LTV are the two most prominent. These two macroprudential instruments have 
been utilised by many central banks worldwide.  
In banking operations, the CAR and LTV basically have a similar primary objective, 
which is to affect banking credit behaviour. Changing the CAR directly affects banks, which 
subsequently affects borrowers. On the contrary, LTV ratio first affects borrowers and 
subsequently affects banking profitability. For instance, imposing higher capital 
requirements means that banks need to allocate more capital to support credit intermediation 
to private-sector firms. Hence, with all else equal, a higher capital requirement dampens 
credit intermediation, which is why it is known as a countercyclical capital buffer. 
Differently, lowering the CAR incentivises banks to expand the credit market, and in such a 
case, banks need to allocate a smaller amount of capital. On the other hand, expanding (or 
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lowering) the LTV ratio means giving more (or less) allowance for borrowers to access more 
credit. 
5.2.2 Interaction between Monetary and Macroprudential Policy 
Besides using Gerali et al. (2010) as a reference model, this chapter is also close with the 
work from Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2012). Angelini et al. (2012) study the policy 
coordination between monetary policy and macroprudential policy under cooperative and 
non-cooperative settings. The study incorporates macroprudential policy rules into the 
macroeconomic model developed by Gerali et al. (2010). Monetary authority uses a short-
term interest rate as a policy instrument while macroprudential regulator uses capital 
requirements as the policy instrument. The loss function of monetary authority is calculated 
by the weighted sum of variation in inflation and output growth. Meanwhile, the loss 
function of macroprudential authority is calculated by the weighted sum of the variation in 
the loan-to-output ratio, capital requirement and output growth.  
 The cooperative setting of the two authorities is modelled to suppose that there is 
only one single institution that minimises the joint loss function of the two authorities. The 
financial constraints in the model are assumed to be always binding. The results show that 
under a cooperative setting, the welfare loss of depositors is greater under technology shocks 
than under financial shocks. However, the welfare loss of borrowers is relatively equal under 
both types of shocks. The study illustrates that cooperation between monetary and 
macroprudential authorities is not significant under normal circumstances triggered by 
technology shocks but is beneficial under financial shocks. Under financial shocks, the 
central bank deviates from its target and tends to place more focus on macroprudential policy 
issues. 
Quint and Rabbanal (2013) study the optimal mix of monetary policy and 
macroprudential policy in the euro area. The authors utilise the Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) model with two types of financial intermediaries: domestic and 
international intermediaries. The model follows the financial accelerator model of Bernanke, 
Gilchrist and Gertler (1999). The monetary policy instrument used in the model is a short-
term interest rate within two types of Taylor rules, namely the simple Taylor rule and the 
extended Taylor rule, which reacts to nominal credit growth and credit-to-GDP ratio. The 
macroprudential policy instrument used in the study is an exogenous variable that limits the 
loans given out to borrowers. This exogenous variable could be given in terms of increasing 
loan provisions, capital requirements, reserve requirements, or loan-to-value ratios. Instead 
of formulating the welfare loss function, the study defines the welfare function as the sum 
of the welfare of savers and borrowers, where each welfare function is derived by taking the 
 143 
second order approximation to the utility function and subtracting it by the utility value at a 
steady state level. The results show that macroprudential and monetary policy coordination 
increases welfare under housing demand shocks and risk shocks. However, macroprudential 
policy reduces welfare under technology shocks and propagates the countercyclical 
behaviour of the lending-deposit spread.  
Bailiu, Meh, and Zhang (2015) study the interaction between macroprudential and 
monetary policy under financial imperfection and financial shocks. The model is developed 
by the DSGE in a closed economy estimated based on Canadian data. The model is simulated 
under four scenarios: a standard Taylor rule regime, representing monetary policy focusing 
on price stability only; an augmented Taylor rule regime, representing monetary policy 
focusing on price stability and financial imbalance; a macroprudential policy regime with a 
standard Taylor rule, focusing on the interaction between macroprudential policy and 
monetary policy to maintain price stability; and a macroprudential policy with augmented 
Taylor rule regime, focusing on the interaction between macroprudential policy and 
monetary policy to maintain price stability and to prevent financial imbalances. It was found 
that monetary policy results in more welfare when its objective goes beyond price stability, 
either through fighting financial imbalances or interacting with macroprudential policy.  
Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2012) study the coordination of monetary policy and 
macroprudential policy within the framework of a macroeconomic mode,l focusing on a 
housing price boom. The study was conducted in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005) and 
Iacoviello and Nerri (2010). The monetary and macroprudential policies were assumed to be 
mandated to a central bank. Within the study, the authors develop four combinations of 
policy rules: a simple Taylor rule (which serves as a baseline), an augmented Taylor rule, an 
augmented Taylor rule with macroprudential policy, and an optimised augmented Taylor 
rule with macroprudential policy. The four rules are then ranked based on traditional welfare 
criteria, minimising the variation of inflation and output gap. The monetary policy 
instrument in the model is policy rate, while the macroprudential policy instrument is the 
lagged nominal credit changes.  
The results show that the the knowledge of the actual source of the housing price 
boom determines the efficacy of a macroprudential policy towards welfare. Under a 
productivity shock, macroprudential policy plays no role in the coordination, while it 
increases welfare when the economy is hit by a demand shocks. Furthermore, based on the 
welfare criterion comparison, the ranking of rules is influenced by the type of shocks that hit 
the economy. Under a housing shock or technology shock, the augmented Taylor rule is 
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preferred, while under a financial shock, the augmented Taylor rule with macroprudential 
policy is preferred. 
5.2.3 The Role of Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Although few studies have focused on the interactions between multiple macroprudential 
instruments, many studies have focused on the role of CAR or LTV ratio in the economy. In 
general, both policy instruments contribute positively to create financial stability.  
The capital requirements affect the economy through the credit intermediation 
activity in the banking sector. In principle, greater capital requirements are introduced when 
the economy is in a boom phase, while lower requirements are recommended when the 
economy is in a bust phase. Economic theory suggests that if an increase in capital 
requirements is binding and the Miller-Modigliani theorem fails, then the affected bank will 
either need to either raise capital or reduce risk-weighted assets to satisfy the new 
requirements (Uluc and Wieladek, 2018). Francis and Osborne (2012), in their studies 
focusing on the U.K. financial sector, shows that the bank-specific capital requirements, set 
by the regulator, are an important determinant of banks’ internal capital targets, and that 
banks’ capitalisation relative to an internal target is an important determinant of balance 
sheet growth and lending activity. The country’s economy is stable when the activity of 
credit intermediation is manageable. Therefore, the close relationship between capital 
requirements and banks’ lending activity leads to an understanding that capital requirements 
can be used to stabilise the financial sector when lending activity is stabilised as well. 
Angeloni and Faia (2013) used two terms to explain how capital requirements affect 
the economy: procyclical and anti-cyclical. Procyclical capital requirements are considered 
when banks decrease the capital buffer in a contractionary economy, while the anti-cyclical 
capital requirement is relevant in a situation in which banks accumulate a capital buffer 
under an expansionary economic cycle. A study by Angeloni and Faia (2013), which focuses 
on fragile banks,  points out that the procyclical capital requirement reduces welfare, while 
the anti-capital requirement enhances welfare. The decline of welfare under a procyclical 
capital requirement is caused by an increase in the volatility of inflation and in the output 
towards of exogenous shock. 
The effectiveness of the CAR in creating financial stability – and, in turn,  stabilising 
lending activity – has also been examined in many studies. For instance, Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2016) utilises the CAR to investigate the interaction of Basel I, II, and III 
regulations with monetary policy. Using the ratio, the study demonstrates that the interaction 
between capital requirements and monetary policy results in a more stable economic and 
financial system, which is in accordance with Basel I and Basel II. The author also 
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demonstrates that the optimal way to implement the countercyclical capital buffer is to 
follow a rule that responds to the deviation of credit from its steady state. This result is 
slightly from that obtained by Yoshino and Hirano (2011), who demonstrate that the Basel 
capital adequacy ratio should depend on various economic factors such as the cyclical stage 
of GDP, credit growth, stock prices, interest rates, and land prices. However, Yoshino and 
Hirano (2011) emphasise that the CAR should be designed differently across countries due 
to the different banking behaviours and macroeconomic structures present in different 
countries.  
The link between CAR and banking behaviour, as well as macroeconomic 
conditions, indicates that, ideally, the ratio is to be designed as time varying rather than 
constant, which is also consistent with the recommendation of Basel III. The time-varying 
capital requirement is also suggested in a study conducted by Francis and Osborne (2012). 
In examining the role of capital requirements in all U.K. banks, the study demonstrates that 
capital requirements that include firm-specific, time-varying add-ons set by supervisors can 
affect banks’ desired capital ratios. Besides banking behaviour and macroeconomic 
conditions, the way in which the CAR affects banks’ lending behaviour – and, hence, the 
economy – also depends on its interaction with monetary policy. A study by Uluc and 
Wieladek (2018), focusing on the impact of interactions between monetary policy and 
capital requirements, demonstrates that increasing capital requirements leads to decrease in 
mortgage loans in U.K. banking sector. Surprisingly, the detrimental impact of a higher 
capital adequacy ratio on mortgage loans is larger for existing customers than for new ones. 
The study also demonstrates that monetary policy helps to mitigate the effect of higher 
capital requirements. 
5.2.4 The Role of Loan-to-Value Ratio 
In many studies, the LTV is strongly associated with the housing market, housing prices, 
and mortgage loan activity. LTV is the ratio between debt and the collateral value, which 
also represents the coverage ratio from households’ debt relative to the market collateral 
value. Besides functioning as a coverage ratio, the LTV ratio is also useful in controlling 
credit availability, changing how agents behave, and determining how housing market prices 
evolve (Antunes and Prado, 2018). In Asian countries, LTV ratio also helps to curb housing 
price growth, credit growth, and bank leverage (Zhang and Zoli, 2015). 
Many studies explore the role of loan-to-value ratio in the economy through its 
interaction with monetary policy. Some studies have found that LTV ratio affects welfare. 
For instance, Mendicino and Punzi (2014) study the impact of the interaction of monetary 
policy and macroprudential policy with social welfare in a two-country economic model. 
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The macroprudential tool in the study is represented by LTV ratio and shows  that it 
countercyclically responds to house price dynamics. The results reveal that the additional 
use of a countercyclical LTV ratio in monetary policy operations improves welfare. With 
regards to this, Mendicino and Punzi (2014) defines welfare as the sum of variation from 
inflation and output. 
In another study, Basto, Gomes, and Lima (2018) evaluate the impact of changes in 
the LTV ratio on macroeconomic variables in the model with financial frictions and the 
banking sector. Their findings suggest that permanent LTV ratio tightening leads to a long-
term decline in banking lending to the private sector. In contrast, the impact of LTV ratio on 
macroeconomic variables in the short run depends heavily on the policy design. The study 
also points out that a temporary change of LTV ratio has milder recessionary effects on 
lending activities. These results essentially demonstrate that the impact of LTV ratio on an 
economy improves welfare.  
Similar results were also gathered by the study from Punzi and Rabitsch (2018), who 
study the impact of LTV ratio on the macroeconomy in heterogeneous households. Punzi 
and Rabitsch (2018) demonstrate that LTV ratio improves welfare regardless of whether 
households are homogenous or heterogeneous. However, the study found that the 
implementation of LTV ratio improves welfare to a greater extent when the authority targets 
only highly leveraged borrowers. The authors define LTV ratio as a countercyclical tool that 
limits the supply of credit relative to the debt-to-GDP ratio. Hence, this study supports the 
targeting of LTV ratio to a specific group of borrowers, as doing so improves welfare more 
than when all types of borrowers are homogenised.  
The welfare-improving effect of implementing LTV is also found in the study from 
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014). The researchers focus on the implications of 
macroprudential and monetary policy interactions regarding business cycles and shows that 
the the interaction between the two policies improves welfare for society and promotes 
financial sector stability. The authors also define the optimal feedback parameter in the rule 
for LTV ratio as a macroprudential instrument and nominal interest rate as a  monetary policy 
instrument, and then present the losses under the coordinated and non-coordinated policy 
regime. LTV ratio is presented as a countercyclical tool and defined as a macroprudential 
rule that responds to credit growth. Thus, a lower LTV ratio is imposed during a credit boom 
to restrict excessive credit growth. In their study, Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) uses 
a consumption equivalent to measure welfare, which is derived from the second order 
approximation from the utility function following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007).  
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Lambertini, Mendicino, and Punzi (2013) explore the effectiveness of 
countercyclical LTV ratios as a macroprudential tool designed to achieve financial and 
macroeconomic stabilisation. Lambertini, Mendicino, and Punzi (2013) study the potential 
gains of monetary and macroprudential policies that lean against house prices and credit 
cycles. The study reveals that under monetary policy, borrowers and savers are better off 
when the interest rate optimally responds to credit growth. However, when monetary policy 
interacts with LTV ratio as a macroprudential instrument, the benefit received from the 
interaction depends on the degree of welfare heterogeneity among agents. The study shows 
that an optimal LTV ratio is achieved when it responds countercyclically to credit growth, 
as this is the condition that most effectively stabilises credit relative to GDP. In contrast, the 
optimal policy for savers features a constant LTV ratio coupled with an interest rate response 
to credit growth. LTV ratio rules face a trade-off between savers’ and borrowers’ welfare, 
as they respond to the GDP of house-prices growth in a countercyclical manner.  
Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2012) also study the benefits derived from the use of 
LTV ratio as a macroprudential instrument that interacts with monetary policy. The study 
demonstrates that using an LTV ratio that is specifically designed to dampen credit market 
cycles can provide stabilisation benefits under financial shocks and housing demand shocks. 
However, the study also shows that no benefits are derived from macroprudential policy 
under productivity shocks. The welfare loss function is assumed to be constructed by the 
volatility of inflation and the output gap. 
In conclusion, studies in the area of macroprudential policy mostly demonstrate that 
the policy is benefitting the macroeconomy in general. The LTV and CAR are two prominent 
policy instruments employed in understanding the impact of macroprudential policy. 
Furthermore, the implementation of mactoptudential policy is examined under its interaction 
with conventional monetary policy where mostly employs a single macroprudential 
instrument optimisation. 
5.3 Model 
The model we develop follows Gerali et al. (2010) who introduces collateral constraint 
following Iacoviello (2005). The primary features of the model are the monopolistic banking 
sector, the balance sheet constraint, and the interest rate stickiness. There are two 
macroprudential policy instruments used in the model, namely loan to value ratio and capital 
requirement. The original model designs LTV ratios, both for impatient household and 
entrepreneurs, as a stochastic process with shock, while the capital adequacy ratio is set as a 
constant. In this study, the two LTV ratios are no longer designed as a stochastic process, 
but it remains to be a time-varying variable, in which its value is to be determined based on 
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the fully optimal commitment rule. Furthermore, the capital adequacy ratio is also no longer 
as a constant, but it is designed as a time-varying variable, in which its value is also 
determined based on the fully optimal commitment rule. The conversion of capital adequacy 
ratio from constant to be a time-dependent variable was also conducted by Angelini et al. 
(2011), but the value of ratio in their study is determined based on a simple macroprudential 
rule rather than through the optimisation. 
The model contains seven economic agents, namely households, entrepreneurs, 
retailers, wholesale banks, retail banks, capital goods producers, and the central bank. 
Households are classified into two types, namely patient households and impatient 
households. In their daily life, patient households consume, work and save deposit in banks. 
On the other hand, impatient households consume, work, and borrow loan from banks. 
Hence, households provide differentiated labour types, which then are aggregated by 
perfectly competitive labour unions who assemble them in a CES aggregator and sell the 
homogeneous labour to entrepreneurs. Banking sector is divided into wholesale banks and 
retail banks. Each unit of bank consists of one wholesale bank and two retail banks, namely 
deposit retail bank and loan retail bank. Deposit retail banks function to receive deposit from 
patient households, while loan retail banks function to give loan to impatient households and 
entrepreneurs. Finally, the wholesale banks function to intermediate funds from deposit 
retail banks to loan retail banks. 
Entrepreneurs and impatient households are both borrowing money from the loan 
retail banks. The loan retail banks are allowed to set higher lending rate than the original rate 
given by the wholesale bank by a certain markup. However, the retail banks must bear the 
adjustment cost due to the changing the lending rate. Similarly, the adjustment cost is also 
beared by the deposit retail banks whenever they change different deposit rate from the 
wholesale deposit rate. Loan are used by entrepreneurs to purchase capital from capital good 
producers, which then is used to produce intermediate goods. Entrepreneurs produce 
intermediate goods using capital bought from capital goods producers and sell it to retailers. 
Final goods firms bundle the intermediate goods and sell the final good to households and 
capital good producers. Moreover, both entrepreneurs and retailers are assumed to live in 
perfect competitive setting. Monopolistic competitive market is introduced in banking 
sector, where banks have the ability to adjust interest rate spread between lending rate and 
deposit rate. 
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5.3.1 Households 
• Patient Households 
Patient households own houses and earn income by supplying labour to entrepreneurs. They 
use their income to purchase consumption and save deposit in banks. Patient households 
maximise their expected lifetime utility derived from consumption and housing, in which 
the problem is given by 
 
ü†U ,*Ö/F! 	_Eè!1, ℎ!1, 1!1G	(!)* , 																																						(á. ã)	 
where the utility function is formulated by 
_Eè!1, ℎ!1, 1!1G = (1 − †1)s!g 123(è!1 − †1è!$%1 ) + Ls!a 123 ℎ!1 − 1!1(%#<)	1 + [ 	,								(á. ú) 
where /F!  denotes discount factor of patient households, è!1 is the level of consumption, ℎ!1 
denotes housing, and 1!1 denotes hours worked with parameter [. Following Gerali et al. 
(2010), two disturbances are also added into the model, namely shock on consumption	s!g, 
and shock on housing demand s!a. There is also a habit formation in the household 
consumption denoted by the habit coefficient †1. The utility function is maximized with 
respect to 
è!1 + °!a∆ℎ!1 + u!1 ≤ £!11!1 + E1 + §!$%h Gu!$%1x! +	•C!v1 	.																								(á. f) 
The budget constraint (5.3) implies that patient households earn income at period ! from 
three sources: from labour income £!11!1 by working for entrepreneurs, from lumpsum 
transfer •C! as dividend from retailers and banks, and from previous period deposit u!$%1  
including its deposit interest income at rate §!$%h ; v1 is the share of patient households. Using 
the income earned, patient households use it to purchase consumption è!1, accumulate 
investment in housing by °!a∆ℎ!1()), where °!a denotes housing price at period !, and deposit 
some of them in banks by u!1. 
• Impatient Households 
Impatient households earn income from working and by borrowing fund from banks. Similar 
to patient households, impatient households maximise their expected lifetime utility function 
derived from consumption, housing, and disutility of labors, which is given by 
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ü†U ,*Ö/M!	_Eè!" , ℎ!" , 1!"G	,																																																(á. ç)(!)*  
where the utility function is formulated by 
_Eè!" , ℎ!" , 1!"G = (1 − †")s!; 123(è!" − †"è!$%" ) + Ls!a 123 ℎ!" − 1!"(%#<)(1 + [)	,																		(á. á) 
where /M! denotes discount factor of impatient households, è!M is the level of consumption,  ℎ!M  denotes housing, and 1!M denotes hours worked with parameter [. There is also a habit 
formation for impatient households, denoted by habit coefficient †M. Impatient households 
face the budget constraint as follow 
è!" + °!a∆ℎ!" + E1 + §!$%ij G¶!$%"x! ≤ £!"1!" + ¶!" 																																		(á. â) 
The budget constraint implies that income at period !, which is derived from labour income £!"1!"  and new loan ¶!" with lending rate §!ij, is used to purchase consumption è!", housing 
investment °!a∆ℎ!"  and the repayment of previous loan, including its interest, (1 + §!$%ij )¶!$%" . 
In addition, impatient households also face collateral constraint, which is determined by the 
next period housing value. This collateral constraint depends on the loan to value ratio (LTV) 
for households set by the authority. 
The collateral constraint is given by E1 + §!iaG¶!" = +?N!k,!E°!#%a Gℎ!",(x!#%)																															(á. h)	 
where ca is an exogenous depreciation rate for house and LTV ratio is assumed to follow 
an exogenous stochastic process. 
5.3.2 Labor Market 
The model assumes that households provide differentiated labors to entrepreneurs through 
labour unions. Households must pay the union fees in order to receive this facility. There are 
two labour unions in the model, namely labour union for patient households and labour union 
for impatient households. Labor unions then sell the labors to perfectly competitive labour 
packers who assemble them in a CES aggregator with stochastic parameter s!l where the 
labour packer sells them to the entrepreneurs. Suppose labour type is denoted by ü and its 
corresponding labour union is denoted by ñ. Each union (ñ,ü) sets nominal wages A!N(ü) 
for its members by maximising their utility subject to labour demand. Labor union also bears 
quadratic adjustment cost with indexation to a weighted average of lagged inflation 
(weighted by ß) and steady state inflation (weighted by 1 − ß). 
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1/230# 451!"(3,5) 67#0(8)9# :#0(;,8) − #72 ? 7#0(8)7#*80 (8) − @#*89 @8*9A:7#09# B;#</ − :#$(;,8)8,=1 + E F,																																																																																																																					(H. J) 
subject to demand from labour packers  
1!N(),ü) = 1!N(ü) = pA!N(ü)A!N r$R!> 1!N	.																																											(á. à) 
5.3.3 Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs hire labors supplied by households and purchase capital from capital goods 
producers to produce intermediate goods. Entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods using 
the constant return to scale production function, given by ë!f = ^!f[©!$%f ™!]>1!f(%$>),																																									(á. ãä) 
where ë!f denotes intermediate output, ^!f denotes stochastic technology following AR(1) 
process, ©!f denotes capital, 1!f denotes labors hired and a denotes capital share. Labors hired 
by entrepreneurs come from both labour of patient household 1!1and impatient households 1!" . The capital inside the production function must be adjusted first by the capacity utilisation 
rate ™!. The term 1!f represents the bundled labors derived by 1!f = E1!1G7(E1!"G%$7( ,																																																		(á. ãã) 
where S" measures labour income share of patient households. In this basic model, we still 
assume equal income share between patient and impatient labour. Entrepreneurs borrow loan 
from banks to purchase capital and maximizes its utility derived from consumption given by 
ü†U ,*Ö/f!	_(è!f)	(!)* ,																																												(á. ãú) 
where its utility function is given by _(è!f) = 123(è!f − †fè!$%f ),																																						(á. ãf) 
subject to the budget constraint )27 +E2FG28 + G29H + F1 + I240:; HJ2407 + K2<L27 + M(N2)L2407  = K27*27 + J27 + K2<(1 − O<)L2407 	,																							(á. ãç) 
where °!f and °!3 denote the price of intermediate goods and price of capital, respectively. 
This budget constraint implies that at period ! entrepreneurs earn income from selling 
intermediate goods to retailers by °!fë!f, selling the goods to capital goods producers by °!3(1 − O=)©!$%f  and borrow loan from bank at period ! by ¶!f. They use income to purchase 
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consumption è!f, pay labour wages by £!(1!1()) + 1!"())) and pay back the previous loan by E1 + §!$%i G¶!$%f . Furthermore, ™! denotes the capacity utilisation rate of capital and M(™!) 
denotes the real cost of setting a level ™! of utilisation rate.  
In borrowing funds from banks, entrepreneurs also face collateral constraint given by E1 + §!iG¶!f ≤ +?N!f,![°!#%3 x!#%(1 − O=)©!f]	,																																(á. ãá) 
where O< is a depreciation rate for capital and LTV ratio is assumed to follow exogenous 
stochastic process. 
5.3.4 Capital Goods Producers 
Capital good producer produces capital by purchasing undepreciated capital from 
entrepreneurs and some final inputs from retailers and later sell the effective capital U! back 
to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are the owner of capital good producers. Capital good 
producers live in perfect competitive setting. They buy (1 − c)©!$% at price °!3 from 
entrepreneurs and )! units of final goods from retailers at price b! to produce new capital ©!. 
Hence, the problem of capital good producers is to maximise the expected lifetime net 
effective capital subject to the law of motion of effective capital. 
ü†U ,*Ö/f!E°!3∆U! − b!)!G,																																															(á. ãâ)(!)*  
where ∆U! = ©! − (1 − c)©!$% denotes the flow of effective capital. The flow of effective 
capital is adjusted by investment adjustment cost such that 
U! = U!$% + ¨1 − }"2 ps!3)!)!$% − 1rO≠ )!	,																																					(á. ãh) 
where °!3 is the real price of capital. The equation above also implies that capital good 
producers must bear adjustment cost if they change the investment level from )!$% to )!, 
where the amount of investment adjustment cost is given by }"2 ps!3)!)!$% − 1rO )!	.																																																							(á. ãï) 
5.3.5 Retailers 
Retailers play a role to buy intermediate goods from entrepreneurs, differentiate them 
without cost and sell the final output to households and capital good producers. Retailers are 
assumed to be monopolistically competitive by incorporating staggered price setting that 
indexed to a combination of past and steady state inflation. The past inflation is weighted by ß1 and the steady state inflation is weighted by 1 − ß1. Following the Calvo pricing model, 
the fraction a of final goods firms are able to set the optimal price and the rest fraction by 
 153 
1 − a of firms are unable to do so. Every time firm L adjusts its optimal price, the firm must 
face a quadratic adjustment cost parameterized by }1.  
The retailers who choose b!(L) maximise profit that is derived from revenue selling   
,*Ö/F! |b!(L)ë!(L) − b!` ë!(L) − }12 í b!(L)b!$%(L) − x!$%m? x%$m?ìO b!ë!~(!)* ,									(á. ãà) 
subject to 
ë!(L) = íb!(L)b! ì$R!@ ë!	,																																																	(á. úä) 
where s!V is the stochastic demand price elasticity. 
5.3.6 Loan and Deposit Demand 
Due to monopolistic competition in banking sector, the model assumes that impatient 
households purchase differentiated loan products and patient households purchase 
differentiated deposit products from banks. In accommodating this feature, the model 
assumes that total loan given to impatient households is a composite constant elasticity of 
substitution following Dixit-Stiglitz framework. Similarly, the total deposit received from 
patient households is also the aggregation of differentiated deposit following a composite 
constant elasticity of substitution. Banks are assumed to have interest rate stickiness that 
represented by elasticity coefficient s!ia, s!if and s!h. The s!ia denotes the elasticity 
coefficient representing the lending rate stickiness for impatient household loan, s!if denotes 
the elasticity coefficient representing the lending rate for entrepreneur, and s!h denotes the 
elasticity coefficient representing the deposit rate for patient household. Therefore, the 
demand schedule for loan given to impatient households by bank L is given as follow.  
¶!"(L) = p§!ia(L)§!ia r$R!AB ¶!" 	,																																													(á. úã) 
where the aggregated lending rate charged to impatient households follows 
§!ia = ÆØ§!ia(L)%$R!AC%* uL∞
%%$R!AB .																																			(á. úú) 
Similarly, the aggregated loan for entrepreneur given by bank L is given by 
¶!f(L) = p§!if(L)§!if r$R!AD ¶!f ,																																											(á. úf) 
where the aggregated lending rate charged to entrepreneurs follows 
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§!if = ÆØ§!if(L)%$R!AD%* uL∞
%%$R!AD .																																										(á. úç) 
Similarly, the demand schedule for deposit demand of bank L is given as follow 
u!"(L) = p§!h(L)§!h r$R!E u!	,																																																		(á. úá) 
where the aggregated deposit rate given to patient households follows 
§!h = ÆØ§!h(L)%$R!E%* uL∞
%%$R!E .																																															(á. úâ) 
5.3.7 Banks 
The banks are set to live in a monopolistic competitive environment where they have the 
market power to adjust interest rates.  In doing so, we divide the banks into two categories 
namely wholesale banks and retail banks. The wholesale bank operates under perfect 
competitive environment, while retail bank operates under monopolistic competitive 
environment. Each bank consists of one wholesale bank and two retail banks, namely deposit 
retail bank and loan retail bank. Deposit retail bank plays a role to absorb deposit funds from 
patient households and pass the deposit on to the wholesale bank. The wholesale bank 
collects all deposits from the deposit retail bank as a wholesale deposit (±!) at the wholesale 
deposit rate C!h and intermediate the funds to the loan retail bank as a wholesale loan (>!) at 
the wholesale lending rate C!i according to the exogenous level of capital to asset ratio 
(*^C!) set by the authority. Finally, the loan retail bank will give out the loan to impatient 
households and entrepreneurs. In absorbing the deposit and lending out the funds, retail 
banks can set the deposit rate and the lending rate, respectively, to maximise profit. 
• Wholesale Bank 
The main role of the wholesale bank in the extended model is to bind the balance sheet 
constraint. That is, the wholesale bank sets the level of net worth and the wholesale deposit 
on the liability side and sets the level of wholesale loan on the asset side. Thus, the balance 
sheet constraints ensure the accounting identity is binding. >! = \!i + ±!	,																																																					(á. úh) 
where the law of motion in capital accumulation is given similar to the simple model as 
follows x!©!i = (1 − ci)©!$%i + •>!	,																																					(á. úï) 
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where ©!i denotes bank capital, ci is depreciation rate of bank capital and •>! denotes 
retained profit of the bank. Retained profit is derived from period (! − 1) profit minus 
dividends paid to patient household that given at period !.  
Wholesale banks also bear the adjustment cost due to the deviation of the capital to asset 
ratio in bank from the target set by the authority. That is, the deviation of capital to asset 
position in period !, \!i >!⁄ , from the target level *^C! imposes the adjustment cost by }Hi2 p\!i>! − *^C!rO \!i ,																																									(á. úà) 
where }Hi denotes the capital adjustment coefficient. The problem of the wholesale bank in 
the simple model is now improved by adding capital adjustment cost inside the maximization 
problem. Thus, the problem of the wholesale bank now is to choose the level of debt >! and 
deposit ±! to maximise the cash flow as follow, 
ü†U C!n>! − C!o±! − }Hi2 p\!i>! − *^C!rO \!i ,																								(á. fä) 
subject to balance sheet identity and capital accumulation given above given by ¶!" + ¶!f = u! + ©!i ,																																																(á. fã) ©!i = 1x! [(1 − c3i)©!$%i + 	(§!$%ia ¶!$%" + §!$%if ¶!$%f − §!$%h u!$% − ±!)].								(á. fú) 
• Deposit Retail Bank 
Retail deposit bank receives deposits from patient households u!F()) at deposit rate §!h and 
pass the funds to the wholesale bank at rate C!o. In other words, the wholesale bank purchases 
deposit funds from the deposit retail bank at price C!o. Retail deposit banks also experience 
adjustment cost every time they change the deposit rate from §!$%h  to §!h. The amount of 
adjustment cost due to the change of deposit rate is given by }h2 p §!h§!$%h − 1rO §!hu!	,																																																								(á. ff) 
where }h denotes the adjustment deposit cost coefficient. Therefore, the maximization 
problem of the retail deposit bank ) in period ! is to set the deposit rate §!h()) to maximise 
the profit, which is given by 
ü†U ,*Ö/o! ÑC!o±! − §!hu!F − }h2 p §!h§!$%h − 1rO §!hu!Ü(!)* ,																				(á. fç) 
where /!o denotes a discount factor of the deposit retail bank at period !. The maximization 
of profit should be solved with subject to the deposit demand at will be formulated later.  
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• Loan Retail Bank 
Similar to deposit retail bank, the loan retail bank is assumed to live in a monopolistic 
competitive environment. Recall that the loan retail bank offers two types of loan, namely 
household loan and entrepreneur loan. The household loan is given out to impatient 
households at the lending rate §!ia, while the entrepreneur loan is given out to entrepreneurs 
at the lending rate §!if. 
Similar to the deposit retail bank, the loan retail bank also bears adjustment cost whenever 
the lending rate is adjusted from §!$%ia  to §!ia for the households loan, and from  §!$%if  to §!if 
for the entrepreneurs loan. Therefore, the total adjustment cost that the loan retail bank bears 
is given by }ia2 p§!ia§!$%ia − 1rO §!ia¶!" + }if2 p§!if§!$%if − 1rO §!if¶!f ,																								(á. fá) 
where }ia and }if denote the adjustment coefficient for adjusting the lending rate in 
household loan and entrepreneur loan, respectively. While ¶!" and ¶!f denote the amount of 
loan given out to households and entrepreneurs, respectively.  
Therefore, the problem of the loan retail bank ) is to choose §!ia()) and §!if()) to maximise 
the profit, which is given by 
ü†U ,*Ö/@! Ñ§!ia())¶!M(L) + §!if())¶!,()) − C!i>!(L) − }ia2 p§!ia§!$%ia − 1rO §!ia¶!"(!)* − }if2 p§!if§!$%if − 1rO §!if¶!fÜ , 																																																											(á. fâ) 
where /!@ denotes the discount factor of the loan retail bank at period !. The maximisation is 
solved subject to the demand of loan retail bank.   
• Bank Profit 
The total profit of banking sector is the sum of the profits of the wholesale bank and the two 
retail banks. The profit B! of each type of banks in period ! is given as follow. B!pb!el = B!` ablfNelf	ieL3 + B!of1bN"!	qf!e"l	ieL3 + B!@beL	qf!e"l	ieL3 																		(á. fh) B!` ablfNelf	ieL3 =C!n>! − C!o±! − }Hi2 p\!i>! − *^C!rO \!i ,																						(á. fï) B!of1bN"!	qf!e"l	ieL3 = C!o±! − §!hu!F − }h2 p §!h§!$%h − 1rO §!hu!	,																			(á. fà) 
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B!@beL	qf!e"l	ieL3 = §!ia¶!" + §!if¶!, − C!i>! − }ia2 p§!ia§!$%ia − 1rO §!ia¶!"− }if2 p§!if§!$%if − 1rO §!if¶!f .																																																																													(á. çä) 
Therefore, the total profit is given by B!pb!el = §!ia¶!" + §!if¶!f − §!hu!1 − ^uL™ñ!üåê!	*2ñ!,																									(á. çã) 
where the adjustment cost is given by ^uL™ñ!üåê!	è2ñ!
= }Hi2 p\!i>! − *^C!rO \!i + }h2 p §!h§!$%h − 1rO §!hu! + }ia2 p§!ia§!$%ia − 1rO §!ia¶!"+ }if2 p§!if§!$%if − 1rO §!if¶!f .																																																																													(á. çú) 
5.3.8 The Central Bank 
The central bank sets the policy rate §!"i according to the simple rule as follow E1 + §!"iG = E1 + §"iG(%$<F)E1 + §!$%"i G<F 0x!x 5<G(%$<F) í ë!ë!$%ì<@(%$<F) s!q(A , (á. çf) 
where [\ is the weight assigned to inflation and [V to output growth, §"i is the steady state 
policy rate, and s!q(A is a monetary policy shock with standard deviation éq(A. The market 
clearing condition in goods market is 
ë! = è! + °!3[©! − (1 − c)©!$%] + ©!$%M(™!) + ci p\!$%ix! r + ^uL! ,																			(á. çç) 
where è! ≡ è!1 + è!" 	+	è!f is aggregate consumption, ©! is aggregate physical capital, and \!i is aggregate bank capital. The term ^uL! includes all adjustment costs. In the housing 
market, equilibrium is given by ℎ≥ = ℎ!F + ℎ!M  , where ℎ≥ is the fixed housing stock. 
5.3.9 Exogenous Shocks 
The model is equipped to accommodate eleven types of exogenous shocks. The model 
originally contains 13 shocks, including shock on LTV for entrepreneurs and LTV for 
impatient households. However, since LTV ratios in this study are not designed as a 
stochastic process, the two shocks are then removed. Hence, only eleven shocks are left in 
the model namely the technology shock, consumption shock housing demand shock, markup 
shock on deposit demand, markup shock on household lending rate, markup shock on 
entrepreneurs lending rate, investment shock, stochastic demand price elasticity, labour 
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shock, banking capital shock, and shock on policy rate. All exogenous shocks follow 
autoregressive AR(1) process, in which the details are provided in appendix C. 
5.3.10 Parameter Values 
The parameters used in the simulation follow those from the original model Gerali et al. 
(2010). Some key parameters are presented in Table 5.1. 
Table 5-1: Parameter Values 
Parameters Description Value P> Patient households’ discount factor 0.994 P? Impatient households’ discount factor 0.975 P@ Entrepreneurs discount factor 0.975 PAB  Capital goods discount factor 0.975 P( Labor union discount factor 0.975 Q Inverse of Frisch elasticity 1 S" Share of unconstrained households 0.8 !C Weight of housing in households’ utility function 0.2 R8, R9 , R7 Degree of habit formation in consumption 0.856 S Capital share in the production function 0.3 v1 Share of patient households 1 v" Share of impatient households 1 O Depreciation rate of physical capital 0.025 <9  Cost for adjusting investment 10.18 !D Is the markup in the goods market 6 !E  Is the markup in the labour market 5 <> Cost for adjusting goods prices 28.65 <F Cost for adjusting nominal wages 99.90 T> Indexation of prices to past inflation 0.160 TF Indexation of nominal wages to past inflation 0.276 TG Indexation deposit rates 0.00 T:7 Indexation rates on loans to firm 0.00 T:C Indexation rates on loans to households 0.00 UVWH Households’ LTV ratio 0.7 UVW@  Entrepreneurs’ LTV ratio 0.35 !:7 !:7/(!:7 − 1) is the markup on rate on loans to entrepreneurs 2.7 !:C !:C/(!:C − 1) is the markup on rate on loans to households 2.7 !I  !I/(!I − 1) is the markdown on deposit rate -1.4 <:C Cost for adjusting rate on loans to households 10.09 <:7 Cost for adjusting rate on loans to entrepreneurs 9.364 <I  Cost for adjusting rate on deposits 3.503 Y7Z Target capital-to-loans ratio 0.09 ;0 Parameter of adjustment cost for capacity utilisation 0.0478 ;+ Parameter of adjustment cost for capacity utilisation 0.00478 8H Persistence weighting function loans to households 0.94 8@  Persistence weighting function loans to entrepreneurs 0.92 QJ Taylor Rule coefficient on inflation 1.98 
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Parameters Description Value QK  Taylor Rule coefficient on policy rate 0.77 QD Taylor Rule coefficient on output 0.35 <6: Cost for adjusting capital-assets ratio 11.06 O: Depreciation rate of bank capital 0.115 8L Persistence technology shock 0.97 8M< Persistence investment efficiency shock 0.45 8< Persistence financial shock 0.82 
The discount factor across agents are set differently. Patient households have a larger 
discount factor by 0.994, while the discount factor for impatient households and 
entrepreneurs are set equally by 0.975. Furthermore, consumption habit formation across 
agents are set identically with degree of habit formation 0.856. In terms of macroprudential 
instrument, we set the steady state for CAR by 0.09, the LTVH by 0.7 and the LTVE by 0.35. 
The last two instruments, namely LTVH and LTVE, are set differently where impatient 
household’s is set twice than that of the entrepreneurs. In terms of the monetary policy rule, 
the model rules the interest smoothing parameter by 0.77. Furthermore, the coefficient on 
inflation in the Taylor rule is set at 1.98 and the coefficient in the output is set to be 0.35. 
5.4 Results and Analysis  
5.4.1 Simulation Scenarios 
The simulation in this study provides two scenarios, namely the scenario where the central 
bank only optimises a single macroprudential instrument and the scenario where the central 
bank optimises multiple macroprudential instruments. The optimisation assumes that the 
central bank optimises macroprudential instruments under commitment and sets the nominal 
interest rate based on the simple Taylor rule. All cases are simulated under the ad-hoc loss 
function, which will be explained in the subsequent section. Table 5.2 summarises all the 
simulation scenarios. 
Table 5-2: The Simulation Scenarios 
Scenarios Cases ¥µ∂ ∑∏πrstuv ∑∏πw ∑∏πx 
Benchmark  Benchmark - - - - 
 
Scenario 1:  
single instrument 
[ Optimised - - - \N - Optimised - - \O - - Optimised - \P - - - Optimised 
 
Scenario 2: 
multiple 
instruments 
[\N Optimised Optimised - - [\O Optimised - Optimised - [\P Optimised - - Optimised \P\O - - Optimised Optimised [\P\O Optimised - Optimised Optimised 
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 There are three macroprudential instruments in the model: capital adequacy ratio (*^C), loan-to-value ratio for impatient households	(+?Nk), and loan-to-value ratio for 
entrepreneurs 	(+?N,). In addition, we also construct a joint LTV ratio (	+?Nyb"L!) where 
the central bank equalises the log-linear of one LTV with the log-linear of another LTV. The 
joint LTV ratio is present to accommodate the possibility that equalising the dynamics of 
two LTV ratios could be more efficient than optimising two LTV ratios separately. 
 In the benchmark model, all macroprudential policy instruments are set as constants 
and not optimised (i.e., when no macroprudential policy is active in the economy). In this 
table, [ refers to CAR; \N refers to +?N0b"L!; \O refers to +?Nk, and \P refers to +?N,. For 
example, [\P\O is the case when the central bank implements CAR, +?Nk, and +?N, 
simultaneously. The simulation follows the algorithm of commitment regime from Dennis 
(2007) and the comparison across cases is evaluated based on the unconditional loss value. 
5.4.2 Loss Function 
The simulation in this study is conducted under an ad-hoc loss function. The ad-hoc loss 
function in the study is based on that used by Angelini et al. (2011), which is the summed 
quadratic deviation of inflation, output, loan-to-output ratio, and two macroprudential policy 
instruments from their steady states. Equation (5.45) describes the structure of the loss 
function. However, the main difference between our loss function from that of Angelini’s is 
that the loss function (5.45) provided below combines both monetary policy and 
macroprudential policy instruments, while Angelini et al. (2011) separate the loss function 
into two different institutions, namely the central bank and the macroprudential authority. 
Our loss function is given as 
A = ,* ÑÖ/!Ex!O + X?]j!O + X^gi!O + X\LCjL!O G(!)* Ü	,																			(á. çá) 
where / is the discount factor, and X? is the weight of output relative to inflation. Moreover, gi!O represents variations in the loan-to-output ratio from its steady state, and X^ is the weight 
given for the loan-to-output ratio relative to inflation. Likewise, X\L is the weight given to 
the nominal interest rate, which is the monetary policy instrument, while XWF is the weight 
given to the macroprudential policy instrument (MP), which can be the CAR and/or the LTV 
ratio (or both). The weights of X\L is set equally to one, which expresses that the variation 
of the monetary instrument. 
 The loss function is composed of three parts. The first part is the macroeconomic 
objective, which is the objective when the central bank in concerned about the fluctuation of 
inflation and output from their steady states. The second part of the loss function is the 
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financial stability objective, which is the part in which the central bank incorporates loan-
to-output ratio into the loss function. Hence, the central bank believes that stabilising the 
loan-to-output ratio can foster financial stability. As quoted in Angelini et al. (2014), the 
inclusion of loan-to-output ratio follows the recommendation of the BCBS, which proposes 
that the credit-to-GDP ratio should be used as a benchmark for the countercyclical capital 
buffer, as introduced in Basel III.  In their study, Angelini et al. (2014) also assume that the 
loan-to-output ratio can represent abnormal credit behaviour, as this ratio demonstrates how 
the credit expansion is compared to the level of economic activity.  
 Furthermore, as mentioned in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and Borio and Drehman 
(2009), as cited in Angelini et al. (2014), abnormal credit expansion tends to trigger financial 
crises. The loan-to-output ratio also represents leverage, which magnified the impact of the 
shock that occurred during the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008. Hence, including this ratio 
in the loss function can enable the central bank to penalise or dampen the variation of the 
ratio when it fluctuates too much.  
 The third part of the loss function comprises the policy instruments. The central bank 
aims to prevent the nominal interest rate from fluctuating too much by transforming this 
variable into the loss function. Although the nominal interest rate in the model follows the 
simple Taylor rule, this variable essential to a loss function with that aims to avoid excessive 
fluctuation in interest rate. Also, the minimization of interest rate, together with output and 
inflation, describes a typical loss function, as postulated in Woodford (2003), except that all 
weights in our case are set to a value of one.  
 Among the provided macroprudential policy instruments, the difference between 
loan-to output-ratio and the loan-to-value ratio should be clarified. Although they sound 
similar, the two ratios are different. Loan-to-output ratio is the comparison between the total 
loans in the economy and the total output produced in the same period. On the other hand, 
LTV ratio considers loans given towards the expected market collateral value. In the model 
of Gerali et al. (2010), the value of collateral is determined by the expected future housing 
value (for households) or physical capital value (for entrepreneurs). Therefore, since the two 
ratios are different, they can both be used in the loss function. 
5.4.3 Single Macroprudential Instrument 
In this scenario, the simulation assumes that the central bank only optimises one 
macroprudential instrument under commitment, manages other macroprudential policy 
instruments as constants, and manages the nominal interest rate using a simple Taylor rule. 
The simulation aims to demonstrate which macroprudential policy instrument is superior to 
the other instrument, under commitment. Additionally, we also aim to observe whether 
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implementing two separate LTV ratios is more beneficial than implementing a joint type 
one. As shown in Table 5.3, this scenario provides four cases.  
Table 5-3: The Simulation Result from Optimising Single Macroprudential Instrument 
Cases ∑∫ªª [ Optimising Capital adequacy ratio 1.2524 \N Optimising LTV joint 0.7775 \O Optimising LTV impatient household 0.4959 \P Optimising LTV entrepreneurs 0.6162 
The first case is case [, which is a situation where the central bank only optimises CAR, 
while LTVH and LTVE are constants. The second case is \N, which is a situation where the 
central bank optimises a joint LTV ratio and leaves CAR as a constant4. The third case is 
where the central bank only optimises LTVH, while CAR and LTVE are set as constants, 
which is denoted as \O. The final case is \P, where the central bank optimises LTVE and 
leaves CAR and LTVH as constants.  
 Based on the policy performance, the simulation demonstrates that \O is the best 
performing case with a loss value of 0.4959, which implies that optimising LTV for 
impatient households produces a superior policy performance than optimising the rest of 
macroprudential instruments. In contrast, policy performance when the central bank 
optimises CAR alone (i.e., case [ ) is the worst of all the cases with a loss of 1.2524, which 
is almost twice worse than \O. 
 Table 5.3 also demonstrates that, under a single instrument optimisation, separating 
the LTV ratio into two types is more beneficial than having them aggregated as a joint LTV. 
The simulation shows that the joint LTV performs with a loss of 0.7775, which performs 
worse than \O and \P that perform with loss values of 0.6162 and 0.4959, respectively. 
Therefore, overall, when the central bank optimises a single macroprudential instrument, 
optimising LTV for impatient households is superior to optimising other macroprudential 
policy instruments. 
5.4.4 Multiple Macroprudential Instruments 
The second scenario in the simulation is where the central bank implements multiple 
macroprudential instruments. We present five different cases that cover all possible 
interactions among the instruments as shown in Table 5.4.  
 
 
4 Under case LJ, LTVH and LTVE do not exist since they are replaced by the joint type LTVj. 
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Table 5-4: The Simulation Result from Optimising Multiple Macroprudential Instrument 
Case ∑∫ªª [\N Optimising CAR and LTVjoint 0.4121 [\O Optimising CAR and LTVH 0.4761 [\P Optimising CAR and LTVE 0.6107 \P\O Optimising LTVH and LTVE 0.3825 [\P\O Optimising CAR, LTVH, and LTVE 0.3822 
The first case is [\N, which represents the case where the central bank optimises CAR and 
the joint LTV ratio, while leaving other macroprudential instruments as constants. 
Furthermore, the second case is [\O, which is when the central bank optimises CAR and 
LTV for impatient households and leaves the other macroprudential instruments as 
constants. In a similar fashion, case [\P is when the central bank only optimises CAR and 
LTV for entrepreneurs. Case \P\O is when the central bank only optimises the LTV for 
impatient households and entreprenerus. Finally, [\P\O is when the central bank optimises 
CAR, LTV for impatient households, and LTV for entrepreneurs. 
 Various findings from the simulation stand out. First, case [\N, which is the 
optimisation of CAR and the joint LTV ratio, can deliver a policy performance of 0.4121, 
which is the best of all cases. Considering that the case \N in Table 5.3 performs at 0.7775, 
this indicates that the presence of [ (i.e., CAR) in the simulation of [\N can improve the 
policy performance from 0.7775 to 0.4121, which is an improvement of 49.36%. Likewise, 
considering that case [ in Table 5.3 results in policy performance of 0.4121, the policy 
performance of [\N indicates that the presence of the joint LTV \N can improve the 
performance significantly from 1.2524 to 0.4121, which is an improvement of 60.72%. 
Hence, optimising [ and \N simultaneously in the form of [\N is better off  than optimising [ or \N separately. Therefore, based on this finding, we argue that the central bank can gain 
more benefit when interacting multiple macroprudential instruments. The subsequent section 
regarding the unconditional variances will further explore through which economic variable 
the optimisation can significantly influence the policy performance. 
 Second, according to Table 5.4 above, [\P\O is the second-best performing case 
with a policy performance of 0.3822. This means that optimising CAR, LTV for impatient 
households, and LTV for entrepreneurs can produce the second-best policy performance 
after [\N. Considering that the case \P\O performs at 0.3825, the policy performance of [\P\O indicates that the presence of CAR in the simulation [\P\O can improve the policy 
performance modestly from 0.3825 to 0.3822, which is only 0.07% of improvement. This 
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finding shows that the contribution of CAR in miniscule and diminishes significantly when 
the LTV ratio is changed from being joint to being separated.  
 In contrast, considering the policy performance in case of [\O is 0.4761, this implies 
that the presence of \P into the simulation of [\P\O can improve the policy performance 
from 0.4761 to 0.3822, which is 18.5% of improvement. Similarly, given that the policy 
performance in [\P is 0.6107, this implies that the presence of \O into the simulation of [\P\O can improve the policy performance from 0.6107 to 0.3822 or 35.74% of 
improvement. Based on these findings, the impact of LTV for households is greater than 
LTV for entrepreneur and CAR, while CAR gives the smallest improvement in the 
simulation. 
 Third, recall that introducing CAR to the joint LTV ratio can improve the policy 
performance by 49.36%. In contrast, introducing CAR to the optimisation of the separate 
LTVs only improves the policy performance by 0.07%. This finding implies that equalising 
the dynamics of two LTV ratios as a joint LTV can result in a declining contribution of CAR. 
In other words, the CAR performs substantially better when the central bank equalises the 
LTVs, but then has almost no effect when the separation of LTV takes place. We argue this 
finding indicates a conflict where the interaction between macroprudential policy 
instruments can hinder the efficacy of another macroprudential instrument. Therefore, 
managing multiple macroprudential policy instruments simultaneously in the economy 
requires careful consideration, since the interaction of the instruments induces a conflict. 
 The conflict under multiple instrument optimisation is also seen from the number of 
instruments being optimised. For instance, as shown in Table 5.4, policy performance 
between \P\O and [\P\O is almost identical although the number of variables being 
optimised increases from two to three variables, which suggests that the impact of CAR is 
miniscule. In contrast, the impact of CAR is more obvious between \N and  [\N, although the 
number of instruments increases from one to two. Based on this finding, we argue that 
managing too many policy instruments can pose the central bank with risk of conflict among 
the instruments.  
5.4.5 Performance Analysis 
This section analyses the performance of all cases in comparison to the performance of the 
benchmark model. This part specifically investigates how much the economy can benefit 
from activating macroprudential policy. Therefore, in the benchmark model in this section, 
the central bank optimises nothing in the economy and only sets the nominal interest rate 
using the ordinary simple Taylor rule. Technically, in this case, all macroprudential 
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instruments are set as constants. The benefit from optimising macroprudential instruments, 
which is denoted by ∆WF,  can be derived by following the formula (5.46) 
∆WF= í+ÉJJ∗ − +ÉJJ+ÉJJ∗ ì U100%	,																																								(á. çâ) 
where +ÉJJ∗ denotes the loss value from the benchmark model, and +ÉJJ denotes the loss 
value from a particular case, as shown in Table 5.3 and 5.4. The notation used here is 
consistent with that of the previous section. Our simulation calculates that the policy 
performance for the benchmark model when all macroprudential policy instruments are 
constants is 1.4028 (i.e. ∑∫ªª∗=1.4028). On the basis of this result and using equation 
(5.46), the benefit of activating macroprudential policy under a single policy instrument 
scenario can be measured and provided in Table 5.5. 
Table 5-5: Benefits from Optimising Single Macroprudential Instrument 
Case ∆z{ 
Benchmark No optimisation 0.00% [ Optimising Capital adequacy ratio 10.72% \N Optimising LTV joint 44.57% \O Optimising LTV impatient household 64.65% \P Optimising LTV entrepreneurs 56.07% 
As shown in Table 5.5, in the single instrument scenario, optimising CAR alone ([) only 
benefits the economy by 10.72% more than the benchmark model. This achievement is tiny 
compared to the rest of the cases. For instance, optimising the single joint LTV (\N) can 
improve the economy by 44.57% more than the case when macroprudential policy does not 
exist. Furthermore, optimising only LTV for entrepreneurs (\P) can benefit the economy by 
56.07% more than the benchmark model. Finally, the optimisation of LTV for impatient 
households (\O) delivers the highest benefit at 64.65% more than the benchmark model. 
Therefore, overall, optimising macroprudential policy under a single scenario can benefit 
the economy up to 64.65% better than the case when the macroprudential policy does not 
exist. 
           A similar result occurs when the central bank optimises multiple macroprudential 
policy instruments in the economy. Table 5.6 illustrates the benefit of optimising CAR and 
LTV simultaneously. 
 
 166 
Table 5-6: Benefits from Optimising Multiple Macroprudential Instruments 
Case ∆z{ 
Benchmark No optimisation 0.00% [\N Optimising CAR and LTVjoint 66.01% [\O Optimising CAR and LTVH 66.06% [\P Optimising CAR and LTVE 55.75% \P\O Optimising LTVH and LTVE 72.73% [\P\O Optimising CAR, LTVH , and LTVE 72.75% 
 Overall, the second scenario produces a greater difference in policy performance than 
the first. The simulation demonstrates that optimising CAR and the joint LTV 
([\N)	simultaneously can improve the economy by 66.01% more efficient than not 
optimising any macroprudential instrument. Furthermore, if the central bank optimises CAR 
and LTV for impatient households simultaneously ([\O), it can improve the economy by 
66.06% more than when macroprudential policy is not active. Similarly, the coordination 
between CAR and LTV for entrepreneurs ([\P) can only benefit the economy by 55.75% 
relative to the benchmark model. The coordination between LTV for impatient households 
and entrepreneurs (\P\O) can benefit the economy by 72.73% more than the benchmark 
model. Finally, when the central bank coordinates all macroprudential instruments in the 
economy, case [\P\O, the benefit that the interaction can yield is 72.75% better than the 
benchmark model. The results from this table informs that under the multiple instrument 
scenario, activating macroprudential policy can benefit the economy up to 72.75% more 
efficient than the case of no macroprudential policy. 
 Based on the finding above, we argue that optimising multiple macroprudential 
instruments is generally more beneficial. For instance, the benefit of optimising all the 
instruments simultaneously is 72.75%. In contrast, when the instrument is optimised 
individually, optimising LTV for entrepreneurs only benefits the economy by 56.07%; 
optimising LTV for impatient households only benefits by 64.65%; and optimising CAR 
alone only benefits the economy by 10.72%. These benefits are all smaller than most cases 
in multiple instrument optimisation. This finding suggests that optimising multiple 
macroprudential instruments is welfare-enhancing. Recall that multiple instruments 
optimisation can improve the economy up to 72.75%. Therefore, relative to the single 
instrument scenario, which benefits the economy up to 64.65%, multiple instrument 
optimisation can thus increase the benefit by 8.1%5.  
 
5 Which is derived from 72.75% minus 64.65%. 
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 In conclusion, our simulation demonstrates that, generally, optimising multiple 
macroprudential policy instruments can benefit the economy more than optimising a single 
instrument. In our simulation, the benefit from a multiple instrument optimisation is 10.01% 
higher than the single instrument optimisation. One could argue that optimising more 
instruments naturally delivers a better policy performance, since this implies that the model 
reduces more variables in the loss function6. In our case, this is not entirely true. For instance, 
our simulation illustrates that the benefit from case \O remains higher than [\P although the 
former only optimises single policy instrument. Furthermore, although it is welfare 
enhancing, multiple policy instrument also has a drawback. Our simulation demonstrates 
that multiple macroprudential instrument interaction can generate a conflict in terms of 
hindering the efficacy of another policy instrument. There should be a threshold regarding 
how many macroprudential instruments that the central bank can manage while benefitting 
the economy at the same time. However, further study is required to validate this argument. 
5.4.6 Unconditional Variances 
This section explains the variance decomposition from the chosen case, relative to the 
benchmark, which is the case when all macroprudential instruments are set as constants. This 
section aims to explore how macroprudential policy significantly stabilizes the economy. In 
this section, we provide four cases. In addition to the variables in the loss function, we also 
provide the variance for macroprudential policy instruments being optimized. The first case 
is \N, which is the best performing case under the single instrument scenario. The second 
case is [\N, which is the best performing case under the multiple instrument senario. The 
third case is \P\O, which is the case where the central bank does not involve CAR in the 
simulation. Finally, the last case is [\P\O, which is the case where the central bank separates 
the LTV into impatient households and entrepreneurs, and optimises them simultaneously 
with CAR. Table 5.7 illustrates the variance decomposition of these four cases. 
Table 5-7: Unconditional Variances from the Chosen Cases  
Case ºv Ωv æv øv ¥µ∂v ∑∏πvw ∑∏πv| ∑∏πvr 
Benchmark 0.1282 0.3061 0.0537 1.1961 - - - - \N 0.1162 0.4253 0.0447 0.2277 - - - 0.2905 [\N 0.1289 0.2321 0.0521 0.0207 0.0033 - - 0.1209 \P\O 0.1273 0.2022 0.0504 0.0259 - 0.0786 0.0858 - [\P\O 0.1273 0.2020 0.0504 0.0257 0.0008 0.0784 0.0848 - 
 
6 Recall that the loss function depends on a number of policy instruments being optimised. That is, the 
more policy instruments optimised, a number of variables in the loss function increases. 
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As shown in Table 5.7, in the benchmark model, the variation of macroprudential policy 
instruments is absent because the central bank is not optimising any macroprudential 
instruments in the economy. In contrast, in other cases, all macroprudential instruments 
fluctuate when the central bank optimises them. 
 Some findings from the simulation stand out. First, the case where the central bank 
optimises the single joint LTV (\N) is the best when comes to the job of dampening the 
fluctuation of inflation. In that case,  inflation fluctuation declines from 0.1282 to 0.1162, 
which is 9.36% more stabile than that of the benchmark model. However, once the central 
bank incorporates CAR into the optimisation ([\N), our simulation demonstrates that the 
variance of inflation worsens from 0.1282 to 0.1289, or around 0.54%, although the 
deterioration is minimal. However, in contrast, this case performs very well in dampening 
the fluctuation of the loan-to-output ratio. The variance of the loan-to-output ratio declines 
from 1.1961 to 0.0207, which is 98.2% more stable than that of the benchmark model.  
 The presence of CAR plays a significant role in reducing the loan-to-output ratio and 
helps in stabilising the joint LTV. The presence of CAR can stabilise the joint LTV ratio by 
53.38% than the benchmark model, which is from 0.2905 to 0.1209. We argue that this is a 
substitution effect between macroprudential instruments, which means that the presence of 
one instrument can help stabilise another instrument, but at the cost of a higher fluctuation 
of the instrument itself. The more stabilised joint LTV indicates that the presence of CAR 
can decrease credit risks for the lender. However, as a consequence, CAR fluctuates more, 
which means that banks fluctuate their capital buffer more frequently. Therefore, we argue 
that although the case [\N works impressively for financial stability, which is the ultimate 
objective of macroprudential policy, the case impedes monetary policy from stabilising 
inflation. For this reason, we argue that the central bank should not operate this policy.  The 
substitution effect between macroprudential policy instruments is not only found in the case 
of [\N but also in the case of [\P\O. In this case, the presence of CAR causes the variance 
of CAR inceases but also reduces the variance of LTV for impatient households and 
entrepreneurs simultaneously, although the improvement is only small.  
 The simulation demonstrates that interacting CAR with the separated LTV ratios is 
not only helpful in achieving financial stability, but also helpful in stabilising inflation. That 
is, relative to the benchmark model, this case can stabilise the loan-to-output ratio by 97.8% 
of the benchmark model, which is from 1.1961 to 0.0257. Inflation is also stabilised under 
this case from 0.1282 to 0.1273, although the improvement is only small by 0.70%. The 
stabilisation of these two objectives suggests that the implementation of this case does not 
create a conflict with monetary policy. In terms of dampening output fluctuation, we 
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demonstrate that case [\P\Ois also superior. That is, the variance of output declines by 34% 
from 0.3061 to 0.2020, which suggests that although case [\P\Oresults in a slightly higher 
loss than [\N, case [\P\O	performs better because it stabilises all economic variables in the 
loss function. Therefore, we argue that case [\P\O is the best case that the central bank can 
implement. 
 Among all variables in the loss function, the loan-to-output ratio is the variable that 
most contribute to reducing loss loss in the economy. Before the optimisation takes place, 
the unconditional variance for the loan-to-output ratio is 1.1961, which accounts for 71% of 
the total variance in the benchmark model. The variation then declines significantly, from 
1.1961 to 0.0257 (or declines by 97.8%) once the central bank optimises all available 
macroprudential instruments. This improvement is the highest compared to those in other 
variables, which suggests that macroprudential policy is useful to dampen the fluctuation of 
the loan-to-output ratio. This result also confirms Basel III’s recommendation to prioritise 
macroprudential policy to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio. In case [\P\O, the simulation also 
found that the fluctuation between LTV for impatient households and LTV for entrepreneurs 
are almost similar, but the LTV for impatient households performs better with unconditional 
variance by 0.0784, while the fluctuation of LTV for entrepreneurs is 0.0848. Finally, 
relative to case \P\O, the unconditional variance demonstrates that the role of CAR is much 
smaller than that of the LTV ratio. 
5.4.7 Impulse Response Function 
This section explains the impulse response functions when the economy experiences 
exogenous shocks. The optimised model in the impulse function refers to the case when the 
central bank optimises CAR, LTV for entrepreneurs and LTV for households simultaneously 
([\P\O). On the other hand, the benchmark model in the impulse function refers to the case 
when the central bank optimises no macroprudential policy and only manages the policy rate 
using the non-optimal simple Taylor rule. Of the eleven types of shocks in the model, this 
section only provides the impulse response function for five types of shocks. The shocks are 
consumption shock, housing demand shock, markup shock on deposit rate, markup shock 
on household lending rate, markup shock on entrepreneurs lending rate, and technology 
shock. The five shocks are considered sufficient to represent the response of key agents in 
the economy, namely households, firms, and banks. 
• Consumption Shock 
This section describes the response of some key economic variables when one positive 
standard deviation of consumption shock is present in the economy (é*g = 0.0144), which 
is given as 
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s!g = 0.394	s!$%g + é!g	.     (5.47) 
For the sake of clarity, the benchmark model and optimized model are as follows: 
- The benchmark model : No instruments are optimised. 
- The optimized model : Optimising CAR, LTVH , and LTVE (¥∑x∑w) 
The impulse presents two models, namely the benchmark model and the optimised model. 
The benchmark model is the case when no macroprudential policy is active in the economy. 
Overall, the economic response in the optimised model under positive consumption shock is 
more stabilised than the benchmark model. This result demonstrates that the presence of 
macroprudential policy can dampen the fluctuation of some economic variables. 
 
Figure 5-1: Impulse Response Function Under Consumption Shock 
 One standard deviation of positive consumption shock stimulates households’ 
consumption activity. This rising consumption increases demand for goods, which then 
drives the price of final goods upward through the supply and demand mechanism. 
Everything else being equal, the accelerating consumption and higher final goods price 
causes inflation to rise. The rising final goods price then offers higher profits for firms and 
thus incentivises firms to increase production. Therefore, everything else being equal, the 
production of output rises in the initial period. The higher production activity also triggers 
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firms to demand more loans from banks since now they need to produce output a larger 
output than usual. Also, in anticipating higher production, capital good producers accelerate 
investment, produce more capital stock, and hence provide more new capital in the economy 
for firms. As a response, the loans given from banks increase above a steady state because 
firms now have more collateral supporting their higher demand for loans. 
 The loan initially has no impact on banking capital, but it then gradually increases 
banking capital and profits in the subsequent periods. The increasing banking profit is 
ultimately driven by higher loans for households and entrepreneurs. As the demand for loans 
rises, banks are more tempted to gain more profit and they increase the lending rate both for 
households and entrepreneurs elevate. The percentage increase of lending rate from its 
steady state exceeds that of deposit rate, which then increases credit spread from the steady 
state. In the benchmark model, the loan-to-output ratio plummets because the increase of 
output is higher than the deviation of the loan from its steady state. This situation reflects an 
accelerating economy but increasing risks in the financial sector. 
 Initially, macroprudential policy instruments seem to have no response to the shock. 
However, the impulse function illustrates that LTV for impatient households and 
entrepreneurs start to rise in the subsequent periods. The rise of these two LTVs indicates 
that the positive consumption shock initially triggers macroprudential policy to allow more 
credit. Although the rising LTVs allow more credit for the borrower, at the same time this 
situation is more risky for the lender and destabilises the financial sector, which can be seen 
from the high response of the loan-to-output ratio from its steady state. Therefore, after some 
time, the LTVs are saturated and gradually return to their steady state. Also, in comparison 
to the case where the ratios do not exist, the presence of LTV can dampen the loan and the 
loan-to-output ratio more signiifficantly than in the benchmark model. In addition to 
macroprudential policy, the shock also leads the central bank to cut the policy rate, which is 
followed by a decrease in lending and deposit rates.  
 To prevent over lending in the economy, the central bank also regulates to elevate 
the CAR. However, the rise in CAR is very small. These two policy instruments can stabilise 
the response of the loan to the shock. In this shock, CAR and LTV work in the opposite 
directions. Consequently, the size of the loans that firms can receive is also smaller than in 
the benchmark model, which is then followed by less banking capital, less output production, 
and a lower inflation than those in the benchmark model. Furthermore, as not all households’ 
demand can be met by firms, capital good producers then produce less capital than in the 
benchmark model, which then reduces investment and provides smaller capital stock. This 
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macroprudential action can balance the progression of output and loans in the economy, such 
that it stabilises the loan-to-output ratio more than in the benchmark model. 
• Housing Demand Shock 
A positive housing demand shock by one standard deviation ( é*0 = 0.0658) is given to the 
economy. Housing demand shock in the model is described related to consumers’ budget 
constraints and is given as s!0 = 0.921	s!$%0 + é!0 	.         (5.48) 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the impulse response function for some key economic variables.  
 
Figure 5-2: Impulse Response Function Under Housing Demand Shock 
For the sake of clarity, the benchmark model and optimized model are as follows: 
- The benchmark model : No instruments are optimised. 
- The optimized model : Optimising CAR, LTVH , and LTVE (¥∑x∑w) 
In general, the simulation illustrates that the fluctuation of real economic variables 
in the optimised model is smaller than those in the benchmark model. Also, the persistence 
of real economic variables between the two models is similar, which means that the 
propagation of shock to the real economy is minimal. The presence of housing demand shock 
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comes to the economy through households’ budget constraints. This positive shock reflects 
higher households’ expenditure to purchase houses. On impact, based on the household 
budget constraint, higher purchase on housing will reduce private consumption. The lower 
consumption also corresponds to the lower demand of final goods. Through supply and 
demand, the impact of a smaller demand for final goods reduces equilibrium price, inflation, 
and diminishes firms’ profitability. Smaller production also disincentivises capital goods 
producers from providing more new capital stock in the economy. As a result, capital stock 
in the economy declines and investment falls.  
Furthermore, all else being equal, the lower firms’ profitability will reduce labour 
income, which subsequently discourage patient households to save more deposits in banks . 
Therefore, smaller deposit in banks then influences the ability of banks to supply loans, 
which explains why the loan supply in the two models decreases. In the benchmark model, 
the impulse function illustrates that the loan increases more quickly than production, which 
causes the loan-to-output ratio to rise immediately in the initial period. This rising loan-to-
output ratio indicates an increasing impact of systemic risk that requires macroprudential 
policy to manage. 
As a macroprudential authority, the central bank optimises LTV for impatient 
households and LTV for entrepreneurs to prevent the loan-to-output ratio from soaring and 
increasing impact of systemic risk. The two LTVs do not fluctuate in the first period, but 
then gradually move in the subsequent periods. For instance, LTV for impatient households 
falls, which means that macroprudential policy discourages households from allocating more 
spending in housing purchase. In contrast, LTV for entrepreneurs temporarily rises, which 
indicates that macroprudential policy allows entepreneurs to receive more loans and drive 
higher production. However, the two LTVs tend to decline across the subsequent periods, 
which means that macroprudential policy tends to decrease loans for impatient households 
and borrowers. In preventing loans from shrinking, the CAR declines. The interaction among 
these three macroprudential policy instruments can stabilise loans from decreasing further 
than that in the benchmark model. Therefore, during this shock, CAR and LTV behave in 
opposite directions. Additionally, the central bank also implements a simple Taylor rule and 
cuts the policy rate below its steady state. In the optimised model, the fall in policy rate is 
more moderate than it is in the benchmark model. 
In conclusion, the response of most key economic variables to the shock in the 
optimised model is more stabilised than that in the benchmark model. For instance, the 
optimisation of multiple macroprudential instruments moderates the reaction of inflation, 
loan, consumption, and investment. Similarly, the loan-to-output ratio is also found to be 
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much more stable in the optimised model than in the benchmark model. The more stable 
loan-to-output ratio indicates that the activation of macroprudential policy under this shock 
is also useful to mitigate the impact of systemic risks. However, although macroprudential 
policy can moderate the impact of shocks and minimise the impact of systemic risks, it does 
not make the economy recovers more quickly than than the benchmark model does. 
• Markup Shock on Deposit Rate 
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the impulse response function when one standard deviation of 
positive shock on demand elasticity of deposit rate is given to the economy (é*o = 0.0488). 
This shock in the model is constructed as follows: s!o = 0838s!$%o + é!o	.         (5.49) 
This shock explains the scenario where retail banks increase the deposit rate independently 
of monetary policy.  
 
Figure 5-3: Impulse Response Function Under Markup Shock on Deposit Demand 
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For the sake of clarity, the benchmark model and optimized model are as follows: 
- The benchmark model : No instruments are optimised. 
- The optimized model : Optimising CAR, LTVH , and LTVE (¥∑x∑w) 
The positive shock of demand elasticity on deposit rate, or the deposit rate shock, 
pushes the deposit rate upward. The increase of the deposit rate in the optimised model and 
in the benchmark model are identical. Increased deposit rates encourage patient households 
to save more deposits in banks. As a consequence, everything else being equal, the budget 
constraint for patient households suggests that the increase in deposits will cause 
consumption to go down. Therefore, consumption activity declines. The decline in 
consumption also means that households’ demand for final goods diminishes. Therefore, 
everything else being equal, the decreased demand for final goods causes the equilibrium 
price for final goods to decline. Everything else being equal, a decline in final goods price 
causes the inflation rate to decline as well. In the benchmark model, the falling inflation and 
output automatically causes the Taylor rule to decrease the policy rate.  
 The lower final goods price also reduces the supply of goods, which means that 
firms now produce a smaller output than usual. This explains why output falls below the 
steady state when the shock presents. The decline in production also affects capital goods 
producers. That is, due to smaller profits from capital production, the capital goods producers 
now only create less capital in the economy, which then reduces investment. In the financial 
sector, a lower demand for final goods also negatively affects the supply of loans from the 
banking sector negatively. Although more deposits are created in banks, the banks only 
intermediate smaller amount of credit due to the weakening production. As a consequence, 
lower credit will negatively affect banking profitability and reduce banking capital. In the 
benchmark model, the loans decline further than the output. Therefore, the loan-to-output 
ratio plummets deeper than that it does in the optimised model.  
The LTV for impatient households and entrepeneurs show no response to the shock 
in the initial period, but then increases in the subsequent period. The increasing LTV for 
impatient households indicates that macroprudential policy relaxes the restrictions for 
impatient households to access more loans and purchase more housing. Relaxing the 
instrument can moderate the impact of the shock on loan activity. Similarly, the LTV for 
entrepreneurs also increases, which indicates that macroprudential policy intends to grant 
more access for entrepreneurs to receive more loans. However, the two LTVs tend to decline 
in the long run, which means that macroprudential policy tends to decrease loans for 
impatient households and borrowers, which possibly intends to curb the impact of systemic 
risks. However, in preventing the loan from shrinking, the central bank also regulates banks 
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to reduce CAR. The interaction among these three policy instruments then moderates the 
fall of the loans, which means that banks in the optimised model can supply more loans to 
the economy. Therefore, under this shock, CAR and LTV work in the opposite direction.  
In conclusion, a higher supply of loans in the optimised model can stabilise most 
economic variables in the impulse. For instance, entrepreneurs can receive more loans and 
demand more capital, which incentivises capital good goods producers to provide more 
capital in the economy. Furthermore, with more capital produced, investment can rebound. 
Similarly, impatient households can then receive more loans to purchase houses, which 
improves housing prices. Finally, as production increases, firms can gain more profit and 
hence pay higher dividends for households. All else being equal, higher dividens can 
improve households’ spending for consumption. In the optimised model, the pace of 
response of loan and output is relatively similar, such that the loan-to-output ratio can be 
stabilised.  
• Markup Shock on Household Lending Rate 
Figure 5.4 illlustrates the impulse response function when positive shock on demand 
elasticity of household lending rate by one standard deviation comes to the economy (é*ia =0.1454). This shock in the model is constructed as: s!ia = 0.820s!$%ia + é!ia	.     (5.50) 
 
Figure 5-4: Impulse Response Function Under Markup Shock on Household Lending Rate 
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 This shock explains the scenario where retail banks increase lending rates for 
households independently of monetary policy. For the sake of clarity, the benchmark model 
and optimized model are as follows: 
- The benchmark model : No instruments are optimised. 
- The optimized model : Optimising CAR, LTVH , and LTVE (¥∑x∑w) 
Overall, the response of economic variables in the optimised model is more stable than those 
in the benchmark model. The shock on the lending rate for impatient households 
automatically increases the lending rate for households, which causes credit for impatient 
households more expensive. This condition restrains households from demanding such loans 
and hence increases consumption instead. That is, impatient households become less 
attracted to purchasing new houses. The higher household spending on consumption will 
increase their demand for final goods and thus increases the new equilibrium price of final 
goods. Everything else equal, higher final goods price will raise inflation. Higher final goods 
price then encourage firms to produce more output in the economy, such that production 
goes up when the shock presents. Moreover, accelerating production activity also 
incentivises capital good producers to create more new capital, which causes investment and 
capital stock to respond positively when the shock comes. Higher production also allows 
firms to earn greater profits and more dividends are sent to patient households. The higher 
dividends sent to patient households enable them to create more deposits in the banking 
sector. 
           In the financial sector, more deposit creation from patient households enables banks 
to increase more credit for borrowers. Under the benchmark model, the loan rises when the 
shock presents. It seems that the loan accelerates more quickly than the output, which then 
drives the loan-to-output ratio upward. The rising loan-to-output ratio in the benchmark 
model indicates that the impact of systemic risk in the banking sector is rising. In managing 
financial stability, the central bank optimises both LTV for impatient households and 
entrepreneurs simultaneously. LTV for impatient households tends to increase. The increase 
of LTV for impatient households indicates that macroprudential policy allows impatient 
households to receive more loans and purchase new houses.  
 In contrast, the LTV for entrepreneurs decreases temporarily before it moves up after 
some time, which indicates that macroprudential policy intends to restrict firms from 
accessing more loans. However, the two LTVs tend to increase across the subsequent 
periods, which means that macroprudential policy tends to increase loans for impatient 
households and borrowers. In preventing overlending, the central bank regulates banks to 
elevate the CAR, although the rise in CAR is very small. These two policy instruments can 
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stabilise the response of loans to the shock. Therefore, during this shock, CAR and LTV 
work in opposite directions. As shown in the impulse function, the loan in the optimised 
model fluctuate less than they do in the benchmark model. That means that banks in the 
optimised model intermediate smaller loans than that under the optimised model. 
           In conclusion, the decreasing loans given in the economy can stabilise the fluctuation 
of other economic variables. For instance, given banks can now supply less loans for 
entrepreneurs, output in the optimised model only increases less than it does in the 
benchmark model. Capital good producers will also adjust their capital production, such that 
investment and capital stock are more modest than those in the benchmark model. 
Correspondingly, the smaller output produced means less dividends for households, which 
then also reduces consumption. Furthermore, the declining consumption reduces demand for 
final goods, which then reduces equilibrium prices. Everything else being equal, inflation in 
the optimised model is more moderate than in the benchmark model.  Finally, with smaller 
loans and reduced output, the loan-to-output ratio is stabilised and the impact of systemic 
risk is dampened. 
• Markup Shock on Entrepreneurs Lending Rate 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the impulse response function when one standard deviation of positive 
shock on demand elasticity of entrepreneurs’ lending rate is present in the economy (é*if =0.1454). In the model, this shock is constructed as:  s!if = 0834s!$%if + é!if 	.     (5.51) 
This shock explains the circumstance where retail banks increase the level of lending rate 
for entrepreneurs independently of monetary policy. For the sake of clarity, the benchmark 
model and optimized model are as follows: 
- The benchmark model : No instruments are optimised. 
- The optimized model : Optimising CAR, LTVH , and LTVE (¥∑x∑w) 
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Figure 5-5: Impulse Response Function Under Markup Shock on Entrepreneurs Lending Rate 
Overall, economic variables in the optimised model are more stable than those in the 
benchmark model. A positive shock on markup on entrepreneurs’ lending rate elevates the  
lending rate above its steady state, which causes loans for entrepreneurs to be more 
expensive. Everything else being equal, this higher borrowing cost reduces the 
entrepreneurs’ demand for loans and reduces the total loan itself. Therefore, in the 
benchmark model, the impulse illustrates that the loan declines below the steady state when 
the shock presents. The fall in loans granted for entrepreneurs negatively affects output since 
firms now only have less fund to purchase new capital. Therefore, output also goes down 
below the steady state in the initial period.  
The falling output production corresponds to the falling firms’ demand for new 
capital and causes the capital goods producers to create less new capital in the economy, 
reducing capital stock and investment. From the household perspective, the smaller output 
produced will affect firms’ profitability and provides less dividends for households. As a 
consequence, everything else equal, less dividends received reduces consumption, which 
explains why consumption declines in the initial period. Overall, a weaker production 
corresponds reduces the supply of goods and rises the equilibrium of final good prices. 
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Everything else equal, higher prices for final goods increases inflation. The benchmark 
model demonstrates that systemic risk rises because the loan-to-output ratio soars.   
In diminishing the impact of systemic risk, the central bank implements 
macroprudential policy. LTV for both impatient households and entrepreneurs shows no 
discernible response in the initial period, but then move in opposite directions in the 
subsequent periods. LTV for impatient households declines, while  LTV for entrepreneurs 
increases, which mainly reduces loan from banks. Recall that higher LTV means higher 
credit access given by banks. Therefore, the fall of LTV for impatient households suggests 
that banks tend to prevent impatient households from purchasing more loans. In contrast, the 
increasing LTV for entrepreneurs implies that banks intend to encourage entrepreneurs to 
access more loans. However, the two LTVs tend to decline in the long run, which means that 
macroprudential policy tends to curb the loan for impatient households and borrowers.  
In preventing the loan from shrinking, the central bank regulates banks to reduce 
CAR. These policy instruments can stabilise the response of loans to the shock. Therefore, 
under this shock, CAR and LTV move in opposite directions. Overall, this increased access 
incentivises entrepreneurs to borrow more loans and use these loans to purchase new capital 
from capital goods producers. The capital goods producers then use the loans to create more 
new capital and increases investment. With more new capital provided, firms can boost their 
production, gain greater profits, give more dividends to households, and eventually improve 
consumption.  
In conclusion, some economic variables in the optimised model move more 
moderately than those in the benchmark model, but some of them do not. The more stabilised 
response of economic variables can be seen in consumption and investment, where the 
optimised model can moderate the impact of the shock on these two variables. Another 
variable that is significantly stabilised in the optimised model is the loan-to-output ratio, 
which indicates the efficacy of macroprudential policy under this shock. In contrast, the 
optimised model tends to increase inflation more than in the benchmark model. With the 
more stabilised response of output and inflation, the optimised model increases the policy 
rate more than in the benchmark model. 
• Technology Shock 
This section explains the impulse response function when one standard deviation of 
technology shock (é*] = 0.0062) on the economy. The process of technology shock is given 
as follows:  ^!f = 0.939^!$%f + é!]	.         (5.52) 
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Figure 5.6 illustrates the impulse response function for some key economic variables. 
 
Figure 5-6: Impulse Response Function Under Technology Shock 
For the sake of clarity, the benchmark model and optimized model are as follows: 
- The benchmark model : No instruments are optimised. 
- The optimized model : Optimising CAR, LTVH , and LTVE (¥∑x∑w) 
A positive technology shock affects the economy through a production function of 
intermediate goods. Typically, one positive standard deviation of technology shock should 
have caused production activity to move upward, which then also increases the final goods, 
everything else equal. However, this is not a usual case to happen when macroprudential 
policy exists. Recall that macroprudential policy tends to increase credit when lending 
activity is slowing but restrain it when the lending activity is excessive. In this case, the 
positive shock favouring entrepeneurs triggers macroprudential policy to restrain credit for 
entrepreneurs rather than to enhance it. Consequently, LTV for entrepreneurs elevates above 
its steady state. The rise of LTV for entrepreneurs imposes increases their bankability, which 
increases their demand for new loans. On the other hand, LTV for impatient households 
declines in the initial period. This situation suggests that macroprudential policy tends to 
encourage entrepreneurs from accessing more loan but at the same time discourage 
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households from purchasing more housing. As a result, loans in the optimised model 
increases, although it is slightly below te steady state in the beginning. 
Higher LTV for entrepreneurs also incentivies capital goods producers to produce 
more capital in the economy, although capital and investment slightly declines in the 
beginning. Everything else equal, with increased production activity, a supply of goods 
increases, firms profitability increases, labour income increases, and eventually causes 
consumption spending to increase. However, the impulse function illustrates that the 
movement of consumption between the benchmark model and in the optimized model is 
relatively the same. However, higher production activity that increases supply of goods leads 
to lower prices, and hence reduces inflation.  
In the benchmark model, the positive productivity shock encourages loan to grow 
above its steady state, which then increases the loan-to-output ratio. The excessive loan-to-
output ratio poses higher financial risks for the economy, which calls the need for 
macroprudential policy intervention. Therefore, when the central bank activates 
macroprudential policy, the rise of LTV for entrepreneurs increases loan activity. In the long 
run, the two LTVs tend to increase across the subsequent periods, which means that 
macroprudential policy tends to increase loans for impatient households and borrowers. To 
prevent overlending, the central bank elevates the CAR. The interaction of these instruments 
can stabilise the response of loans to the shock. Therefore, under this shock, CAR and LTV 
work in the opposite direction.  Across all variables, the loan-to-output ratio is the most 
stabilised variable in the optimised model, which reflects macroprudential policy efforts in 
achieving financial stability.  
Besides macroprudential policy, the central bank also implements a conventional 
monetary policy by cutting the policy rate, which decreases lending and deposit rates, 
everything else equal. Consequently, credit spread is adjusted to decline, everything else 
equal. The decline in the lending rate then reduces the borrowing cost and makes it more 
affordable for entrepreneurs, which then gradually increases loans. The LTV of 
entrepreneurs will increase until it gradually declines after some time, but still stays above 
the steady state. On the other hand, the rising LTV for impatient households also improves 
impatient households’ bankability to borrow more money and they can purchase more 
houses. The increase in the purchase of houses increases asset prices and incentivises capital 
goods producers to create more new capital in the economy. This rising capital production 
increases investment, production activity, and eventually consumption. 
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5.5 Concluding Remarks 
Macroprudential policy is broad and still requires further development, particularly 
regarding its role in conjunction with the well-established monetary policy. Therefore, both 
the choice and design of how macroprudential policy instruments interact are crucial to 
ensure the policy can benefit the economy. This study focuses on the interaction between 
conventional monetary policy and the macroprudential policy with multiple instruments. 
The study demonstrates to what extent this interaction can benefit the economy compared to 
when the authority only focuses on the operation of a single macroprudential instrument. 
The result of this study is expected to contribute positively to macroprudential policy 
literature. 
 Using the model taken from Gerali et al. (2010), this study utilises two prominent 
types of macroprudential instruments: the CAR and LTV. Moreover, the model divides the 
latter into LTV for impatient households and LTV for entrepreneurs. Using the method 
developed by Dennis (2007), this study produces various simulations in a scenario that the 
central bank optimises macroprudential policy instruments under the fully optimal 
commitment rule. As for the monetary policy instrument, the central bank follows a simple 
Taylor rule, which is the one provided in the reference model.  
 Using the ad-hoc loss function constructed by the variation of inflation, output, loan-
to-output ratio, monetary instrument, and macroprudential instrument(s), the study 
introduces two different scenarios in the simulation. In the first scenario, the central bank 
optimises only one macroprudential policy instrument and leaves other policy instruments 
as constants. In the second scenario, the central bank assumes to optimise multiple 
macroprudential policy instruments, which cover all possible pairings of instruments. The 
best case is determined based on how it compares to the benchmark model. The benchmark 
model is designed as a case in which all macroprudential instruments are constants. In other 
words, the benchmark model is the scenario where macroprudential policy is not active.  
           Our simulation demonstrates some findings. Firstly, macroprudential policy can 
benefit the economy more than if the policy does not exist. The ability of the policy to 
achieve financial stability is the main benefit. This positive contribution of macroprudential 
policy is similar to what has been stated in studies conducted by Boar et al. (2017), Akinci 
and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), Lim et al. (2011), Dell’ Ariccia et al. (2012), and Galati and 
Moessner (2014), among others.  
 Secondly, we argue that there is a mutual benefit derived from interacting with 
multiple macroprudential instruments, which is not the case when optimising the policy 
based on a single instrument. However, managing multiple macroprudential instruments 
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simultaneously in the economy requires careful consideration, since the interaction can 
create a conflict between the instruments. The conflict manifests itself in such a way that the 
interaction can benefit some policy instruments, but also attenuates the efficacy of other 
policy instruments. In other words, a trade-off between variables can emerge when the 
central bank manages too many policy instruments. There should be a threshold regarding 
how many macroprudential instruments the central bank can manage while still benefitting 
the economy at the same time. However, further study is required to validate this argument. 
           Thirdly, our simulation demonstrates that there is a substitution effect between 
macroprudential instruments, which means that the presence of one instrument can help in 
stabilising the other instrument but at the cost of a higher fluctuation of the instrument itself. 
For this model, we argue that optimising CAR and the joint LTV can deliver the best policy 
performance, but it has a negative impact on inflation. At this rate, we argue that the central 
bank should not operate this policy. In contrast, the case when the central bank optimises 
CAR and the separate LTVs perform positively to inflation, although this case only gives a 
second-best policy performance.  
 This finding suggests that the implementation of this case does not cause a conflict 
with monetary policy. Therefore, we argue that this is the best case that the central bank can 
implement for our reference model. Moreover, for this model, we found that LTV is superior 
to CAR. The superiority of LTV ratio to CAR is understood, as mortgage market and housing 
prices dominate the banking activity in the models. This high impact of LTV ratio on the 
economy with housing market is in line with studies conducted by Ritcher, Schularick, and 
Shim (2018), Suh (2012), Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), Montoro and Moreno 
(2011), and Lim et al. (2011), among others. 
           In addition, among all the variables in the loss function, the loan-to-output ratio is the 
variable that contributes most significantly to the total loss in the economy, which indicates 
that macroprudential policy is useful to stabilise this ratio. This result is in line with the 
recommendation made by Basel III that prioritises macroprudential policy to stabilise              
debt-to-GDP ratio, which also supports the studies conducted by Angelini et al. (2014), 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), and Borio and Drehman (2009). From the perspective of policy 
recommendation, this study supports the view that multiple macroprudential instruments can 
a provide better policy performance. Finally, the simulation on impulse response functions 
demonstrates that optimising multiple macroprudential instruments can moderate the 
fluctuation of credit and, at the same time, accelerate the economy to return to its steady 
states.  
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CHAPTER 6 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
6.1 Main Results and Contribution to The Literature 
This thesis presents essays on unconventional monetary policy and macroprudential policy, 
and explores the ways in which they interact with traditional monetary policy. The credit 
injection ratio is the focused instrument of the unconventional monetary policy, and the 
capital adequacy ratio and loan-to-value ratio are the focus in terms of the macroprudential 
policy.  
 The thesis consists of three core chapters. In the first chapter, we investigate the 
optimal strategic interaction between the conventional monetary policy and the quantitative 
easing policy. The second chapter examines whether the optimal simple rule for quantitative 
easing policy can be optimally constructed based on the endogenous variables in the 
economy. Finally, the final chapter interacts conventional monetary policy with 
macroprudential policy to understand to the extent to which macroprudential policy with 
multiple policy instruments can benefit the economy. The reference model for the first and 
second chapters is that of Gertler and Karadi (2011), while the reference for the third chapter 
is the model from Gerali et al. (2010). All the simulations are conducted following the 
algorithm developed by Dennis (2004; 2007), and Dennis and Ilbas (2016). 
The first core chapter reveals that simultaneous interaction under fully optimal 
commitment regime between the conventional monetary policy and the quantitative easing 
policy offers the best policy performance compared to other policy regimes. In this case, the 
central bank’s commitment in quantitative easing plays an important role in the policy 
performance. Our finding regarding the positive impact of commitment in quantitative 
easing is similar to arguments proposed by Ugai (2007); Beriel and Mendes (2015), 
Khrisnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), and Oda and Ueda (2007), among others, who 
argue that commitment is an essential factor in the operation of quantitative easing policy.   
In contrast, a discretionary policy regime delivers the lowest policy performance, 
with a level similar to that when the two policies interact using the leadership scenario. The 
study also found that the quantitative easing policy is best performing when it leads the 
interaction (i.e., the central bank optimises the quantitative easing policy before the 
conventional monetary policy), which is in line with the argument from Cui and Sterk 
(2018). Finally, the findings of this chapter demonstrate that the combination of the non-
optimal simple monetary rule and the simple quantitative easing rule is still better than 
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discretionary or leadership regimes, which suggests a possibility of using an optimal simple 
rule in managing quantitative easing policy. However, performance of the simple policy rule 
regime is conditional on the level of the central bank’s aggressiveness, in terms of 
combatting the crisis. The simulation reveals that the simple policy rule regime outperforms 
the discretionary policy regime if the credit parameter in the simple quantitative easing rule 
is below 15.  
Most policy performances produced indicate that the traditional monetary policy 
remains superior to the quantitative easing policy, except for the independent leadership 
regime where quantitative easing leads the interaction. This result contributes to the 
literature by indicating that the quantitative easing policy cannot replace the traditional 
monetary policy, which is noted in studies by Curdia and Woodford (2018); Cui and Sterk 
(2018); Sheedy (2016); and Kiley (2018), among others. Furthermore, by using the 
simulation on the simple policy rule regime, this study also reinforces that the central bank’s 
excessive aggressiveness, in terms of injecting credit into the economy, can benefit the 
fluctuation of some macroeconomic variables. However, this also contributes to the 
deterioration of policy performance, which is a similar notion to ideas expounded by Cui 
and Sterk (2018); Kiley (2008); Sheedy (2016) and Fernandez, Bortz, and Zeolla (2018), 
among others. 
We also found that, although the commitment regime offers the smallest loss value, 
its ability to stabilise inflation performs worse than the simple policy rule regime. That is to 
say, the simple policy rule regime outperforms the commitment and discretionary policy 
regimes, in terms of the role of inflation stabilisation. In contrast, the job of stabilising 
output, credit spread, and nominal interest rate are best in the commitment regime. Finally, 
simulations of impulse response functions under various shocks demonstrate that central 
bank injects the largest liquidity under the simple policy rule regime. 
The second core chapter formulates the optimal simple quantitative easing rule when 
the central bank manages both monetary and quantitative easing policies. This chapter works 
on the assumption that the central bank only optimises quantitative easing policy to minimise 
loss function, while the monetary policy rule is maintained in order to follow the non-optimal 
simple Taylor rule, as provided in the original model.  
The study demonstrates that the best performing optimal simple quantitative easing 
rule is under the past time horizon, using information from lagged deviation of leverage, 
capital price, and credit spread from their steady states. However, incorporating inflation and 
output in the optimal simple rule only returns minor improvements to the policy 
performance. Similarly, when the central bank utilises non-zero interest rate smoothing 
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parameters, the structure of the optimal simple quantitative easing rule remain unchanged, 
which is still constructed by the past leverage, capital price, and credit spread. The 
superiority of information from financial sector in quantitative easing is similar with 
argument from Borio and Zabai (2016). 
Our investigation on unconditional variances shows that the optimal simple 
quantitative easing rule results in the lower fluctuation of credit injection than that in the 
fully optimal commitment rule. This implies that the optimal simple quantitative easing rule 
can prompt the central bank to inject less credit than they would under full commitment. 
However, this lower credit injection leads to higher fluctuations in output and credit spread, 
than in the fully optimal commitment rule. Across all variables in the loss function, output 
has been shown to be the most fluctuating variable. 
This second core chapter contributes to the recent evolving literature that focuses on 
developing the quantitative easing policy rule and conventionalising the unconventional 
monetary policy, such as Sheedy (2016), Curdia and Woodford (2010), and Quint and 
Rabanal (2017). It is shown that the quantitative easing positively contributes to the 
economy, compared to when quantitative easing is not active. Although this is not an 
empirical finding based on econometric studies, this favourable impact finding is similar to 
studies from Chen et al. (2016); Gagnon et al. (2011); Khrisnamurty and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2011); Chung et al. (2012); Giannone, Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2012); Quint and Rabanal 
(2017); Meaning and Zhu (2011), and Kapetianos et al. (2012), among others.  
This chapter also reinforces that the central bank should mainly derive its information 
from the banking sector when implementing the quantitative easing policy. Among all 
banking variables provided in the reference model, credit spread is the most affecting 
variable in the simple quantitative easing rule. Hence, the chapter argues that targeting credit 
spread in the quantitative easing policy can improve the efficacy of the optimal simple 
quantitative easing rule in the economy. The importance of credit spread in the operation of 
quantitative easing policy subsequently supports studies from Gertler and Karadi (2011); 
Quint and Rabanal (2017); Christensen and Gillan (2018); Pang and Siklos (2010), and 
Paesani and Bruno (2014), among others. 
Furthermore, the findings in this chapter also highlight that past time endogenous 
variables can provide the central bank with useful information to determine the level of 
quantitative easing in the financial sector at present time. This is an interesting result because 
the quantitative easing policy rule usually incorporates either a contemporaneous or future 
time horizon, such as shown in Gertler and Karadi (2011); Sheedy (2016); Cui and Sterk 
(2018), and Curdia and Woodford (2010), among others.  
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Finally, the study also found that the central bank’s aggressiveness can create a trade-
off between optimality and stability in the economy. The central bank’s aggressiveness can 
unbind the optimality of the simple quantitative easing rule. This occurs because the credit 
parameter changes the feedback coefficients in the optimal simple rule, which consequently 
leads to a higher credit injection into the economy and, thus higher loss. However, although 
aggressiveness can reduce the fluctuation of other variables in the loss function, which 
generally benefit the macroeconomy, it deteriorates policy performance, which is similarly 
noted by Cui and Sterk (2018); Kiley (2008); Sheedy (2016) and Fernandez, Bortz, and 
Zeolla (2018). Therefore, the credit injection ratio, as the quantitative easing instrument, 
should not be used with excessive aggressiveness. 
 The third core chapter incorporates both conventional monetary policy and 
macroprudential policy, in order to investigate the effect of macroprudential policy on the 
economy under the commitment regime. A number of conclusion are drawn from our 
simulations. First, the presence of macroprudential policy can benefit the economy 
compared to a situation in which macroprudential policy does not exist. Our finding 
regarding macroprudential policy’s positive contribution is similar to that noted in the 
studies of Boar et al. (2017); Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015); Lim et al. (2011); Dell’ 
Ariccia et al. (2012); Galati and Moessner (2014); Quint and Rabbanal (2013); Angelini, 
Neri and Panetta (2012); Kannan and Rabanal (2012); Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2016); 
Basto, Gomes, and Lima (2018), and Lambertini, Mendicino, and Punzi (2013), among 
others. This chapter outlines the mutual benefit that is possible when multiple 
macroprudential policy instruments interact, compared to only optimising the policy based 
on a single instrument. 
 However, managing multiple macroprudential instruments simultaneously in the 
economy requires careful consideration, since the interaction can create conflict between the 
instruments. This conflict is manifested in the fact that this interaction can benefit some 
policy instruments but can also attenuate the efficacy of another policy instrument. That is 
to say, a trade-off between variables emerges when the central bank manages too many 
policy instruments. Thus, there should be a threshold regarding how many macroprudential 
instruments a central bank can manage, while benefitting the economy at the same time. 
However, further study is required to validate this argument. Finally, the efficacy of the LTV 
ratio in the economy is similar for both LTV for households and LTV for entrepreneurs. The 
significant impact of the LTV ratio can be understood in an economy with extensive housing 
market, which is also articulated in the studies by Ritcher, Schularick, and Shim (2018); Suh 
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(2012); Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015); Montoro and Moreno (2011), and Lim et al. 
(2011), among others.  
 Our simulations on unconditional variances demonstrate that there is a substitution 
effect between macroprudential policy instruments, which means that the presence of one 
policy instrument can help stabilise the other policy instrument, but at the cost of higher 
fluctuation for the instrument itself. This model demonstrates that optimising the CAR and 
the joint LTV ratio can deliver the best policy performance, but this also returns a negative 
impact on inflation.  Consequently, we argue that the central bank should not operate this 
policy. In contrast, when the central bank optimises CAR and the separate LTV ratios, it can 
reduce the fluctuation of inflation, despite only returning the second-best policy 
performance. This finding suggests that this situation does not cause a conflict with monetary 
policy. Hence, we argue that this scenario provides the best performance and suggest the 
central bank to implement this model.  
 We found that LTV is superior to CAR in our reference model. The superiority of 
LTV ratio over CAR is understood, as the mortgage market and housing prices dominate 
economic activities in the reference model. The efficacy of LTV ratio as a policy instrument 
of macroprudential policy in this study is in line with studies from Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2014); Mendicino and Punzi (2014); Basto, Gomes, and Lima (2018), and 
Lambertini, Mendicino, and Punzi (2013). 
 Furthermore, among all the variables in the loss function, the loan-to-output ratio is 
the variable that contributes most significantly to the benefit of macroprudential policy in 
the economy. This finding indicates that macroprudential policy is a useful tool to create 
financial stability by dampening the fluctuation of the loan-to-output ratio. This result 
supports the recommendation from Basel III that prioritises macroprudential policy to 
stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio, which in turn supports the work of Angelini et al. (2014); 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), and Borio and Drehman (2009). Finally, we also found that, 
although optimising multiple numbers of macroprudential policy instruments is better than 
relying solely on the single macroprudential instrument optimisation, the results of the 
unconditional variance demonstrate that the capital adequacy ratio does not fluctuate 
significantly.  
6.2 Policy Implications of The Research 
Less research is being conducted into unconventional monetary policies, particularly 
quantitative easing policy, compared to conventional monetary policy or fiscal policy. This 
is understood as quantitative easing is considered to only active during an economic crisis, 
which makes it unconventional, compared to policies that work during regular economic 
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activities. However, quantitative easing is not entirely unconventional, as the central bank 
actually has been operating the policy in government bonds market for the last 200 years 
(Goldman Sachs, 2019). Hence, conventionalising quantitative easing policy is something 
logical for policymakers to think about, considering its narrow scope of literature today. 
Martin and Milas (2012) argue that the literature on quantitative easing policy is limited and 
too narrow, which means exploration of alternative approaches to quantitative easing are 
required. For instance, most studies in this area refer to a global financial crisis as a starting 
point, which is a time in which massive credit injection into the economy are made. They 
then expand this perspective to elaborate on the effectiveness of the policy in terms of 
dampening the impact of the crisis.  
 Unfortunately, other possibilities to expand the research area of quantitative easing 
policy are overlooked and underexplored. For instance, to our best knowledge, the topics 
related to conventionalising the quantitative easing policy, how this policy should interact 
with traditional monetary policy, and how the central bank should govern this policy, are all 
rarely examined in the literature. Hence, this study as an effort towards expanding the 
literature on quantitative easing policy. That is to say, this thesis expands quantitative easing 
policy beyond the current narrow focus on its effectiveness in the economy. From a policy 
perspective, as the economy is growing more sophisticatedly, it is most likely that this type 
of policy will play a significant future role, rather than being assumed to only be active 
during times of financial distress. 
           The results of the first two chapters in this thesis present a picture for policymakers 
and researchers, which urges them to view the quantitative easing policy as a more strategic 
policy, rather than as simply an emergency asset purchase. For example, the first chapter 
reveals that the non-optimal simple rule can perform better than the discretionary or the 
leadership policy regime, provides policymakers a broader insight to elaborate an 
appropriate simple rule to  set the size of quantitative easing in the economy. Furthermore, 
one finding from the second chapter regarding the optimal simple rule for quantitative easing 
also provides information for policymakers regarding the critical financial variables that can 
help direct the path of quantitative easing in the economy. Furthermore, the importance of 
the past time horizon for financial variables also indicates the crucial nature of the degree of 
access or transparency between the central bank and the historical information in the private 
sector. These examples have favourable implications for the development of quantitative 
easing policy specifically, as well as for other macro-stabilisation policies in general. 
           Macroprudential policy is similar to quantitative easing policy in that it is also a 
relatively new policy that is growing in popularity, and whose name has become popular 
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since the global financial crisis. However, macroprudential policy differs from quantitative 
easing policy in that macroprudential policy is naturally broad due to various sources of 
systemic risk. To our best knowledge, current macroprudential policy studies focus on two 
areas: namely those that assess the effectiveness of the policy and those that examine its 
interactions with monetary policy. This study contributes to both areas by exploring the 
interactions between monetary and macroprudential policy, when the latter implements more 
than one policy instrument.  
 For instance, one finding from our study is that the substantial magnitude of impact 
from the presence of macroprudential policy can improve policy performance up to 72.75% 
than the case without its presence. This indicates the interesting policy implication of 
whether this policy could have replaced the conventional monetary policy in practice or not. 
Further research should elaborate on this, in order to answer this research question. Another 
significant finding from the last chapter is that the interaction of multiple policy instruments 
can induce conflict, but it can also trigger a substitution effect between the instruments. Our 
finding also demonstrates that LTV is more impactful than CAR. These two findings suggest 
policymakers that the choice of macroprudential instrument is also dependent on the 
structure of the instrument and the type of dominant market in the economy.  For instance, 
in our case, when mortgages dominant the banking sector, the loan to value ratio might have 
a more powerful impact on the economy than other macroprudential instruments. 
6.3 Limitation of The Study and Direction for Further Research 
In an effort to present a new perspective within this research area, this thesis contains 
assumptions and has limitations that call for further research. From a methodological 
perspective, the construction of the loss function is one of the limitations in this research. 
All three chapters implement ad-hoc loss functions, rather than the optimal welfare function 
that is derived from a utility function. The ad-hoc loss function contains some limitations, 
such as the rationale behind the choice of variables or the weights assigned to each variable 
in the loss function. Hence, future research is necessary to establish whether the results of 
this thesis change when these two types of loss functions are switched. Furthermore, this 
study is limited by its lack of examination of the intertemporal impact of the quantitative 
easing policy, which is asserted in similar studies.  
 Another assumption of this study lies in its traditional monetary policy. In practice, 
quantitative easing policy is usually present when the traditional interest rate monetary 
policy is poorly functioning, or when the overnight short-term interest rate is extremely low. 
In contrast, our simulation presents a circumstance when monetary policy can work normally 
using the ordinary simple Taylor rule, which does not reflect the malfunctioning of monetary 
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policy. This fundamental assumption probably explains the superiority of the traditional 
monetary policy over the quantitative easing policy across most regimes in the first chapter. 
Unfortunately, this thesis does not provide further analysis regarding the interaction between 
the two policies under a zero lower bound constraint, which highlights another limitation. 
Hence, further research should elaborate whether the superiority of monetary policy is 
maintained, even when the zero lower bound constraint is applied.  
 Regarding macroprudential policy study in this thesis, further research could be 
continued to explore the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy 
when both the capital adequacy ratio and loan-to-value ratio are expressed in the simple 
policy rule, rather than in the optimal policy rule. Another further study can also focus on 
the interaction between independent monetary policy and macroprudential policy pursuing 
different loss functions, rather than a single loss function, which can contribute to answer 
whether macroprudential policy and monetary policy should be mandated under single or 
separate institutions. Finally, further research can also explore the role of macroprudential 
policy in recovering the economy after an economic crisis.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
BCBS  : Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS  : Bank of International Settlement 
CAR  : Capital Adequacy Ratio 
FED  : Federal Reserve 
GDP  : Gross Domestic Product 
LDR  : Loan-to-Deposit Ratio 
LGD  : Loan-Given-Defaut 
LTV  : Loan-to-Value Ratio 
MEP  : Maturity Extensive Program 
MP  : Monetary Policy 
QE  : Quantitative Easing 
UK  : United Kingdom 
US  : United States 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Solving Dynamic Optimization in Rational Expectation Model 
This section explains the methodology used in this thesis. The first step from the simulation 
is to replicate the reference model using the undetermined coefficient approach from Uhlig 
(1999), which classifies endogenous variables into pre-determined and non-predetermined 
variables. Given the model replication has been established, the equation system is then 
rearranged into a structural form rather than in a state space model. Specifically, we produce 
matrix µ to satisfy the algorithm from Dennis (2007), which is given by µ*¡! = µ%¡!$% + µO,!¡!#% + µ}¬! + µ~,!¬!#% + µ√! ,                         (A.1) 
where matrices µ*, µ%, µO, µ}, µ~ and 	µ contain the model of structural parameters, ¡! is 
the vector of endogenous variables, ¬! denotes the vector of policy instrument, √! is the 
vector of stochastic disturbances where √!~). ). u. [ä, ≈] and ≈ is the variance-covariance 
matrix of structural shocks. In case of simultaneous interaxtion, the vector ¬! is decomposed 
into two. Accordingly, following Dennis and Ilbas (2016), the setting of two independent 
policies will expand the structural form of the model into the following µ*¡! = µ%¡!$% + µO,!¡!#% + µ}¬! + µ∆}¬«! + µ~,!¬!#% + µ∆~,!¬«!#% + µ√! ,       (A.2) 
where ¬! denotes the vector of policy instrument for the first policy and ¬«! denotes the policy 
instrument for the second policy. The main difference between the former structural form 
with the latter is that matrix µ} is split into µ} and  µ∆}, which represent the matrix of 
structural parameter of the first and second policy instrument at period !, respectively. 
Similarly, matrix µ~ is also split into µ~ and µ∆~, which represent the matrix of structural 
parameter for the first and second policy instrument at period ! + 1, respectively. 
• Fully Optimal Commitment Regime 
In the fully optimal commitment regime, it is assumed that the central bank implements two 
policies simultaneously. Under commitment, the policymaker adheres to its chosen policy 
rules from the beginning, apply the rules to all subsequent periods, and never reoptimises. 
Every period, the authority sets policy instruments to minimise the loss function given by 
+2ññ = ,*Ö/![¡!B»¡! + ¬!B…¬!],																																														( . f)(!)*  
where / is the discount factor, ¡! is an (ê	U	1) vector of endogenous variables, ¬! is a (À	U	1)  vector of policy instruments, » is a welfare matrix, which is the square matrix (ê	U	ê) representing the weights assigned to variables in the loss function, and … is the 
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square matrix (À	U	À) representing the weights of policy instruments in the loss function. 
Vectors ¡! and ¬! represent deviations from the nonstochastic steady state values. The sign ,* denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on period 0 information. The 
policymaker determie ¬! to minimise the the loss function (A.3) subject to the constraints: µ*¡! = µ%¡!$% + µO¡!#% + µ}¬! + µ~¬!#% + Ã!             (A.4) Ã! = µ√! − µOS!#% − µOÕ!#%,           (A.5) 
where Œ!#% and Õ!#% are the expectation errors and are martingale difference sequences, 
which are defined as  Œ!#% = ¡!#% − ,!¡!#%,    (A.6) Õ!#% = ¬!#% − ,!¬!#%.    (A.7) 
The solution in the commitment regime is to solve the optimisation problem above using the 
Lagrangian is as follows ' = )) ∑ +2[Q2R) -2S.-2 + 02S102 + 232S(5)-2 − 50-240 − 5+-2T0 − 5.02 − 5/02T0 − 72)] 
(A.8) 
then taking derivatives of U with respect to œ!, ¡! and ¬! , gives the following results C@bNNCÄ! = µ*¡! − µ%¡!$% − µO,Å¡!#% − µ}¬! − µ~,Å¬!#% − µ√! = ä  (A.9) C@bNNCÇ! = »¡! 	+ µ*B œ! − /$%µOB œ!$% − /µ%B,!œ!#% 	= ä  (A.10) C@bNNCÉ! = …¬! − µ}B œ! − /$%µ~B œ!$% 	= 0.   (A.11) 
One possibility to solve the derivative equations (A.9) – (A.11) above is to express them in 
the second-order form as follows: 
] ^ _) −_._)S ` ^−_.S ^ a b cd2e2f2g = ]
^ _0 ^P40_+S ^ ^P40_/S ^ ^b cd240e240f240g + c ^ _+ _/P_0S ^ ^^ ^ ^ gh2 cd2T0e2T0f2T0g + c_U^^ g [j2],  
(A.12) 
given ¡$% = ¡– and œ$% = ä, where œ represents Lagrange Multipliers from the optimisation 
problem. Implementing the undetermined-coefficient method returns the solutions in the 
form 
Ñœ!¡!¬!Ü = Ñ—%% —%O ä—O% —OO ä“% “O äÜ Ñœ!$%¡!$%¬!$%Ü + Ñ—%}—O}“} Ü [√!],           (A.13) 
where the optimal solution above depends on the vector of the lagged Lagrange multipliers. 
Suppose ”! = [œ!B		¡!B		¬!B]B, then we can rearrange the solution as ”! = ‘”!$% + ’√!. 
Accordingly, the loss function can be written as 
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+2ññ = [”!$%B ‘B÷◊‘”!$% + √!B’B÷◊’√! + Ñ%$Ñ !§(’B÷◊’≈)	],              (A.14) 
where ”v denotes the deviation of vector ”! from its steady states and √v denotes the deviation 
of vector √! from its steady state. The matrix ÷◊ is defined as a fixed point from  ÷◊ ≡ ÿ◊ + /‘B÷◊‘,      (A.15) 
where  
ÿ◊ ≡ Ñä ä ää » ää ä …Ü.       (A.16) 
• Discretionary Policy Regime 
In discretionary policy regime, it is assumed that the central bank always reoptimises in 
every period. Under discretion, we assume the central bank that optimises policy instrument 
today is the Stackelberg leader, while the private sector agents and future policymakers are 
assumed as Stackelberg followers. This discretion optimisation method also employs the 
algorithm developed by Dennis (2007) where we allow expected future instruments to enter 
the optimisation constraints and that we base the algorithm on a framework in which the 
optimisation constraints are written in a structural form (A.1), not in a state-space form 
(Dennis, 2007). 
Considering that the state variables are ¡!$% and √!, we expect that the solution 
derived under discretion regime will also be functions of these variables. Hence, there are 
matrices ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ% and ŸO that build solutions in the following process  ¡! = ‘%¡!$% +‘O√!     (A.17) ¬! = Ÿ%¡!$% + ŸO√! .                (A.18) 
Substituting equations (A.17) and (A.18) to structural form (A.1) gives ⁄¡! = µ%¡!$% + µ}¬! + µ√!,           (A.19) 
where ⁄ = µ* − µO‘% − µ~Ÿ%.       (A.20) 
Furthermore, substituting equation (A.17) and (A.18) to the loss function (A.3) gives the 
loss function that expressed in terms of ¡! , ¬! , ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ% and ŸO, as follows +2ññ = ¡!B÷¡! + ¬!B…¬! + Ñ%$Ñ !§[(ŸOB…ŸO +‘OB÷‘O)≈],   (A.21) 
where ÷ = »+ /(Ÿ%B…Ÿ% +‘%B÷‘%).                              (A.22) 
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Next, replacing ¡! in equation (A.21) using equation (A.19) produces the loss function as 
follows +2ññ = (µ%¡!$% + µ}¬! + µ√!)B⁄B$Ö÷⁄$Ö(µ%¡!$% + µ}¬! + µ√!) +¬!B…¬! + Ñ%$Ñ !§[(ŸOB…ŸO +‘OB÷‘O)≈].    (A.23) 
Furthermore, when policymaker optimiess a policy instrument to minimise a loss function, 
this is equal to differentiating equation (A.23) with respect to ¬!, which gives  C@bNNCÉ! = µ}B⁄B$Ö÷⁄$Ö(µ%¡!$% + µ√!) + (… + µÜB⁄′$Ö÷⁄$Öµ})¬! = ä.  (A.24) 
Rearranging equation (A.24) in terms of  ¬! gives ¬! = −(… + µ}B⁄$%÷⁄$%µ})$%µ}B⁄B$%÷⁄$%(µ%¡!$% + µ√!).      (A.25) 
Comparing equation (A.25) to equation (A.18) yield the evolutions for Ÿ% and ŸO as follows Ÿ% = −(… + µ}B⁄$%÷⁄$%µ})$%µ}B⁄B$%÷⁄$%µ%   (A.26) ŸO = −(… + µ}B⁄$%÷⁄$%µ})$%µ}B⁄B$%÷⁄$%µ.    (A.27) 
Finally, substituting equation (A.22) to the solution equation (A.17) gives a new evolution 
for ¡! as follows ¡! = ⁄$%(µ% + µ}Ÿ%)¡!$% +⁄$%(^ + µ}ŸO)√!.    (A.28) 
Comparing equation (A.28) to which is compared to (A.21) gives equations as follow ‘% = ⁄$%(µ% + µ}Ÿ%)      (A.29)   ‘O = ⁄$%(µ + µ}ŸO).      (A.30) 
Finally, since P and ⁄ are implicit functions of ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ% and ŸO, the final solution (A.26), 
(A.27), (A.29), and (A.30) can be solved using an iterative procedure to find the fixed point 
between the matrices until converges. Finally, using the known ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ%, ŸO and P, the 
evaluation of loss value under discretionary regime can be computed using equation (A.21). 
The iteration procedure taken can be executed in the following order: 
Step 1. Initialise ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ% and ŸO. 
Step 2. Solve ⁄ according to equation (A.20) and ÷ according to equation (A.22). 
Step 3. Update ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ% and ŸO according to equation (A.26), (A.27), (A.29), and (A.30), 
respectively.  
Step 4. Iterate over Steps 2 and 3 until convergence. 
• Simple Policy Rule Regime 
In the simple policy rule regime, the central bank is assumed to operate a simple policy rule 
in managing the policy instrument. Hence, no optimisation of policy instrument takes place 
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in this regime. The system of equations is an ordinary rational expectation model with a 
simple policy rule that present within the system. The solution of this regime is matrices ‘% 
and ‘O that constructs the evolution of ”! as follows  ”! = ‘%”!$% +‘O√! ,          (A.31) 
where  ”! = [	¡!B		¬!B]B,  is a vector that contains all endogenous variables and policy 
instrument. Finally, the loss value for this regime is evaluated using  
+2ññ =Ö/!(!)* ”!B»”!																																																								( . fú) 
where » is a welfare matrix.  
• Independent Simultaneous Regime 
This regime explains a situation when the central bank optimises two policy instruments 
simultaneously where each policy pursues different objective functions. Suppose there are 
two macro policies: monetary policy (b1) and quantitative easing policy (b2). The central 
bank is assumed to minimise loss function +2ññF% for monetary policy, and +2ññFO for 
quantitative easing policy with their formulas as follow +2ññF% = ,* ∑ /!(¡!B»¡! + ¬!B…%¬! + ¬«!B…O¬«!)(!)*          (A.33) +2ññFO = ,* ∑ /j!E¡!B»‹¡! + ¬!B…∆%¬! + ¬«!B…∆O¬«!G(!)*        (A.34) 
where » denotes the welfare matrix, …% denotes the weight for monetary policy instrument, 
and …O denotes the weight for quantitative easing policy instrument7.  
Under simultaneous movement, the solution method is to find matrix ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ%, ŸO, Ÿ∆% and Ÿ∆O such that ¡! = ‘%¡!$% +‘O√!     (A.35) ¬! = Ÿ%¡!$% + ŸO√!      (A.36) ¬«! = Ÿ∆%ë!$% + Ÿ∆OR! .      (A.37) 
Substituting equations (A.35) – (A.37) into the structural model form (A.2) gives a 
relationship as follow  ⁄¡! = µ%¡!$% + µ}¬! + µ∆}¬«! + µ√! ,    (A.38) 
where 
 
7 67 is the welfare matrix that quantitative easing pursues; 83/ is the weight on monetary policy instrument 
that quantitative easing policy assign on its loss function; 830 is the wright on quantitative easing instrument 
that quantitative easing policy sets on its own loss function. If the two authorities cooperate then 9 =93 , '/ = ':/ and '0 = ':0. 
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⁄ = µ* − µO‘% − µ~Ÿ% − µ∆~Ÿ∆%.         (A.39) 
Further, expressing the loss function (A.33) and (A.34) in terms of ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ%, ŸO, Ÿ∆% and Ÿ∆O using the equations (A.35) - (A.37) gives the equation of loss function as follow +2ññF% = (µ%¡!$% + µ}¬! + µ∆}¬«! + µ√!)′⁄B$%÷⁄$%(µ%¡!$% + µ}¬! + µ∆}¬«! +µ√!) + ¬!B…%¬! + ¬«!B…O¬«! + Ñ%$Ñ !§OEŸOB…%ŸO + Ÿ∆OB…OŸ∆O +‘O÷‘OG›P   (A.40) +2ññFO = (µ%¡!$% + µ}¬! + µ∆}¬«! + µ√!)′⁄B$%÷∆⁄$%(µ%¡!$% + µ}¬! + µ∆}¬«! +µ√!) + ¬!B…∆%¬! + ¬«!B…∆O¬«! + Ñ%$Ñ !§OEŸOB…∆%ŸO + Ÿ∆OB…∆OŸ∆O +‘O÷∆‘OG›P.   (A.41) 
where ÷ = »+ /(Ÿ%B…%Ÿ% + Ÿ∆%B…OŸ∆% +‘%B÷‘%)     (A.42) ÷∆ = »‹ + /EŸ%B…∆%Ÿ% + Ÿ∆%B…∆OŸ∆% +‘%B÷∆‘%G.      (A.43) 
Differentiating the two loss functions above with respect to ¬! will result C@bNN?#CÉ! = µ}B⁄B$%÷⁄$%(µ%¡!$% + µ}¬! + µ∆}¬«! + µ√!) + …%¬! = 0   (A.44) C@bNN?HCÉá! = µ∆}B⁄B$%÷∆⁄$%(µ%¡!$% + µ}¬! + µ∆}¬«! + µ√!) + …∆O¬! = 0   (A.45) 
Comparing (A.35) and (A.36) to the solution (A.44) and (A.45) gives solutions for fi%, fiO,	fij%,	fijO as follow l0 = −(a0 + _.Sm40nm40_V)40_.SmS40nm40(_0 + _A.lA0)   (A.46) l+ = −(a0 + _.Sm40nm40_.)40_.SmS40nm40(_U + _A.lA+)   (A.47) lA0 = −FaA+ + _A.Sm40nAm40_A.H40_A.SmS40nAm40_0    (A.48) lA+ = −FaA+ + _A.Sm40nAm40_A.H40_A.SmS40nAm40_U   (A.49) 
Furthermore, substituting (A.48) and (A.49) back to equation (A.38), respectively, gives the 
solution as follow ‘Ö = ⁄$%Eµ% + µ}Ÿ% + µ∆}Ÿ∆%G          (A.50) ‘O = ⁄$%Eµ + µ}ŸO + µ∆}Ÿ∆OG          (A.51) 
Given that the matrices l contains n, and vice versa, the iterative procedure can be taken to 
derive the converged solution. The iterative procedure can be taken using the following 
steps: 
Step 1. Initialise ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ%, ŸO, Ÿ∆% and Ÿ∆O. 
Step 2. Solve ⁄ according to equation (A.39), ÷ according to equation (A.42), and ÷∆ 
according to equation (A.43) 
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Step 3. Update ‘% according to (A.50); ‘O according to (A.51);	Ÿ% according to (A.46); ŸO 
according to (A.47) ; Ÿ∆% according to (A.48); Ÿ∆O according to (A.49) 
Step 4. Iterate over Steps 2 – 4 until convergence. 
Finally, given the known ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ%, ŸO, Ÿ∆% and Ÿ∆O, the evaluaton of loss value is conducted 
by substituting the known matrices into equations (A.57) and (A.58). 
• Independent Leadership Regime 
In this regime, the central bank assumes to optimise two different policy instruments 
sequentially. That is, one policy moves first after the other. The policy that moves earlier is 
called as a leader, while the policy moves after is called as a follower. The follower optimises 
by taking information on the policy instrument of the first mover. The loss function that the 
two policies pursue are not alike. Suppose the first policy pursues loss function (A.33) while 
the second policy pursues to minimise loss function (A.34). Suppose the leader’s policy 
instrument is ¬! and the follower’s policy instrument movement is ¬«!. Thus, the solution 
under this regime is the evolution of endogenous variables ¡! and policy instruments,  ¬! 
and ¬«!, such that ¡! = ‘%¡!$% +‘O√!     (A.52) ¬! = Ÿ%¡!$% + ŸO√!      (A.53) ¬«! = Ÿ∆%¡!$% + Ÿ∆O√! + ∑¬!     (A.54) 
where, as shown in equation (2.54), the policy instrument of the follower ¬«! is now defined 
as the function of the policy instrument of the leader ¬!. The matrix ∑ in equation (A.54) 
indicates a relationship between the two policy instruments. Substituting equation (A.52) – 
(A.54) into the structural form equation (A.2) gives the equation as follows: ⁄¡! = µ%¡!$% + µ}¬! + µ∆}¬«! + µ√! ,    (A.55) 
where ⁄ = µ* − µO‘% − µ~Ÿ% − µ∆~Ÿ∆% − µ∆~∑Ÿ%.    (A.56) 
 Furthermore, substituting the solution (A.52) – (A.54) to the loss functions (A.33) 
and (A.34) provides the loss functions expressed in terms of ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ%, ŸO, Ÿ∆%, Ÿ∆O and ∑ as 
follows: +2ññF% = ¡!B÷¡! + ¬!B…%¬! + ¬«!B…O¬«! + Ñ%$Ñ !§OEŸOB…%ŸO + (Ÿ∆OB + ∑ŸO)′…OEŸ∆O + ∑ŸOG +‘OB÷‘OG≈P   (A.57) +2ññFO = ¡!B÷∆¡! + ¬!B…∆%¬! + ¬«!B…∆O¬«! + Ñà%$Ñà !§OEŸOB…∆%fiO + (Ÿ∆OB + ∑ŸO)′…∆OEŸ∆O + ∑ŸOG +‘OB÷∆‘OG≈P,   (A.58) 
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where ÷ = »+ /EŸ%B…%Ÿ% + Ÿ∆%B…OŸ∆% +‘%B÷‘%G,    (A.59) ÷∆ = »‹ + /jEŸ%B…∆%Ÿ% + (l∆1, + \l1)…∆O(l∆1, + \l1) + ‘%B÷∆‘%G.   (A.60) 
Furthermore, differentiating equations (A.57) and (A.58) with respect to ¬! and ¬«!, 
respectively, gives  C@bNN?#CÉ! = (µ}+µ∆}∑)′⁄B$%÷⁄$%((µ% + µ∆}Ÿ∆%)	¡!$% + (µ} + µ∆}∑)¬! + (µ +µ∆}Ÿ∆O)√!) + …%¬! + ∑′…O(Ÿ∆%¡!$% + Ÿ∆O√! + ∑¬!) = ä,        (A.61) C@bNN?HCÉá! = µ∆}B⁄B$%÷∆⁄$%(µ%¡!$% + µ}U! + µ∆}¬«! + µ√!) + …∆O¬! = ä.     (A.62) 
Next, comparing equation (A.61) to the solution equation (A.53) results in the specification 
for Ÿ% and ŸO as follows: Ÿ% = −E…% + ∑B…O∑ + (µ} + µ∆}∑)′	⁄$%÷⁄$%((µ} + µ∆}∑)′G$% ×	(µ} + µ∆}∑)′⁄B$%÷⁄$%(µ% + µ∆}Ÿ∆%) + ∑′…OŸ∆%  (A.63) ŸO = −E…% + ∑B…O∑ + (µ} + µ∆}∑)′	⁄$%÷⁄$%((µ} + µ∆}∑)′G$% × (µ% + µ∆}∑)′⁄B$%÷⁄$%Eµ + µ∆}Ÿ∆OG + ∑′…OŸ∆O	.  (A.64) 
Furthermore, comparing equation (A.62) to the solution equation (A.54) results in the 
equations for Ÿ∆%, Ÿ∆O and ∑ as follows: Ÿ∆% = −E…∆O + µ∆}B⁄$%÷∆⁄$%µ∆}G$%µ∆}B⁄B$%÷∆⁄$%µ%,    (A.65) Ÿ∆O = −E…∆O + µ∆}B⁄$%÷∆⁄$%µ∆}G$%µ∆}B⁄B$%÷∆⁄$%µ,   (A.66) ∑ = −E…∆O + µ∆}B⁄$%÷∆⁄$%µ∆}G$%µ∆}B⁄B$%÷∆⁄$%µ}.      (A.67) 
Finally, substituting the equations (A.65) and (A.66) back to equation (A.55) will produce 
the equations of ‘% and ‘O as follows: ‘% = ⁄$%Eµ% + µ}Ÿ% + µ∆}Ÿ∆% + µ∆}∑Ÿ%G,     (A.68) ‘O = ⁄$%Eµ + µ}ŸO + µ∆}Ÿ∆O + µ∆}∑ŸOG.     (A.69) 
Given that the matrices Ÿ contains ÷, and vice versa, the iterative procedure can be taken to 
derive the converged solution. The iterative procedure can be taken in the following steps: 
Step 1. Initialise ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ%, ŸO, Ÿ∆%, Ÿ∆O and ∑. 
Step 2. Solve ⁄ according to equation (A.56), ÷ according to equation (A.59), and ÷∆ 
according to equation (A.60) 
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Step 3.  Update ‘% according to (A.68); ‘O according to (A.69);	Ÿ% according to (A.63); ŸO 
according to (A.64) ; Ÿ∆% according to (A.65); Ÿ∆O according to (A.66), and ∑ 
according to (A.67).  
Step 4. Iterate over steps 2 – 4 until convergence. 
Finally, given the known ‘%, ‘O, Ÿ%, ŸO, Ÿ∆%, Ÿ∆O and ∑, the evaluaton of loss value is 
conducted by substituting the known matrices into equations (A.57) and (A.58). 
• Cooperating Leadership Regime 
This regime explains a situation when a central bank implements two policies that pursue 
the identical objective function but one policy is optimized before the other. The algorithm 
in solving this regime is similar to that of the independent leadership regime, except now the 
loss function between the two policies is identical. Precisely, suppose the first policy 
minimizes loss function (A.33) and the second policy minimizes the loss function (A.34), 
the cooperation exists when » = »‹, …% = …∆%, and …O = …∆O. Accordingly, equation (A.52) 
to (A.69) are employed to derive the optimal solution for this regime. 
Solving the Optimal Simple Policy Rule Under Commitment 
The solution method used in this study follows the method to find the optimal simple policy 
rules in rational expectation model from Dennis (2004). The method introduces the 
algorithm to derive the optimal simple policy rule under two regimes: commitment and 
discretion regime. In commitment regime, the policymaker is assumed committed to the 
optimised simple rule in the first period and implement it in all subsequent periods. Hence, 
the policymaker never re-optimises the feedback coefficient in the rule throughout periods. 
On the contrary, under discretionary regime the policymaker is assumed to always optimise 
the rule period-by-period by assuming that the subsequent policymakers will also behave the 
same. This study only focuses on building the optimal simple rule under commitment. 
The algorithm on finding optimal simple rule is applied under the structural form of 
economy given by  µ*ë! = µ%ë!$% + µO,!¡!#% + µ}¬! + µ~,!¬!#% + µ√!	,																							( . hä)                          
where matrix µ*, µ%, µO, µ}, µ~ and 	µ contains the model structural parameters, ¡! is the 
vector of endogenous variables, ¬! denotes the vector of policy instrument, R! is the vector 
of stochastic disturbances where √!~). ). u. [0, ≈] and ≈ is the variance covariance matrix of 
structural shock. Ideally, if there are two policy instruments, the vector ¬! should contain 
two policy instruments. However, the development of simple rule in this study is only 
conducted for macroprudential policy instrument, such that only one policy instrument, i.e. 
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the credit injection ratio, lies in vector ¬! and ¬!#%. Suppose the simple rule is considered to 
be given in the following form ¬! = “%¡!$% +“O¡! +“},!¡!#% + =~√! ,																													( . hã) 
where ¬! denotes the policy instrument at period !, which is the the credit injection ratio in 
this study. Furthermore, “%-	“~ are the feedback coefficient in the simple rule which can be 
expressed as the set of free parameters “ = [“%	“O	“}	“~]. 
Under the commitment regime, the loss function is constructed in the following way 
+2ññ1; =Ö/![¡!B»¡! + ¬!B…¬!],(!)* 																																			( . hú)	 
where » is the welfare matrix and … is the weight matrix given to the policy instrument. 
Under this study, the welfare matrix is an ad-hoc loss function which contains the deviation 
of inflation, output and credit spread from their steady state. On the other hand, … is the 
weight given to the the credit injection ratio. Solving the pre-commitment regime involves 
combining the equation (A.70) and (A.71) into the form as follows n µ* −µ}−“O ‡ o -¡!¬!7 = nµ% ä“% äo -¡!$%¬!$%7 + nµO µ~“} ä o ,! -¡!#%¬!#%7 + nµ 0“~ 0o -√!0 7,								( . hf) 
which can be simplified into ·*”! = ·%”!$% + ·O,!”!#% + ·~Œ! ,																																			( . hç) 
where Œ! = [√!	ä]′ has variance-covariance matrix ≈. Solving equation (A.73) using the 
standard rational expectation solution method produces the solution as follow ”! = —%”!$% + —OŒ! ,																																																			( . há) 
where —% and —O contain the cross-equation restrictions implied by rational expectations. 
The simplification of ”! = [¡!B 		¬!B ]′ also affects the loss function, which now can be given 
as 
+2ññ1; =Ö/!(!)* ”!$%B »‹”!$%,																																												( . hâ) 
where »‹ = n» ää …o	.                  (A.77) 
Furthermore, combining equation (A.75) and (A.76) gives the formula of loss function in 
terms of the set of free parameters “, which is given by 
+2ññ1;(“) =ÖÆ/0”!$%B —%B0A∆—%0”!$% +Ö/3#%!§E—OB —%B0»‹—%0—O≈G(3)0 ∞(0)* ,															( . hï) 
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where for / lies between 0 and 1, it ensures the geometric sums in equation (A.78) converges 
and the recursive equilibrium law motion equation (A.80) is stable. Next, equation (A.78) 
can be further simplified into  +2ññ1;(“) = ”!$%B ÷”!$% + /(1 − /) !§[—OB÷—O≈],																									( . hà) 
where P is the fix point of ÷ = »‹+ /—%B÷—%																																																									( . ïä) 
and ”! is the initial state of the economy, where it is assumed as the deviation of endogenous 
variables from their steady states. The computation steps to solve for optimal simple pre-
commitment rules can be arranged as follows: 
Step 1. The initial values for the free parameters in “ = [“%	“O	“}	“~] are chosen.  
Step 2. Given “,	the —% and —O are solved using the standard rational expectation solution 
method. 
Step 3. Given —% and —O, the loss function +2ññ1;(“) is then evaluated according to equation 
(2.78). 
Step 4. The values of free parameters = are then searched numerically to find the smallest 
possible loss +2ññ1;(“). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
This appendix provides the complete set of equation used for the simulation in chapter 3 and 
chapter 4. This set of equations is adopted from the original dynare code of the reference 
model Gertler and Karadi (2011).  
HOUSEHOLD 
1. Marginal utility of consumption (D!) D! = (*! − ℎ*!$%)$% − /ℎ,!(*!#% − ℎ*!)$%,          (B.1) 
2. Real interest rate on deposit (C!) C! = 1/F!,!#% 																																																														(‚. ú) 
3. Stochastic discount rate (F!,Å#%) 
F!,!#% ≡ ,(D!#%)D! 																																																												(‚. f) 
4. Labor market equilibrium (+!) +!' = (1 − a)D!b=!]!; 																																																						(‚. ç) 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
5. Value of banks’ capital (R!) R! = ,!T(1 − ')/F!,!#%,(C3!#% − C!) + '/F!,!#%U!,!#%,(R!#%)V   (B.5) 
6. Value of banks’ net wealth (S!) S! = (1 − ') + /F!,!#%'W!#%,(S!#%)     (B.6) 
7. Optimal Leverage ([!) [! = 7!(8$9!)(%$:!)             (B.7) 
 
8. Growth rate of banks’ capital (W!,!#%) W!,!#% = ,(C3!#% − C!)(1 − M!)[! + C!                             (B.8) 
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9. Growth of banks’ net wealth (U!,!#%) U!,!#% = ,(5!"#6!"#)5!6! = 0,(<!"#)<! 5 W!,!#%     (B.9) 
10. Aggregate capital (Credit) (\!) \! = [!K!I! 																																																											(‚. ãä) 
11. Bank Net worth (K!) K! = K!f + K!L        (B.11) 
12. Existing banks net worth accumulation (K!f) K!f = 'W!K!s!4        (B.12) 
13. New banks’ net worth (K!L) K!L = „(1 − M!$%)I!`!\!$%    (B.13) 
INTERMEDIATE GOOD PRODUCERS 
14. Return to Capital (C3!) C3! = F$!>?$!H!&#5!&# + K!5!&# EI! − c(_!)G	                     (B.14) 
15. Production function (]=!) ]=! = ^!(_!`!\!$%)>+!%$> 	              (B.15) 
CAPITAL GOODS PRODUCER 
16. Capital price (o2) 
'* = 1 + h+2 + ,,* + ,--,,*./ + ,-- − 1.0 + h+ + ,,* + ,--,,*./ + ,-- − 1.+ ,,* + ,--,,*./ + ,--. −,! n/F!,!#%h" 0,(M'!"#)#M))M'!#M)) − 15 0,(M'!"#)#M))M'!#M)) 5Oo       
 (B.16) 
17. Depreciation rate (c(_!)) c(_!) = c; + eE1 + d _!(%#D)																																											(‚. ãh) 
18. Optimal capacity utilization rate (_!) _!(%#7) = b=!a]=!eE`!\!$% 																																																			(‚. ãï) 
 217 
19. Net investment (lL!) lL! ≡ l! − c(_!)`!\!$%     (B.19) 
20. Investment (l!) l! = \! − \!$%`!(1 − c(_!)).          (B.20) 
GOVERNMENT 
21. Government consumption (y!)  y! = yNN           (B.21) 
EQUILIBRIUM 
22. Total output (]!) ]! = *! + l! + y! + zM!I!\! + ( M'!#M))M'!&##M)) − 1)O(lL! + lNN)       (B.22) 
24. Price dispersion (±!) ±! = ]=!]! 																																																												(‚. úf) 
25. Intermediate goods price (b=!) b=! = 1*! 																																																											(‚. úç) 
26. Optimal price choice I (fi!) fi! = ]!b=! + /vF!,!#%,(x!#%R )x!$RT6,(fi!#%)           (B.25) 
 
27. Optimal price choice II (‰!) ‰! = ]! + /vF!,!#%,0x!#%(R$%)5x!T6(%$R),(‰!#%)           (B.26) 
28. Optimal price choice III (x!∗) 	x!∗ = 0 RR$%5 0J!â!5 x!                                               (B.27) 
29. Price Index (x!) 	x!(%$R) = vx!$%T6(%$R) + (1 − v)x!∗(%$R)           (B.28) 
30. Nominal interest rate (CL!) CL! = C!,!(x!#%)	            (B.29) 
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31. Marginal cost (*!) 
Â *!0 ss − 15Ê
ä@ = p /x!äGrp CL!CL!$%ã r
%%$ã 																																						(‚. fä) 
32. Credit injection ratio (M!) M! = M + }E123(C3!#%) − 123(C!) − (123C3 − 123C)G	+ !!"	,    (B.31) 
EXOGENOUS SHOCK 
33. TFP Shock (^!) ^! = 0.95^!$% + å!]																																				               (B.32) 
34. Capital quality shock (`!) `! = 0.66`!$% + å!H ,																																			         (B.33) 
35. Government expenditure shock (s!å) s!å = 0.66s!$%å + å!å 																																																				(‚. fç) 
35. Monetary policy shock (s!") s!" = å!" 																																		                (B.35) 
36. Credit policy shock (s!6) s!6 = 0.66s!$%6 + å!6																																		  (B.36) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
This appendix provides the complete set of equation used for the simulation in chapter 3. 
The reference model used in these two chapters is the one from Gerali, Nerri, Panetta, and 
Signoretti (2010). This set of equations is derived from the original dynare code of the 
reference model. 
PATIENT HOUSEHOLDS 
1. Patient household’s consumption (è!1) X!1Eè!1 − †1è!$%1 G = (1 − †1)s!g       (C.1) 
2. Housing demand from patient household Eℎ!1G 
ℎ!1 = Ls!aX!1°!a + /1,!(X!#%1 °!#%a )	 																																					(Á. ú) 
3. First order condition of patient household’s deposit (X!1) 
X!1 = /1,!EX!#%1 G (1 + §!h),!(x!#%)																																																			(Á. f) 
4. Patient households’ labor supply (1!1) 
E1 − s!lG1!1 = − 1!1(%#<)s!l£!1X!1 + <YEx!` 1 − x!$%"` x(%$"`)Gx!` 1− /1 ,EX!#%1 GX!1 <YE,!Ex!#%`1 G− x!"`x(%$"`)G ,!Ex!#%`1 GO,!(x!#%) 																																																																																(Á. ç) 
5. Patient household’s wage inflation (x!çF) 
x!` 1 = £!1£!$%1 x!																																																									(Á. á) 
6. Dividend (•C!) •C!v1 = è!1 + °!aEℎ!1 − ℎ!$%1 G + u!1 −£!11!1 − E1 + §!$%h G u!$%1x! 												(Á. â) 
 
 
 220 
IMPATIENT HOUSEHOLDS 
7. Impatient households’ consumption (è!") X!" Eè!" − †"è!$%" G = E1 − †"Gs!g																																								(Á. h) 
8. First order condition of impatient household’s borrowing (X!" ) 
X!" = ñ"!E1 + §!iaG + /",!X!#%" E1 + §!iaG,!x!#% 																													(Á. ï) 
9. Impatient households’ labor supply (1!") 
E1 − s!lG1!" = − 1!"(%#<)s!l£!"X!" + <YEx!` " − x!$%Z5 x(%$Z5)Gx!` "− /1 ,!EX!#%" GX!" <YE,!Ex!#%`" G− x!Z5x(%$Z5)G ,!Ex!#%`" GO,!(x!#%) 																																																																																(Á. à) 
10. Impatient household’s wage inflation (x!` ") 
x!` " = £!"£!$%" x!																																																								(Á. ãä) 
11. Housing demand by impatient households (ℎ!") 
°!aEℎ!" − ℎ!$%" G = ¶!" +£!"1!" − è!" − E1 + §!$%i G ¶!$%"x! 																			(Á. ãã) 
12. Demand for loan by impatient households (¶!") E1 + §!iaG¶!" = +?N!k,!E°!#%a Gℎ!",!(x!#%)																														(Á. ãú) 
13. Impatient household multiplier on borrowing constant (ñ"!) 
ñ"!+?N!k,!°!#%a x!#% 	= X!"°!a − /",!X!#%" °!#%a − L s!aℎ!" 																					(Á. ãf) 
CAPITAL PRODUCERS 
14. Capital accumulation (\!) 
\! = (1 − cH)\!$% + ¨1 − }"2 pl!s!d3l!$% − 1rO≠ l!																			(Á. ãç) 
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15. Investment (l!) 
Â1 − }"2 pl!s!d3l!$% − 1rO − }" pl!s!d3l!$% − 1rpl!s!d3l!$% rÊ
+ /f í,(X!#%)X! ì p,(°!#%3 )°!3 r}" pl!#%(,(s!#%d3 ))l! − 1r,!(s!#%d3 ) í,(l!#%)l! ìO= 1°!3 																																																																																																																																														(Á. ãá) 
ENTREPRENEURS 
16. Consumption for entrepreneurs (è!f) X!fEè!f − †"è!$%f G = E1 − †"G																																													(Á. ãâ) 
17. First order condition: (ñf!) ñf!+?N!f,!E°!#%3 x!#%G(1 − c3)= −/f,!(X!#%f ) p,!(°!#%3 )(1 − c3) + ,!(§!#%3 ),(™!#%)
+ 0s%(,!(™!#%) − 1) + sO2 (,!(™!#%) − 1)O5r + X!f+ °!3 																																																																																																																				(Á. ãh) 
18. Wage of patient households (£!1) £!1 = S"(1 − a) ë!fE1!1h™!G																																																(Á. ãï) 
19. Wage of impatient households (£!") £!" = (1 − S")(1 − a) ë!fE1!"hU!G																																									(Á. ãà) 
20. First order condition of entrepreneur’s borrowing (X!f) 
X!f = /f,!(X!#%f ) E1 + §!ifG,!(x!#%) + ñf!E1 + §!ifG																										(Á. úä) 
21. Utilization rate (™!) sO(™! − 1) = E§!3 − s%G																																											(Á. úã) 
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22. Effective capital (U!) ë!fU! = è!f + E1 + §!$%if G ¶!$%ffx! +£!11!1h +£!"1!"h + 0s%(™! − 1) + sO2 (™! − 1)O5 ©!$%f − ¶!ff− °!3E(1 − c3)©!$%f− ©!fG																																																																																																																		(Á. úú) 
23. Production technology (ë!f) ë!f = ^!f(™!©!$%f )> 0E1!1G7(E1!"G(%$7()5%$> 																							(Á. úf) 
24. Entrepreneur borrowing in branch (¶!ff) E1 + §!$%if G¶!ff = +?Nf!,!(°!#%3 x!#%)©!f(1 − c3)																(Á. úç) 
25. Return on capital (§!3) 
§!3 = a^!f™!(>$%)©!f(>$%)©!$%f(>$%) ¨E1!1G7(E1!"G%$7(U! ≠(%$>) 										(Á. úá) 
26. Capital price E°!3G 
°!3 = 1(©! − (1 − c3)©!$%) Ë]! − *!
− Â0s%(™! − 1) + sO2 (,!(™!#%) − 1)O	5 + }12 Ex! − x!$%MF x≥ (%$Z6)GO]!
+ }h2 p§!$%h§!$Oh − 1rO §!$%h u!$%i + }if2 p§!$%if§!$Oif − 1rO §!$%if ¶!$%f+ }ia2 p§!$%ia§!$Oia
− 1rO §!$%ia ¶!$%a ÊÈ																																																																																										(Á. úâ) 
BANKS 
26. Wholesale banking interest rate (C!	i) 
C!	i = −}HA p\!i>! − *^C!rp\!i>! rO + §!"i																											(Á. úh) 
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27. Accumulation of bank capital (\!	i) 
\!	ix! = (1 − cHA) \!$%is!HA + •>!$%																																	(Á. úï) 
28. Deposit of patient household Eu!1G v1u!F = viu!i																																																					(Á. úà) 
29. Loan for impatient households in branch E¶!aG vi¶!a = v"¶!" 																																																						(Á. fä) 
30. Aggregate loan for entrepreneurs (¶!f) vi¶!f = vf¶!ff 																																																				(Á. fã) 
31. Aggregate deposit in banking system Eu!iG uiu!i + \i\!i = ¶a¶!a + ¶f¶!f 																																							(Á. fú) 
32. FOC deposit branch: deposit interest rate (§!h)  
−1 + p s!os!$%o − 1r − p s!os!$%o − 1rp§!"i§!h r − }h p §!h§!$%h − p§!$%h§!$Oh rmIrp §!h§!$%h r+ /1,! pX!#%1X!1 r }h p§!#%h§!h − p §!h§!$%h rmIrp§!#%h§!h rO pu!#%iu!i r= 0																																																																																																																					(Á. ff) 
33. FOC loan branch: loan interest rate for entrepreneurs (§!if) 
1 + p s!ifs!$%if − 1r − p s!ifs!$%if − 1rpC!i§!ifr − }if p§!if§!$%if − p§!$%if§!$Oif rmADrp§!if§!$%if r+ /1,! pX!#%1X!1 r }if p§!#%if§!if − p§!if§!$%if rmADrp§!#%if§!if rO p¶!#%f¶!f r= 0																																																																																																																				(Á. fç) 
34. FOC loan branch: loan interest rate for impatient households (§!ia) 
1 + p s!ias!$%ia − 1r − p s!ias!$%ia − 1rpC!i§!iar − }if p§!ia§!$%ia − p§!$%ia§!$Oia rmABrp§!ia§!$%ia r+ /1,! pX!#%1X!1 r }ia p§!#%ia§!ia − p§!ia§!$%ia rmABrp§!#%ia§!iarO p¶!#%a¶!a r= 0																																																																																																																			(Á. fá) 
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35. Overall bank profits (•>!) 
•>! = §!ia¶!a + §!if¶!f − §!hu!i − }h2 p §!h§!$%h − 1rO §!hu!i − }if2 p§!if§!$%if − 1rO §!if¶!f− }ia2 p§!ia§!$%ia − 1rO §!ia¶!a− }3i2 p\!i>! − *^C!rO \!i																																																																														(Á. fâ) 
RETAILERS 
36. Aggregate retail profits (•C!) 
•C! = ]! í1 − 1U! − }12 x! − x!$%m? xm?ìO 																										(Á. fh) 
37. New Keynesian Phillips curve (x!) }1Ex! − x!$%m? x≥ (%$m?)Gx!= 1 − s!V + s!VU!− /F,! p(X!#%F )X!F }1Ex!#%− x!$%m? x≥ (%$m?)Gx!#% (ë!#%)ë! r																																																																								(Á. fï) 
AGGREGATION AND EQUILIBRIUM 
38. Aggregate consumption (*!) *! = v1è!1 + v"è!" + vfè!f 																																											(Á. fà) 
39. Aggregate loan for households (>!k) >!k = vi¶!a																																																										(Á. çä) 
 
40. Aggregate loan for entrepreneurs (>!,) >!, = vi¶!f 																																																											(Á. çã) 
41. Aggregate loan (>!) >! = >!k + >!, 																																																					(Á. çú) 
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42. Aggregate deposit (±!) ±! = v1u!1																																																											(Á. çf) 
43. Aggregate output (]!) ]! = vfë!f 																																																											(Á. çç) 
44. Individual bank’s profit (L¶!) viL¶! = •>!																																																									(Á. çá) 
45. Aggregate labor from patient households by labor union (+!Fo) vf1!Fo = v11!1																																																						(Á. çâ) 
46. Aggregate labor from impatient households by labor union (+!Mo) vf1!Mo = v"1!" 																																																						(Á. çh) 
47. Total housing purchased (ℎ!) ℎ! = v1ℎ!1 + v"ℎ!" 																																																	(Á. çï) 
48. Entrepreneurs’ capital purchased (©!f) vf©!f = \!																																																									(Á. çà) 
49. Output gap E]Í!G ]Í! = *! + (\! − (1 − c3))\!$%																																				(Á. áä) 
50. Aggregate wage inflation (x!ç) 
x!ç = p E£!F +£!"GE£!$%F +£!$%" Grx!																																													(Á. áã) 
TAYLOR RULE  
51. Taylor rule, nominal interest rate E§!"iG 
E1 + §!"iG = E1 + §NN"iG%$ã(AE1 + §!$%"i Gã(A ¨í x!xNNì<G p ]Í!]Í!$%r<J≠%$ã(A E1 + s!q(AG			(Á. áú) 
52. Interest rate for loan of entrepreneurs (§!f) 
§!f = X!f − /fX!#%f E1 + §!ifG,!(x!#%) 																																												(Á. áf) 
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53. Loan to output ratio (g!) g! = >!]! 																																																									(Á. áç) 
54. Margin rate of the wholesale bank (¶!=) 
¶!= = p ¶!$%a¶!$%a + ¶!$%f r §!$%ia + p ¶!$%f¶!$%a + ¶!$%f r §!$%if − §!$%h 														(Á. áá) 
55. Interest rate spread EJbC!iG JbC!i = 12 E§!ia + §!ifG − §!h 																																								(Á. áâ) 
EXOGENOUS PROCESSES 
56. Shock on consumption (s!g) s!g = {RKs!$%g + é!g																																																				(Á. áh) 
57. Shock on technology (^!f) ^!f = {]D^!$%f + é!]																																																	(Á. áï) 
58. Shock on housing demand Es!aG s!a = {RBs!$%a + é!RB 																																																			(Á. áà) 
59. Shock on markup on deposit rate Eü©!hG s!o = {RBs!$%o + é!o																																																	(Á. âä) 
60. Shock on markup on lending rate for entrepreneurs Eü©!ifG s!if = {RADs!$%if + é!if 																																															(Á. âã) 
61. Shock on markup on lending rate for impatient households Es!iaG s!ia = {RABs!$%ia + é!ia																																															(Á. âú) 
62. Shock on capital price Es!d3G s!d3 = {RL7s!$%d3 + åRL7 																																															(Á. âf) 
63. Shock on output Es!VG s!V = {R@s!$%V + åR@ 																																																		(Á. âç) 
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64. Shock on labor demand Es!lG s!l = {RMs!$%l + åRM 																																																				(Á. âá) 
65. Shock on banking capital 0s!HA5 
s!HA = {RNAs!HA + åRNA 																																															(Á. ââ) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
